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| purl | pkg:maven/org.eclipse.jetty/jetty-server@9.3.10.v20160621 |
| Next non-vulnerable version | 9.4.57.v20241219 |
| Latest non-vulnerable version | 12.1.6 |
| Risk | 4.5 |
| Vulnerability | Summary | Fixed by |
|---|---|---|
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VCID-12gq-ezut-ckhz
Aliases: CVE-2017-7657 GHSA-vgg8-72f2-qm23 |
Affected by 9 other vulnerabilities. |
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VCID-9xw3-4a4u-hbbb
Aliases: CVE-2023-26049 GHSA-p26g-97m4-6q7c |
Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor Jetty is a java based web server and servlet engine. Nonstandard cookie parsing in Jetty may allow an attacker to smuggle cookies within other cookies, or otherwise perform unintended behavior by tampering with the cookie parsing mechanism. If Jetty sees a cookie VALUE that starts with `"` (double quote), it will continue to read the cookie string until it sees a closing quote -- even if a semicolon is encountered. So, a cookie header such as: `DISPLAY_LANGUAGE="b; JSESSIONID=1337; c=d"` will be parsed as one cookie, with the name DISPLAY_LANGUAGE and a value of b; JSESSIONID=1337; c=d instead of 3 separate cookies. This has security implications because if, say, JSESSIONID is an HttpOnly cookie, and the DISPLAY_LANGUAGE cookie value is rendered on the page, an attacker can smuggle the JSESSIONID cookie into the DISPLAY_LANGUAGE cookie and thereby exfiltrate it. This is significant when an intermediary is enacting some policy based on cookies, so a smuggled cookie can bypass that policy yet still be seen by the Jetty server or its logging system. This issue has been addressed in versions 9.4.51, 10.0.14, 11.0.14, and 12.0.0.beta0 and users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this issue. |
Affected by 2 other vulnerabilities. Affected by 1 other vulnerability. Affected by 1 other vulnerability. Affected by 0 other vulnerabilities. Affected by 0 other vulnerabilities. |
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VCID-ahev-zdjd-gqg1
Aliases: CVE-2019-10241 GHSA-7vx9-xjhr-rw6h |
Cross-site Scripting Jetty server is vulnerable to XSS conditions if a remote client USES a specially formatted URL against the `DefaultServlet` or `ResourceHandler` that is configured for showing a Listing of directory contents. |
Affected by 8 other vulnerabilities. Affected by 8 other vulnerabilities. Affected by 11 other vulnerabilities. Affected by 11 other vulnerabilities. |
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VCID-czhb-gqt2-17av
Aliases: CVE-2019-10247 GHSA-xc67-hjx6-cgg6 |
Information Exposure In Eclipse Jetty, the server running on any OS and Jetty version combination will reveal the configured fully qualified directory base resource location on the output of the error for not finding a Context that matches the requested path. The default server behavior on jetty-distribution and jetty-home will include at the end of the Handler tree a `DefaultHandler`, which is responsible for reporting this error, it presents the various configured contexts as HTML for users to click through to. This produced HTML includes output that contains the configured fully qualified directory base resource location for each context. |
Affected by 6 other vulnerabilities. Affected by 9 other vulnerabilities. |
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VCID-kvqz-fppe-d7fe
Aliases: CVE-2017-7658 GHSA-6x9x-8qw9-9pp6 |
Affected by 9 other vulnerabilities. Affected by 11 other vulnerabilities. |
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VCID-nubz-xqaw-tkfr
Aliases: CVE-2020-27216 GHSA-g3wg-6mcf-8jj6 |
Local Temp Directory Hijacking Vulnerability ### Impact On Unix like systems, the system's temporary directory is shared between all users on that system. A collocated user can observe the process of creating a temporary sub directory in the shared temporary directory and race to complete the creation of the temporary subdirectory. If the attacker wins the race then they will have read and write permission to the subdirectory used to unpack web applications, including their WEB-INF/lib jar files and JSP files. If any code is ever executed out of this temporary directory, this can lead to a local privilege escalation vulnerability. Additionally, any user code uses of [WebAppContext::getTempDirectory](https://www.eclipse.org/jetty/javadoc/9.4.31.v20200723/org/eclipse/jetty/webapp/WebAppContext.html#getTempDirectory()) would similarly be vulnerable. Additionally, any user application code using the `ServletContext` attribute for the tempdir will also be impacted. See: https://javaee.github.io/javaee-spec/javadocs/javax/servlet/ServletContext.html#TEMPDIR For example: ```java import java.io.File; import java.io.IOException; import javax.servlet.ServletContext; import javax.servlet.ServletException; import javax.servlet.http.HttpServlet; import javax.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest; import javax.servlet.http.HttpServletResponse; public class ExampleServlet extends HttpServlet { @Override protected void doGet(HttpServletRequest req, HttpServletResponse resp) throws ServletException, IOException { File tempDir = (File)getServletContext().getAttribute(ServletContext.TEMPDIR); // Potentially compromised // do something with that temp dir } } ``` Example: The JSP library itself will use the container temp directory for compiling the JSP source into Java classes before executing them. ### CVSSv3.1 Evaluation This vulnerability has been calculated to have a [CVSSv3.1 score of 7.8/10 (AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss/v3-calculator?vector=AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H&version=3.1) ### Patches Fixes were applied to the 9.4.x branch with: - https://github.com/eclipse/jetty.project/commit/53e0e0e9b25a6309bf24ee3b10984f4145701edb - https://github.com/eclipse/jetty.project/commit/9ad6beb80543b392c91653f6bfce233fc75b9d5f These will be included in releases: 9.4.33, 10.0.0.beta3, 11.0.0.beta3 ### Workarounds A work around is to set a temporary directory, either for the server or the context, to a directory outside of the shared temporary file system. For recent releases, a temporary directory can be created simple by creating a directory called `work` in the ${jetty.base} directory (the parent directory of the `webapps` directory). Alternately the java temporary directory can be set with the System Property `java.io.tmpdir`. A more detailed description of how jetty selects a temporary directory is below. The Jetty search order for finding a temporary directory is as follows: 1. If the [`WebAppContext` has a temp directory specified](https://www.eclipse.org/jetty/javadoc/current/org/eclipse/jetty/webapp/WebAppContext.html#setTempDirectory(java.io.File)), use it. 2. If the `ServletContext` has the `javax.servlet.context.tempdir` attribute set, and if directory exists, use it. 3. If a `${jetty.base}/work` directory exists, use it (since Jetty 9.1) 4. If a `ServletContext` has the `org.eclipse.jetty.webapp.basetempdir` attribute set, and if the directory exists, use it. 5. Use `System.getProperty("java.io.tmpdir")` and use it. Jetty will end traversal at the first successful step. To mitigate this vulnerability the directory must be set to one that is not writable by an attacker. To avoid information leakage, the directory should also not be readable by an attacker. #### Setting a Jetty server temporary directory. Choices 3 and 5 apply to the server level, and will impact all deployed webapps on the server. For choice 3 just create that work directory underneath your `${jetty.base}` and restart Jetty. For choice 5, just specify your own `java.io.tmpdir` when you start the JVM for Jetty. ``` shell [jetty-distribution]$ java -Djava.io.tmpdir=/var/web/work -jar start.jar ``` #### Setting a Context specific temporary directory. The rest of the choices require you to configure the context for that deployed webapp (seen as `${jetty.base}/webapps/<context>.xml`) Example (excluding the DTD which is version specific): ``` xml <Configure class="org.eclipse.jetty.webapp.WebAppContext"> <Set name="contextPath"><Property name="foo"/></Set> <Set name="war">/var/web/webapps/foo.war</Set> <Set name="tempDirectory">/var/web/work/foo</Set> </Configure> ``` ### References - https://github.com/eclipse/jetty.project/issues/5451 - [CWE-378: Creation of Temporary File With Insecure Permissions](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/378.html) - [CWE-379: Creation of Temporary File in Directory with Insecure Permissions](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/379.html) - [CodeQL Query PR To Detect Similar Vulnerabilities](https://github.com/github/codeql/pull/4473) ### Similar Vulnerabilities Similar, but not the same. - JUnit 4 - https://github.com/junit-team/junit4/security/advisories/GHSA-269g-pwp5-87pp - Google Guava - https://github.com/google/guava/issues/4011 - Apache Ant - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1945 - JetBrains Kotlin Compiler - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-15824 ### For more information The original report of this vulnerability is below: > On Thu, 15 Oct 2020 at 21:14, Jonathan Leitschuh <jonathan.leitschuh@gmail.com> wrote: > Hi WebTide Security Team, > > I'm a security researcher writing some custom CodeQL queries to find Local Temporary Directory Hijacking Vulnerabilities. One of my queries flagged an issue in Jetty. > > https://lgtm.com/query/5615014766184643449/ > > I've recently been looking into security vulnerabilities involving the temporary directory because on unix-like systems, the system temporary directory is shared between all users. > There exists a race condition between the deletion of the temporary file and the creation of the directory. > > ```java > // ensure file will always be unique by appending random digits > tmpDir = File.createTempFile(temp, ".dir", parent); // Attacker knows the full path of the file that will be generated > // delete the file that was created > tmpDir.delete(); // Attacker sees file is deleted and begins a race to create their own directory before Jetty. > // and make a directory of the same name > // SECURITY VULNERABILITY: Race Condition! - Attacker beats Jetty and now owns this directory > tmpDir.mkdirs(); > ``` > > https://github.com/eclipse/jetty.project/blob/1b59672b7f668b8a421690154b98b4b2b03f254b/jetty-webapp/src/main/java/org/eclipse/jetty/webapp/WebInfConfiguration.java#L511-L518 > > In several cases the `parent` parameter will not be the system temporary directory. However, there is one case where it will be, as the last fallback. > > > https://github.com/eclipse/jetty.project/blob/1b59672b7f668b8a421690154b98b4b2b03f254b/jetty-webapp/src/main/java/org/eclipse/jetty/webapp/WebInfConfiguration.java#L467-L468 > > If any code is ever executed out of this temporary directory, this can lead to a local privilege escalation vulnerability. > > Would your team be willing to open a GitHub security advisory to continue the discussion and disclosure there? https://github.com/eclipse/jetty.project/security/advisories > > **This vulnerability disclosure follows Google's [90-day vulnerability disclosure policy](https://www.google.com/about/appsecurity/) (I'm not an employee of Google, I just like their policy). Full disclosure will occur either at the end of the 90-day deadline or whenever a patch is made widely available, whichever occurs first.** > > Cheers, > Jonathan Leitschuh |
Affected by 9 other vulnerabilities. Affected by 0 other vulnerabilities. Affected by 0 other vulnerabilities. |
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VCID-prd3-mmuv-n3dc
Aliases: CVE-2021-28165 GHSA-26vr-8j45-3r4w |
Jetty vulnerable to incorrect handling of invalid large TLS frame, exhausting CPU resources ### Impact When using SSL/TLS with Jetty, either with HTTP/1.1, HTTP/2, or WebSocket, the server may receive an invalid large (greater than 17408) TLS frame that is incorrectly handled, causing CPU resources to eventually reach 100% usage. ### Workarounds The problem can be worked around by compiling the following class: ```java package org.eclipse.jetty.server.ssl.fix6072; import java.nio.ByteBuffer; import javax.net.ssl.SSLEngine; import javax.net.ssl.SSLEngineResult; import javax.net.ssl.SSLException; import javax.net.ssl.SSLHandshakeException; import org.eclipse.jetty.io.EndPoint; import org.eclipse.jetty.io.ssl.SslConnection; import org.eclipse.jetty.server.Connector; import org.eclipse.jetty.server.SslConnectionFactory; import org.eclipse.jetty.util.BufferUtil; import org.eclipse.jetty.util.annotation.Name; import org.eclipse.jetty.util.ssl.SslContextFactory; public class SpaceCheckingSslConnectionFactory extends SslConnectionFactory { public SpaceCheckingSslConnectionFactory(@Name("sslContextFactory") SslContextFactory factory, @Name("next") String nextProtocol) { super(factory, nextProtocol); } @Override protected SslConnection newSslConnection(Connector connector, EndPoint endPoint, SSLEngine engine) { return new SslConnection(connector.getByteBufferPool(), connector.getExecutor(), endPoint, engine, isDirectBuffersForEncryption(), isDirectBuffersForDecryption()) { @Override protected SSLEngineResult unwrap(SSLEngine sslEngine, ByteBuffer input, ByteBuffer output) throws SSLException { SSLEngineResult results = super.unwrap(sslEngine, input, output); if ((results.getStatus() == SSLEngineResult.Status.BUFFER_UNDERFLOW || results.getStatus() == SSLEngineResult.Status.OK && results.bytesConsumed() == 0 && results.bytesProduced() == 0) && BufferUtil.space(input) == 0) { BufferUtil.clear(input); throw new SSLHandshakeException("Encrypted buffer max length exceeded"); } return results; } }; } } ``` This class can be deployed by: + The resulting class file should be put into a jar file (eg sslfix6072.jar) + The jar file should be made available to the server. For a normal distribution this can be done by putting the file into ${jetty.base}/lib + Copy the file `${jetty.home}/modules/ssl.mod` to `${jetty.base}/modules` + Edit the `${jetty.base}/modules/ssl.mod` file to have the following section: ``` [lib] lib/sslfix6072.jar ``` + Copy the file `${jetty.home}/etc/jetty-https.xml` and`${jetty.home}/etc/jetty-http2.xml` to `${jetty.base}/etc` + Edit files `${jetty.base}/etc/jetty-https.xml` and `${jetty.base}/etc/jetty-http2.xml`, changing any reference of `org.eclipse.jetty.server.SslConnectionFactory` to `org.eclipse.jetty.server.ssl.fix6072.SpaceCheckingSslConnectionFactory`. For example: ```xml <Call name="addIfAbsentConnectionFactory"> <Arg> <New class="org.eclipse.jetty.server.ssl.fix6072.SpaceCheckingSslConnectionFactory"> <Arg name="next">http/1.1</Arg> <Arg name="sslContextFactory"><Ref refid="sslContextFactory"/></Arg> </New> </Arg> </Call> ``` + Restart Jetty |
Affected by 0 other vulnerabilities. Affected by 5 other vulnerabilities. Affected by 5 other vulnerabilities. Affected by 5 other vulnerabilities. |
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VCID-q35p-8qhp-aqec
Aliases: CVE-2021-34428 GHSA-m6cp-vxjx-65j6 |
SessionListener can prevent a session from being invalidated breaking logout ### Impact If an exception is thrown from the `SessionListener#sessionDestroyed()` method, then the session ID is not invalidated in the session ID manager. On deployments with clustered sessions and multiple contexts this can result in a session not being invalidated. This can result in an application used on a shared computer being left logged in. There is no known path for an attacker to induce such an exception to be thrown, thus they must rely on an application to throw such an exception. The OP has also identified that during the call to `sessionDestroyed`, the `getLastAccessedTime()` throws an `IllegalStateException`, which potentially contrary to the servlet spec, so applications calling this method may always throw and fail to log out. If such an application was only tested on a non clustered test environment, then it may be deployed on a clustered environment with multiple contexts and fail to log out. ### Workarounds The application should catch all Throwables within their `SessionListener#sessionDestroyed()` implementations. |
Affected by 4 other vulnerabilities. Affected by 0 other vulnerabilities. Affected by 4 other vulnerabilities. Affected by 4 other vulnerabilities. |
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VCID-q3k2-1x5q-buhy
Aliases: CVE-2023-40167 GHSA-hmr7-m48g-48f6 |
Improper Handling of Length Parameter Inconsistency Jetty is a Java based web server and servlet engine. Prior to versions 9.4.52, 10.0.16, 11.0.16, and 12.0.1, Jetty accepts the `+` character proceeding the content-length value in a HTTP/1 header field. This is more permissive than allowed by the RFC and other servers routinely reject such requests with 400 responses. There is no known exploit scenario, but it is conceivable that request smuggling could result if jetty is used in combination with a server that does not close the connection after sending such a 400 response. Versions 9.4.52, 10.0.16, 11.0.16, and 12.0.1 contain a patch for this issue. There is no workaround as there is no known exploit scenario. |
Affected by 1 other vulnerability. Affected by 0 other vulnerabilities. Affected by 0 other vulnerabilities. Affected by 0 other vulnerabilities. |
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VCID-u2b5-uyd6-fbh9
Aliases: CVE-2018-12536 GHSA-9rgv-h7x4-qw8g |
In Eclipse Jetty Server, all 9.x versions, on webapps deployed using default Error Handling, when an intentionally bad query arrives that doesn't match a dynamic url-pattern, and is eventually handled by the DefaultServlet's static file serving, the bad characters can trigger a java.nio.file.InvalidPathException which includes the full path to the base resource directory that the DefaultServlet and/or webapp is using. If this InvalidPathException is then handled by the default Error Handler, the InvalidPathException message is included in the error response, revealing the full server path to the requesting system. |
Affected by 9 other vulnerabilities. Affected by 11 other vulnerabilities. |
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VCID-y3mv-vmwd-tydt
Aliases: CVE-2023-26048 GHSA-qw69-rqj8-6qw8 |
False positive This vulnerability has been marked as a false positive. |
Affected by 2 other vulnerabilities. Affected by 1 other vulnerability. Affected by 1 other vulnerability. |
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VCID-znv6-77jf-v3gu
Aliases: CVE-2017-7656 GHSA-84q7-p226-4x5w |
In Eclipse Jetty, versions 9.2.x and older, 9.3.x (all configurations), and 9.4.x (non-default configuration with RFC2616 compliance enabled), HTTP/0.9 is handled poorly. An HTTP/1 style request line (i.e. method space URI space version) that declares a version of HTTP/0.9 was accepted and treated as a 0.9 request. If deployed behind an intermediary that also accepted and passed through the 0.9 version (but did not act on it), then the response sent could be interpreted by the intermediary as HTTP/1 headers. This could be used to poison the cache if the server allowed the origin client to generate arbitrary content in the response. |
Affected by 9 other vulnerabilities. Affected by 11 other vulnerabilities. |
| Vulnerability | Summary | Aliases |
|---|---|---|
| This package is not known to fix vulnerabilities. | ||