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| purl | pkg:gem/loofah@2.25.0 |
| Next non-vulnerable version | None. |
| Latest non-vulnerable version | None. |
| Risk | 1.4 |
| Vulnerability | Summary | Fixed by |
|---|---|---|
|
VCID-amsh-qpt1-9qb7
Aliases: GHSA-46fp-8f5p-pf2m |
Improper detection of disallowed URIs by Loofah `allowed_uri?` ## Summary `Loofah::HTML5::Scrub.allowed_uri?` does not correctly reject `javascript:` URIs when the scheme is split by HTML entity-encoded control characters such as ` ` (carriage return), ` ` (line feed), or `	` (tab). ## Details The `allowed_uri?` method strips literal control characters before decoding HTML entities. Payloads like `java script:alert(1)` survive the control character strip, then ` ` is decoded to a carriage return, producing `java\rscript:alert(1)`. Note that the Loofah sanitizer's default `sanitize()` path is **not affected** because Nokogiri decodes HTML entities during parsing before Loofah evaluates the URI protocol. This issue only affects direct callers of the `allowed_uri?` string-level helper when passing HTML-encoded strings. ## Impact Applications that call `Loofah::HTML5::Scrub.allowed_uri?` to validate user-controlled URLs and then render approved URLs into `href` or other browser-interpreted URI attributes may be vulnerable to cross-site scripting (XSS). This only affects Loofah `2.25.0`. ## Mitigation Upgrade to Loofah >= `2.25.1`. ## Credit Responsibly reported by HackOne user `@smlee`. |
Affected by 1 other vulnerability. |
|
VCID-qz71-ek2u-8ybh
Aliases: GHSA-2j22-pr5w-6gq8 |
Loofah has improper detection of disallowed URIs via `allowed_uri?` ## Summary `Loofah::HTML5::Scrub.allowed_uri?` does not correctly reject `javascript:` URIs when the scheme is split by HTML entity-encoded control characters such as ` ` (carriage return), ` ` (line feed), or `	` (tab). ## Details The `allowed_uri?` method strips literal control characters before decoding HTML entities. Payloads like `java script:alert(1)` survive the control character strip, then ` ` is decoded to a carriage return, producing `java\rscript:alert(1)`. Note that the Loofah sanitizer's default `sanitize()` path is **not affected** because Nokogiri decodes HTML entities during parsing before Loofah evaluates the URI protocol. This issue only affects direct callers of the `allowed_uri?` string-level helper when passing HTML-encoded strings. ## Impact Applications that call `Loofah::HTML5::Scrub.allowed_uri?` to validate user-controlled URLs and then render approved URLs into `href` or other browser-interpreted URI attributes may be vulnerable to cross-site scripting (XSS). This only affects Loofah `2.25.0`. ## Mitigation Upgrade to Loofah >= `2.25.1`. ## Credit Responsibly reported by HackOne user @smlee. |
Affected by 1 other vulnerability. |
| Vulnerability | Summary | Aliases |
|---|---|---|
| This package is not known to fix vulnerabilities. | ||