Vulnerabilities affecting this package (0)
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This package is not known to be affected by vulnerabilities.
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Vulnerabilities fixed by this package (2)
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VCID-8v5d-ddg5-p3bv
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Angular SSR has an Open Redirect via X-Forwarded-Prefix
An Open Redirect vulnerability exists in the internal URL processing logic in Angular SSR. The logic normalizes URL segments by stripping leading slashes; however, it only removes a single leading slash.
When an Angular SSR application is deployed behind a proxy that passes the `X-Forwarded-Prefix` header, an attacker can provide a value starting with three slashes (e.g., `///evil.com`).
1. The application processes a redirect (e.g., from a router `redirectTo` or i18n locale switch).
2. Angular receives `///evil.com` as the prefix.
3. It strips one slash, leaving `//evil.com`.
4. The resulting string is used in the `Location` header.
5. Modern browsers interpret `//` as a protocol-relative URL, redirecting the user from `https://your-app.com` to `https://evil.com`.
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CVE-2026-27738
GHSA-xh43-g2fq-wjrj
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VCID-fc5v-8zkb-63bt
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Angular SSR is vulnerable to SSRF and Header Injection via request handling pipeline
A [Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Attacks/SSRF) vulnerability has been identified in the Angular SSR request handling pipeline. The vulnerability exists because Angular’s internal URL reconstruction logic directly trusts and consumes user-controlled HTTP headers specifically the Host and `X-Forwarded-*` family to determine the application's base origin without any validation of the destination domain.
Specifically, the framework didn't have checks for the following:
- **Host Domain**: The `Host` and `X-Forwarded-Host` headers were not checked to belong to a trusted origin. This allows an attacker to redefine the "base" of the application to an arbitrary external domain.
- **Path & Character Sanitization**: The `X-Forwarded-Host` header was not checked for path segments or special characters, allowing manipulation of the base path for all resolved relative URLs.
- **Port Validation**: The `X-Forwarded-Port` header was not verified as numeric, leading to malformed URI construction or injection attacks.
This vulnerability manifests in two primary ways:
- **Implicit Relative URL Resolution**: Angular's `HttpClient` resolves relative URLs against this unvalidated and potentially malformed base origin. An attacker can "steer" these requests to an external server or internal service.
- **Explicit Manual Construction**: Developers injecting the `REQUEST` object to manually construct URLs (for fetch or third-party SDKs) directly inherit these unsanitized values. By accessing the `Host` / `X-Forwarded-*` headers, the application logic may perform requests to attacker-controlled destinations or malformed endpoints.
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CVE-2026-27739
GHSA-x288-3778-4hhx
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