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Package details: pkg:npm/aws-cdk-lib@2.177.0
purl pkg:npm/aws-cdk-lib@2.177.0
Next non-vulnerable version 2.189.1
Latest non-vulnerable version 2.189.1
Risk
Vulnerabilities affecting this package (3)
Vulnerability Summary Fixed by
VCID-bssn-gvuq-xkdc
Aliases:
GHSA-qq4x-c6h6-rfxh
aws-cdk-lib has Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File vulnerability when using Cognito UserPoolClient Construct ### Summary The [AWS Cloud Development Kit (CDK)](https://aws.amazon.com/cdk/) is an open-source framework for defining cloud infrastructure using code. Customers use it to create their own applications which are converted to AWS CloudFormation templates during deployment to a customer’s AWS account. CDK contains pre-built components called "[constructs](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cdk/v2/guide/constructs.html)" that are higher-level abstractions providing defaults and best practices. This approach enables developers to use familiar programming languages to define complex cloud infrastructure more efficiently than writing raw CloudFormation templates. The CDK [Cognito UserPool](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cdk/api/v2/docs/aws-cdk-lib.aws_cognito.UserPool.html) construct deploys an AWS cognito user pool. An [Amazon Cognito user pool](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cognito/latest/developerguide/cognito-user-pools.html) is a user directory for web and mobile app authentication and authorization. Customers can deploy a client under this user pool through construct ‘[UserPoolClient](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cdk/api/v2/docs/aws-cdk-lib.aws_cognito.UserPoolClient.html)’ or through helper method '[addClient](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cdk/api/v2/docs/aws-cdk-lib.aws_cognito.UserPool.html#addwbrclientid-options)'. A user pool client resource represents an Amazon [Cognito user pool client](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cognito/latest/developerguide/user-pool-settings-client-apps.html) which is a configuration within a user pool that interacts with one mobile or web application authenticating with Amazon Cognito. When users of the 'cognito.UserPoolClient' construct generate a secret value for the application client in AWS CDK, they can then reference the generated secrets in their stack. The CDK had an issue where, when the custom resource performed an SDK API call to 'DescribeCognitoUserPoolClient' to retrieve the generated secret, the full response was logged in the associated lambda function's log group. Any user authenticated in the account where logs of the custom resource are accessible and who has read-only permission could view the secret written to those logs. This issue does not affect customers who are generating the secret value outside of the CDK as the secret is not referenced or logged. ### Impact To leverage this issue, an actor has to be authenticated in the account where logs of the custom resource Custom::DescribeCognitoUserPoolClient are accessible and have read-only permission for lambda function logs. Users can review access to their log group through AWS CloudTrail logs to detect any unexpected access to read the logs. **Impacted versions: >2.37.0 and <=2.187.0** ### Patches The patches are included in the AWS CDK Library release v2.187.0. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. To fully address this issue, users should rotate the secret by generating a new secret stored in AWS Secrets Manager. References to the secret will use the new secret on update. When new CDK applications using the latest version are initialized, they will use the new behavior with updated logging. Existing applications must upgrade to the latest version, change the [feature flag](https://github.com/aws/aws-cdk/blob/main/packages/aws-cdk-lib/cx-api/FEATURE_FLAGS.md) (@aws-cdk/cognito:logUserPoolClientSecretValue) to false, redeploy the application to apply this fix and use the new implementation with updated logging behavior. ### Workarounds Users can override the implementation changing Logging to be Logging.withDataHidden(). For example define class CustomUserPoolClient extends UserPoolClient and  in the new class define get userPoolClientSecret() to use Logging.withDataHidden(). Example export class CustomUserPoolClient extends UserPoolClient { private readonly customUserPool : UserPool; private readonly customuserPoolClientId : string; constructor(scope: Construct, id: string, props: UserPoolClientProps) { super(scope, id, props); this.customUserPool = new UserPool(this, 'pool', { removalPolicy: RemovalPolicy.DESTROY, }); const client = this.customUserPool.addClient('client', { generateSecret: true }); } // Override the userPoolClientSecret getter to always return the secret public get userPoolClientSecret(): SecretValue { // Create the Custom Resource that assists in resolving the User Pool Client secret const secretValue = SecretValue.resourceAttribute(new AwsCustomResource( this, 'DescribeCognitoUserPoolClient', { resourceType: 'Custom::DescribeCognitoUserPoolClient', onUpdate: { region: cdk.Stack.of(this).region, service: 'CognitoIdentityServiceProvider', action: 'describeUserPoolClient', parameters: { UserPoolId: this.customUserPool.userPoolId, ClientId: this.customUserPool, }, physicalResourceId: PhysicalResourceId.of(this.userPoolClientId), // Disable logging of sensitive data logging: Logging.withDataHidden(), }, policy: AwsCustomResourcePolicy.fromSdkCalls({ resources: [this.customUserPool.userPoolArn], }), installLatestAwsSdk: false, }, ).getResponseField('UserPoolClient.ClientSecret')); return secretValue; } } ### References If you have any questions or comments about this advisory please contact AWS/Amazon Security via our [vulnerability reporting page](https://aws.amazon.com/security/vulnerability-reporting) or directly via email to [aws-security@amazon.com](mailto:aws-security@amazon.com). Please do not create a public GitHub issue.
2.187.0
Affected by 1 other vulnerability.
VCID-r7vk-5d1n-wqbj
Aliases:
GHSA-qc59-cxj2-c2w4
aws-cdk-lib's aspect order change causes different Permissions Boundary assigned to Role ### Summary The [AWS Cloud Development Kit (AWS CDK)](https://aws.amazon.com/cdk/) is an open-source software development framework for defining cloud infrastructure in code and provisioning it through AWS CloudFormation. In the CDK, developers organize their applications into reusable components called "[constructs](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cdk/v2/guide/constructs.html)," which are organized into a hierarchical tree structure. One of the features of this framework is the ability to call "[Aspects](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cdk/v2/guide/aspects.html)," which are mechanisms to set configuration options for all AWS Resources in a particular part of the hierarchy at once. Aspect execution happens in a specific order, and the last Aspect to execute controls the final values in the template. AWS CDK version [2.172.0](https://github.com/aws/aws-cdk/releases/tag/v2.172.0) introduced a new priority system for Aspects. Prior to this version, CDK would run Aspects based on hierarchical location. The new priority system takes precedence over hierarchical location, altering the invocation order of Aspects. Different priority classes were introduced: Aspects added by CDK APIs were classified as MUTATING (priority 200), while Aspects added directly by the user were classified as DEFAULT (priority 500) unless the user specified otherwise. As a result of this change, CDK apps that use a custom Aspect to assign a default permissions boundary and then use a built-in CDK method to override it on select resources could have unexpected permissions boundaries assigned. The following is an affected code sample: ```ts Aspects.of(stack).add(new CustomAspectThatAssignsDefaultPermissionsBoundaries()); // {1} PermissionsBoundary.of(lambdaFunc).apply(...); // {2} -- uses Aspects internally ``` In versions prior to 2.172.0, the Aspect added by {2} would invoke last and assign its permissions boundary to the Lambda function role. In versions 2.172.0 and after, the Aspect added by {2} would have priority 200 while the Aspect added by {1} would have priority 500 and therefore be invoked last. The Lambda function role would get the permissions boundary of {1} assigned, which may not be what users expect. ### Impact If an unexpected permissions boundary is selected for a role, it could lead to that role having insufficient permissions. Alternatively, this could lead to a role having wider permissions than intended; however, this could happen only in combination with an overly permissive role policy, as permissions boundaries do not grant permissions by themselves. Impacted versions: versions 2.172.0 up until 2.189.1 ### Patches In version 2.189.1, the behavior has been reverted to the behavior of pre-2.172.0. The new behavior is available through a feature flag: ```json { "context": { "@aws-cdk/core:aspectPrioritiesMutating": true } } ``` The patches are included in AWS CDK Library version 2.189.1 and after. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. ### Workarounds As a workaround, users can use the location hierarchy to order the invocation of Aspects. To do this, users can assign the custom Aspect a priority of MUTATING to ensure it has the same priority as the Aspect added by the CDK API, and that the location hierarchy is used for the order of invocation Aspects. The following code is an example: ```ts Aspects.of(stack).add(new CustomAspectThatAssignsDefaultPermissionsBoundaries(), { priority: AspectPriority.MUTATING, }); ``` ### References If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, we ask that you contact AWS/Amazon Security via our [vulnerability reporting page](https://aws.amazon.com/security/vulnerability-reporting) or directly via email to [aws-security@amazon.com](mailto:aws-security@amazon.com). Please do not create a public GitHub issue. ### Credit We would like to thank GoDaddy for collaborating on this issue through the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process.
2.189.1
Affected by 0 other vulnerabilities.
VCID-zcjw-fryj-uqem
Aliases:
GHSA-5pq3-h73f-66hr
AWS CDK CodePipeline: trusted entities are too broad ### Summary The [AWS Cloud Development Kit (CDK)](https://aws.amazon.com/cdk/) is an open-source framework for defining cloud infrastructure using code. Users use it to create their own applications, which are converted to AWS CloudFormation templates during deployment to a user's AWS account. AWS CDK contains pre-built components called "constructs," which are higher-level abstractions providing defaults and best practices. This approach enables developers to use familiar programming languages to define complex cloud infrastructure more efficiently than writing raw CloudFormation templates. The [AWS CodePipeline](https://aws.amazon.com/codepipeline/) construct deploys CodePipeline, a managed service that orchestrates software release processes through a series of stages, each comprising one or more actions executed by CodePipeline. To perform these actions, CodePipeline assumes IAM roles with permissions necessary for each step, allowing it to interact with AWS services and resources on behalf of the user. An issue exists where, when using CDK to create a CodePipeline with the CDK Construct Library, CDK creates an AWS Identity and Access Management (AWS IAM) trust policy with overly broad permissions. Any user with unrestricted sts:AssumeRole permissions could assume that trust policy. This issue does not affect users who supply their own role for CodePipeline. ### Impact To leverage the issue, an actor has to be authenticated in the account and have an unrestricted sts:AssumeRole permission. The permissions an actor could leverage depend on the actions added to the pipeline. Possible permissions include actions on services such as CloudFormation, CodeCommit, Lambda, and ECS, as well as access to the S3 bucket holding pipeline build artifacts ([see documentation](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cdk/api/v2/docs/aws-cdk-lib.aws_codepipeline_actions-readme.html)). Users can review their AWS CloudTrail logs for when the role was assumed to determine if this was expected. #### Impacted versions: <v2.189.0 ### Patches The patches are included in the CDK Construct Library release [v2.189.0](https://github.com/aws/aws-cdk/releases/tag/v2.189.0). We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes. When new CDK applications using the latest version are initialized, they will use the new behavior with more restrictive permissions. Existing applications must upgrade to the latest version, change the [feature flag](https://github.com/aws/aws-cdk/blob/main/packages/aws-cdk-lib/cx-api/FEATURE_FLAGS.md) (@aws-cdk/pipelines:reduceStageRoleTrustScope) and (@aws-cdk/pipelines:reduceCrossAccountActionRoleTrustScope) to true and redeploy the application to apply this fix and use the new behavior with more restrictive permissions. ### Workarounds You can explicitly supply the role for your [CodePipeline](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cdk/api/v2/docs/aws-cdk-lib.aws_codepipeline-readme.html#cross-account-codepipelines) and follow the policy recommendations detailed in [CodePipeline documentation](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/codepipeline/latest/userguide/pipelines-create-cross-account.html). ### References [Original reporting issue.](https://github.com/aws/aws-cdk/issues/33709) If you have any questions or comments about this advisory please contact AWS/Amazon Security via our [vulnerability reporting page](https://aws.amazon.com/security/vulnerability-reporting) or directly via email to [aws-security@amazon.com](mailto:aws-security@amazon.com). Please do not create a public GitHub issue.
2.189.0
Affected by 1 other vulnerability.
Vulnerabilities fixed by this package (1)
Vulnerability Summary Aliases
VCID-xm6e-11vq-uugw The AWS Cloud Development Kit (AWS CDK) is an open-source software development framework to define cloud infrastructure in code and provision it through AWS CloudFormation. Users who use IAM OIDC custom resource provider package will download CA Thumbprints as part of the custom resource workflow. However, the current `tls.connect` method will always set `rejectUnauthorized: false` which is a potential security concern. CDK should follow the best practice and set `rejectUnauthorized: true`. However, this could be a breaking change for existing CDK applications and we should fix this with a feature flag. Note that this is marked as low severity Security advisory because the issuer url is provided by CDK users who define the CDK application. If they insist on connecting to a unauthorized OIDC provider, CDK should not disallow this. Additionally, the code block is run in a Lambda environment which mitigate the MITM attack. The patch is in progress. To mitigate, upgrade to CDK v2.177.0 (Expected release date 2025-02-22). Once upgraded, users should make sure the feature flag '@aws-cdk/aws-iam:oidcRejectUnauthorizedConnections' is set to true in `cdk.context.json` or `cdk.json`. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability. CVE-2025-23206
GHSA-v4mq-x674-ff73