Search for packages
| purl | pkg:composer/flarum/core@1.6.1 |
| Next non-vulnerable version | 1.8.10 |
| Latest non-vulnerable version | 2.0.0-rc.1 |
| Risk |
| Vulnerability | Summary | Fixed by |
|---|---|---|
|
VCID-1dh3-wkp4-8kdm
Aliases: CVE-2022-41938 GHSA-7x4w-j98p-854x |
Cross site scripting vulnerability with discussion titles Flarum's page title system allowed for page titles to be converted into HTML DOM nodes when pages were rendered. The change was made after `v1.5` and was not noticed. This allowed an attacker to inject malicious HTML markup using a discussion title input, either by creating a new discussion or renaming one. The XSS attack occurs after a visitor opens the relevant discussion page. ### Impact All communities running Flarum from `v1.5.0` to `v1.6.1` are impacted. ### Patches The vulnerability has been fixed and published as flarum/core `v1.6.2`. All communities running Flarum from `v1.5.0` to `v1.6.1` have to upgrade as soon as possible to v1.6.2 using: ``` composer update --prefer-dist --no-dev -a -W ``` You can then confirm you run the latest version using: ``` composer show flarum/core ``` ### Workarounds **None** ### For more information For any questions or comments on this vulnerability please visit https://discuss.flarum.org/d/27558. For support questions create a discussion at https://discuss.flarum.org/t/support. A reminder that if you ever become aware of a security issue in Flarum, please report it to us privately by emailing [security@flarum.org](mailto:security@flarum.org), and we will address it promptly. |
Affected by 6 other vulnerabilities. |
|
VCID-9k8r-76x9-qucw
Aliases: CVE-2023-22488 GHSA-8gcg-vwmw-rxj4 GMS-2023-10 |
Flarum notifications can leak restricted content Using the notifications feature, one can read restricted/private content and bypass access checks that would be in place for such content. The notification-sending component does not check that the subject of the notification can be seen by the receiver, and proceeds to send notifications through their different channels. The alerts do not leak data despite this as they are listed based on a visibility check, however, emails are still sent out. This means that, for extensions which restrict access to posts, any actor can bypass the restriction by subscribing to the discussion if the [*Subscriptions*](https://extiverse.com/extension/flarum/subscriptions) extension is enabled. ### Impact The attack allows the leaking of some posts in the forum database, including posts awaiting approval, posts in tags the user has no access to if they could subscribe to a discussion before it becomes private, and posts restricted by third-party extensions. Other leaks could also happen for different notification subjects if some features allowed to receive specific types of notifications for restricted content. All Flarum versions prior to v1.6.3 are affected. ### Patches The vulnerability has been fixed and published as flarum/core v1.6.3. All communities running Flarum should upgrade as soon as possible to v1.6.3 using: ``` composer update --prefer-dist --no-dev -a -W ``` You can then confirm you run the latest version using: ``` composer show flarum/core ``` ### Workarounds Disable the Flarum Subscriptions extension or disable email notifications altogether. **There is no other supported workaround for this issue for Flarum versions below 1.6.3.** ### For more information For any questions or comments on this vulnerability please visit https://discuss.flarum.org/ For support questions create a discussion at https://discuss.flarum.org/t/support. A reminder that if you ever become aware of a security issue in Flarum, please report it to us privately by emailing [security@flarum.org](mailto:security@flarum.org), and we will address it promptly. |
Affected by 4 other vulnerabilities. |
|
VCID-akuy-drq1-hkap
Aliases: CVE-2024-21641 GHSA-733r-8xcp-w9mr |
Flarum's logout Route allows open redirects The Flarum `/logout` route includes a redirect parameter that allows any third party to redirect users from a (trusted) domain of the Flarum installation to redirect to any link. Sample: `example.com/logout?return=https://google.com`. For logged-in users, the logout must be confirmed. Guests are immediately redirected. This could be used by spammers to redirect to a web address using a trusted domain of a running Flarum installation. Some ecosystem extensions modifying the logout route have already been affected. Sample: https://discuss.flarum.org/d/22229-premium-wordpress-integration/526 |
Affected by 1 other vulnerability. |
|
VCID-en38-mx5t-vbb9
Aliases: CVE-2023-27577 GHSA-vhm8-wwrf-3gcw |
Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') flarum is a forum software package for building communities. In versions prior to 1.7.0 an admin account which has already been compromised by an attacker may use a vulnerability in the `LESS` parser which can be exploited to read sensitive files on the server through the use of path traversal techniques. An attacker can achieve this by providing an absolute path to a sensitive file in the custom `LESS` setting, which the `LESS` parser will then read. For example, an attacker could use the following code to read the contents of the `/etc/passwd` file on a linux machine. The scope of what files is vulnerable will depend on the permissions given to the running flarum process. The vulnerability has been addressed in version `1.7`. Users should upgrade to this version to mitigate the vulnerability. Users unable to upgrade may mitigate the vulnerability by ensuring that their admin accounts are secured with strong passwords and follow other best practices for account security. Additionally, users can limit the exposure of sensitive files on the server by implementing appropriate file permissions and access controls at the operating system level. |
Affected by 3 other vulnerabilities. |
|
VCID-rv1d-9z9z-xuh2
Aliases: CVE-2023-22487 GHSA-22m9-m3ww-53h3 GMS-2023-12 |
Flarum post mentions can be used to read any post on the forum without access control Using the mentions feature provided by the flarum/mentions extension, users can mention any post ID on the forum with the special `@"<username>"#p<id>` syntax. The following behavior never changes no matter if the actor should be able to read the mentioned post or not: A URL to the mentioned post is inserted into the actor post HTML, leaking its discussion ID and post number. The `mentionsPosts` relationship included in the `POST /api/posts` and `PATCH /api/posts/<id>` JSON responses leaks the full JSON:API payload of all mentioned posts without any access control. This includes the content, date, number and attributes added by other extensions. An attacker only needs the ability to create new posts on the forum to exploit the vulnerability. This works even if new posts require approval. If they have the ability to edit posts, the attack can be performed even more discreetly by using a single post to scan any size of database and hiding the attack post content afterward. ### Impact The attack allows the leaking of all posts in the forum database, including posts awaiting approval, posts in tags the user has no access to, and private discussions created by other extensions like FriendsOfFlarum Byobu. This also includes non-comment posts like tag changes or renaming events. The discussion payload is not leaked but using the mention HTML payload it's possible to extract the discussion ID of all posts and combine all posts back together into their original discussions even if the discussion title remains unknown. All Flarum versions prior to `v1.6.3` are affected. ### Patches The vulnerability has been fixed and published as flarum/core v1.6.3. All communities running Flarum have to upgrade as soon as possible to v1.6.3 using: ``` composer update --prefer-dist --no-dev -a -W ``` You can then confirm you run the latest version using: ``` composer show flarum/core ``` ### Workarounds Disable the mentions extension. ### For more information For any questions or comments on this vulnerability please visit https://discuss.flarum.org/ For support questions create a discussion at https://discuss.flarum.org/t/support. A reminder that if you ever become aware of a security issue in Flarum, please report it to us privately by emailing [security@flarum.org](mailto:security@flarum.org), and we will address it promptly. |
Affected by 4 other vulnerabilities. |
|
VCID-vthb-u9cs-ckak
Aliases: CVE-2025-27794 GHSA-hg9j-64wp-m9px |
Flarum Vulnerable to Session Hijacking via Authoritative Subdomain Cookie Overwrite A session hijacking vulnerability exists when an attacker-controlled **authoritative subdomain** under a parent domain (e.g., `subdomain.host.com`) sets cookies scoped to the parent domain (`.host.com`). This allows session token replacement for applications hosted on sibling subdomains (e.g., `community.host.com`) if session tokens aren't rotated post-authentication. **Key Constraints**: - Attacker must control **any subdomain** under the parent domain (e.g., `evil.host.com` or `x.y.host.com`). - Parent domain must **not** be on the [Public Suffix List](https://publicsuffix.org/). Due to non-existent session token rotation after authenticating we can theoretically reproduce the vulnerability by using browser dev tools, but due to the browser's security measures this does not seem to be exploitable as described. --- |
Affected by 0 other vulnerabilities. Affected by 0 other vulnerabilities. |
|
VCID-wdcn-hjun-vuaq
Aliases: CVE-2023-22489 GHSA-hph3-hv3c-7725 GMS-2023-11 |
Any Flarum user including unactivated can reply in public discussions whose first post was permanently deleted If the first post of a discussion is permanently deleted but the discussion stays visible, any actor who can view the discussion is able to create a new reply via the REST API, no matter the reply permission or lock status. This includes users that don't have a validated email. Guests cannot successfully create a reply because the API will fail with a 500 error when the user ID 0 is inserted into the database. This should also be fixed to return the expected 401/403 status. This happens because when the first post of a discussion is permanently deleted, the `first_post_id` attribute of the discussion becomes `null` which causes access control to be skipped for all new replies. Flarum automatically makes discussions with zero comments invisible so an additional condition for this vulnerability is that the discussion must have at least one approved reply so that `discussions.comment_count` is still above zero after the post deletion. ### Impact This can open the discussion to uncontrolled spam or just unintentional replies if users still had their tab open before the vulnerable discussion was locked and then post a reply when they shouldn't be able to. In combination with the email notification settings, this could also be used as a way to send unsolicited emails. Versions between `v1.3.0` and `v1.6.3` are impacted. ### Patches The vulnerability has been fixed and published as flarum/core v1.6.3. All communities running Flarum should upgrade as soon as possible to v1.6.3 using: ``` composer update --prefer-dist --no-dev -a -W ``` You can then confirm you run the latest version using: ``` composer show flarum/core ``` ### Workarounds If you don't delete the first posts you are not affected. A workaround can be to delete the discussion itself, or amend the database to manually set a `first_post_id`. ### For more information For any questions or comments on this vulnerability please visit https://discuss.flarum.org/ For support questions create a discussion at https://discuss.flarum.org/t/support. A reminder that if you ever become aware of a security issue in Flarum, please report it to us privately by emailing [security@flarum.org](mailto:security@flarum.org), and we will address it promptly. |
Affected by 6 other vulnerabilities. Affected by 4 other vulnerabilities. |
|
VCID-yapt-ka6b-f3ba
Aliases: CVE-2023-40033 GHSA-67c6-q4j4-hccg |
Flarum is an open source forum software. Flarum is affected by a vulnerability that allows an attacker to conduct a Blind Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attack or disclose any file on the server, even with a basic user account on any Flarum forum. By uploading a file containing a URL and spoofing the MIME type, an attacker can manipulate the application to execute unintended actions. The vulnerability is due to the behavior of the `intervention/image` package, which attempts to interpret the supplied file contents as a URL, which then fetches its contents. This allows an attacker to exploit the vulnerability to perform SSRF attacks, disclose local file contents, or conduct a blind oracle attack. This has been patched in Flarum version 1.8.0. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade may disable PHP's `allow_url_fopen` which will prevent the fetching of external files via URLs as a temporary workaround for the SSRF aspect of the vulnerability. |
Affected by 2 other vulnerabilities. |
| Vulnerability | Summary | Aliases |
|---|---|---|
| This package is not known to fix vulnerabilities. | ||