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| purl | pkg:composer/symfony/symfony@5.4.46 |
| Vulnerability | Summary | Fixed by |
|---|---|---|
|
VCID-kgu6-gj5d-7bfx
Aliases: CVE-2026-24739 GHSA-r39x-jcww-82v6 |
Symfony's incorrect argument escaping under MSYS2/Git Bash can lead to destructive file operations on Windows ### Summary The Symfony Process component did not correctly treat some characters (notably `=`) as “special” when escaping arguments on Windows. When PHP is executed from an MSYS2-based environment (e.g. Git Bash) and Symfony Process spawns native Windows executables, MSYS2’s argument/path conversion can mishandle unquoted arguments containing these characters. This can cause the spawned process to receive corrupted/truncated arguments compared to what Symfony intended. ### Impact If an application (or tooling such as Composer scripts) uses Symfony Process to invoke file-management commands (e.g. `rmdir`, `del`, etc.) with a path argument containing `=`, the MSYS2 conversion layer may alter the argument at runtime. In affected setups this can result in operations being performed on an unintended path, up to and including deletion of the contents of a broader directory or drive. The issue is particularly relevant when untrusted input can influence process arguments (directly or indirectly, e.g. via repository paths, extracted archive paths, temporary directories, or user-controlled configuration). ### Resolution Upgrade to a Symfony release that includes the fix from symfony/symfony#63164 (which updates Windows argument escaping to ensure arguments containing = and other MSYS2-sensitive characters are properly quoted/escaped). The patch for branch 5.4 is available at https://github.com/symfony/symfony/commit/ec154f6f95f8c60f831998ec4d246a857e9d179b ### Workarounds / Mitigations Avoid running PHP/your tooling from MSYS2-based shells on Windows; prefer cmd.exe or PowerShell for workflows that spawn native executables. Avoid passing paths containing `=` (and similar MSYS2-sensitive characters) to Symfony Process when operating under Git Bash/MSYS2. Where applicable, configure MSYS2 to disable or restrict argument conversion (e.g. via `MSYS2_ARG_CONV_EXCL`), understanding this may affect other tooling behavior. |
Affected by 0 other vulnerabilities. Affected by 0 other vulnerabilities. Affected by 0 other vulnerabilities. Affected by 0 other vulnerabilities. Affected by 0 other vulnerabilities. Affected by 0 other vulnerabilities. Affected by 0 other vulnerabilities. Affected by 0 other vulnerabilities. Affected by 0 other vulnerabilities. |
|
VCID-p1dw-w76f-gbfv
Aliases: CVE-2025-64500 GHSA-3rg7-wf37-54rm |
Symfony's incorrect parsing of PATH_INFO can lead to limited authorization bypass The `Request` class improperly interprets some `PATH_INFO` in a way that leads to representing some URLs with a path that doesn't start with a `/`. This can allow bypassing some access control rules that are built with this `/`-prefix assumption. |
Affected by 1 other vulnerability. Affected by 0 other vulnerabilities. Affected by 1 other vulnerability. Affected by 0 other vulnerabilities. Affected by 1 other vulnerability. Affected by 0 other vulnerabilities. |
| Vulnerability | Summary | Aliases |
|---|---|---|
| VCID-4num-z8cg-83gt | Symfony vulnerable to command execution hijack on Windows with Process class ### Description On Windows, when an executable file named `cmd.exe` is located in the current working directory it will be called by the `Process` class when preparing command arguments, leading to possible hijacking. ### Resolution The `Process` class now uses the absolute path to `cmd.exe`. The patch for this issue is available [here](https://github.com/symfony/symfony/commit/18ecd03eda3917fdf901a48e72518f911c64a1c9) for branch 5.4. ### Credits We would like to thank Jordi Boggiano for reporting the issue and Nicolas Grekas for providing the fix. |
CVE-2024-51736
GHSA-qq5c-677p-737q |
| VCID-9bzz-84cq-ykh2 | Symfony vulnerable to open redirect via browser-sanitized URLs ### Description The `Request` class, does not parse URI with special characters the same way browsers do. As a result, an attacker can trick a validator relying on the `Request` class to redirect users to another domain. ### Resolution The `Request::create` methods now assert the URI does not contain invalid characters as defined by https://url.spec.whatwg.org/ The patch for this issue is available [here](https://github.com/symfony/symfony/commit/5a9b08e5740af795854b1b639b7d45b9cbfe8819) for branch 5.4. ### Credits We would like to thank Sam Mush - IPASSLab && ZGC Lab for reporting the issue and Nicolas Grekas for providing the fix. |
CVE-2024-50345
GHSA-mrqx-rp3w-jpjp |
| VCID-en6a-wp7q-fbfs | Symfony allows changing the environment through a query ### Description When the `register_argc_argv` php directive is set to `on` , and users call any URL with a special crafted query string, they are able to change the environment or debug mode used by the kernel when handling the request. ### Resolution The `SymfonyRuntime` now ignores the `argv` values for non-cli SAPIs PHP runtimes The patch for this issue is available [here](https://github.com/symfony/symfony/commit/a77b308c3f179ed7c8a8bc295f82b2d6ee3493fa) for branch 5.4. ### Credits We would like to thank Vladimir Dusheyko for reporting the issue and Wouter de Jong for providing the fix. |
CVE-2024-50340
GHSA-x8vp-gf4q-mw5j |