VulnerableCode Package Details - pkg:pypi/cryptography@46.0.1

Search for packages

Vulnerability	Summary	Fixed by
VCID-f44c-ygbw-bufn Aliases: CVE-2026-26007 GHSA-r6ph-v2qm-q3c2	cryptography Vulnerable to a Subgroup Attack Due to Missing Subgroup Validation for SECT Curves ## Vulnerability Summary The `public_key_from_numbers` (or `EllipticCurvePublicNumbers.public_key()`), `EllipticCurvePublicNumbers.public_key()`, `load_der_public_key()` and `load_pem_public_key()` functions do not verify that the point belongs to the expected prime-order subgroup of the curve. This missing validation allows an attacker to provide a public key point `P` from a small-order subgroup. This can lead to security issues in various situations, such as the most commonly used signature verification (ECDSA) and shared key negotiation (ECDH). When the victim computes the shared secret as `S = [victim_private_key]P` via ECDH, this leaks information about `victim_private_key mod (small_subgroup_order)`. For curves with cofactor > 1, this reveals the least significant bits of the private key. When these weak public keys are used in ECDSA , it's easy to forge signatures on the small subgroup. Only SECT curves are impacted by this. ## Credit This vulnerability was discovered by: - XlabAI Team of Tencent Xuanwu Lab - Atuin Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine	46.0.5 Affected by 0 other vulnerabilities.

Vulnerability

Summary

Fixed by

VCID-f44c-ygbw-bufn
Aliases:
CVE-2026-26007
GHSA-r6ph-v2qm-q3c2

cryptography Vulnerable to a Subgroup Attack Due to Missing Subgroup Validation for SECT Curves ## Vulnerability Summary The `public_key_from_numbers` (or `EllipticCurvePublicNumbers.public_key()`), `EllipticCurvePublicNumbers.public_key()`, `load_der_public_key()` and `load_pem_public_key()` functions do not verify that the point belongs to the expected prime-order subgroup of the curve. This missing validation allows an attacker to provide a public key point `P` from a small-order subgroup. This can lead to security issues in various situations, such as the most commonly used signature verification (ECDSA) and shared key negotiation (ECDH). When the victim computes the shared secret as `S = [victim_private_key]P` via ECDH, this leaks information about `victim_private_key mod (small_subgroup_order)`. For curves with cofactor > 1, this reveals the least significant bits of the private key. When these weak public keys are used in ECDSA , it's easy to forge signatures on the small subgroup. Only SECT curves are impacted by this. ## Credit This vulnerability was discovered by: - XlabAI Team of Tencent Xuanwu Lab - Atuin Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine

46.0.5
Affected by 0 other vulnerabilities.

Vulnerability	Summary	Aliases
This package is not known to fix vulnerabilities.

Vulnerability

Summary

Aliases

This package is not known to fix vulnerabilities.

Date	Actor	Action	Vulnerability	Source	VulnerableCode Version
2026-04-17T00:17:14.716799+00:00	GitLab Importer	Affected by	VCID-f44c-ygbw-bufn	https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/advisories-community/-/blob/main/pypi/cryptography/CVE-2026-26007.yml	38.4.0
2026-04-12T01:41:28.147686+00:00	GitLab Importer	Affected by	VCID-f44c-ygbw-bufn	https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/advisories-community/-/blob/main/pypi/cryptography/CVE-2026-26007.yml	38.3.0
2026-04-03T01:50:22.528041+00:00	GitLab Importer	Affected by	VCID-f44c-ygbw-bufn	https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/advisories-community/-/blob/main/pypi/cryptography/CVE-2026-26007.yml	38.1.0