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| purl | pkg:maven/org.postgresql/postgresql@42.2.28 |
| Vulnerability | Summary | Fixed by |
|---|---|---|
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VCID-hpc5-vtmd-gub5
Aliases: CVE-2022-26520 GHSA-727h-hrw8-jg8q |
Path traversal in org.postgresql:postgresql ** DISPUTED ** In pgjdbc before 42.3.3, an attacker (who controls the jdbc URL or properties) can call java.util.logging.FileHandler to write to arbitrary files through the loggerFile and loggerLevel connection properties. An example situation is that an attacker could create an executable JSP file under a Tomcat web root. NOTE: the vendor's position is that there is no pgjdbc vulnerability; instead, it is a vulnerability for any application to use the pgjdbc driver with untrusted connection properties. |
Affected by 1 other vulnerability. |
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VCID-uzj4-puvz-zfgh
Aliases: GHSA-673j-qm5f-xpv8 GMS-2022-75 |
Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') The connection properties for configuring a pgjdbc connection are not meant to be exposed to an unauthenticated attacker. While allowing an attacker to specify arbitrary connection properties could lead to a compromise of a system, that's a defect of an application that allows unauthenticated attackers that level of control. It's not the job of the pgjdbc driver to decide whether a given log file location is acceptable. End user applications that use the pgjdbc driver must ensure that filenames are valid and restrict unauthenticated attackers from being able to supply arbitrary values. That's not specific to the pgjdbc driver either, it would be true for any library that can write to the application's local file system. While we do not consider this a security issue with the driver, we have decided to remove the `loggerFile` and `loggerLevel` connection properties in the next release of the driver. Removal of those properties does not make exposing the JDBC URL or connection properties to an attacker safe and we continue to suggest that applications do not allow untrusted users to specify arbitrary connection properties. We are removing them to prevent misuse and their functionality can be delegated to `java.util.logging`. |
Affected by 1 other vulnerability. |
| Vulnerability | Summary | Aliases |
|---|---|---|
| VCID-6r4u-tem9-vkey | org.postgresql:postgresql vulnerable to SQL Injection via line comment generation # Impact SQL injection is possible when using the non-default connection property `preferQueryMode=simple` in combination with application code that has a vulnerable SQL that negates a parameter value. There is no vulnerability in the driver when using the default query mode. Users that do not override the query mode are not impacted. # Exploitation To exploit this behavior the following conditions must be met: 1. A placeholder for a numeric value must be immediately preceded by a minus (i.e. `-`) 1. There must be a second placeholder for a string value after the first placeholder on the same line. 1. Both parameters must be user controlled. The prior behavior of the driver when operating in simple query mode would inline the negative value of the first parameter and cause the resulting line to be treated as a `--` SQL comment. That would extend to the beginning of the next parameter and cause the quoting of that parameter to be consumed by the comment line. If that string parameter includes a newline, the resulting text would appear unescaped in the resulting SQL. When operating in the default extended query mode this would not be an issue as the parameter values are sent separately to the server. Only in simple query mode the parameter values are inlined into the executed SQL causing this issue. # Example ```java PreparedStatement stmt = conn.prepareStatement("SELECT -?, ?"); stmt.setInt(1, -1); stmt.setString(2, "\nWHERE false --"); ResultSet rs = stmt.executeQuery(); ``` The resulting SQL when operating in simple query mode would be: ```sql SELECT --1,' WHERE false --' ``` The contents of the second parameter get injected into the command. Note how both the number of result columns and the WHERE clause of the command have changed. A more elaborate example could execute arbitrary other SQL commands. # Patch Problem will be patched upgrade to 42.7.2, 42.6.1, 42.5.5, 42.4.4, 42.3.9, 42.2.28, 42.2.28.jre7 The patch fixes the inlining of parameters by forcing them all to be serialized as wrapped literals. The SQL in the prior example would be transformed into: ```sql SELECT -('-1'::int4), (' WHERE false --') ``` # Workarounds Do not use the connection property`preferQueryMode=simple`. (*NOTE: If you do not explicitly specify a query mode then you are using the default of `extended` and are not impacted by this issue.*) |
CVE-2024-1597
GHSA-24rp-q3w6-vc56 |