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| purl | pkg:pypi/gramps-webapi@2.5.3 |
| Vulnerability | Summary | Fixed by |
|---|---|---|
|
VCID-d1eg-rkxk-6yba
Aliases: GHSA-9gjv-jvm7-vv2v |
Gramps Web API: Private Sub-Object Data in Non-Private Objects Exposed to Guest Users ## Summary Users with the **Guest** role could receive private sub-object data (e.g. private alternate names, private addresses, private note/citation/media handles) through list API endpoints such as `GET /api/people/`, `GET /api/places/`, `GET /api/events/`, and all other object list endpoints. **This does not expose objects (people, places, events, …) that are themselves marked private.** Top-level private objects are correctly excluded from all responses. Only sub-object data attached to otherwise-public objects is affected. ## Affected Versions All versions of Gramps Web API prior to the fix. ## Root Cause The vulnerability originates from the behaviour of `PrivateProxyDb.iter_*()` in **Gramps core**. The `ProxyDbBase.__iter_object()` helper, which backs all `iter_*()` methods in `PrivateProxyDb`, correctly filters out top-level private objects but returns the remaining objects **unsanitized** — i.e. without stripping private sub-object references. In contrast, `PrivateProxyDb.get_*_from_handle()` does call the appropriate `sanitize_*()` function. Gramps Web API's `ModifiedPrivateProxyDb` (which wraps the raw database for non-admin users) inherited this behaviour without override. The same issue affects Gramps desktop features that consume `iter_*()` output: reports and exports generated via Gramps desktop using `PrivateProxyDb` may also include private sub-object data that should have been stripped. ## Conditions Required **This issue only affects trees in which sub-objects have been explicitly marked private in Gramps desktop.** The Gramps Web frontend UI does not expose controls for setting the private flag on sub-objects (alternate names, addresses, notes, citations, media references, event references, etc.). In practice, such flags are set in Gramps desktop and then synced or imported into Gramps Web. ## Impact When the conditions above are met, a user with the Guest role querying any list endpoint receives: - **Full content** of private embedded sub-objects on people, such as alternate names (first name, surname, etc.) and addresses (street, city, etc.). - **Handles referencing** private notes, citations, and media attached to places, events, sources, and other objects. These reveal the *existence* of private linked objects but not their content; fetching those objects by handle is correctly blocked by the proxy. ## Fix `ModifiedPrivateProxyDb` now overrides all `iter_*()` object methods to check `obj.get_privacy()` directly on the already-loaded object (eliminating the redundant per-object refetch) and to call the appropriate `sanitize_*()` function before yielding each object. This is consistent with the behaviour of `get_*_from_handle()` in `PrivateProxyDb`. |
Affected by 1 other vulnerability. |
|
VCID-wv1e-z6rw-1kgf
Aliases: CVE-2026-40258 GHSA-m5gr-86j6-99jp |
Affected by 0 other vulnerabilities. |
| Vulnerability | Summary | Aliases |
|---|---|---|
| This package is not known to fix vulnerabilities. | ||
| Date | Actor | Action | Vulnerability | Source | VulnerableCode Version |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-12T22:00:23.823383+00:00 | GitLab Importer | Affected by | VCID-wv1e-z6rw-1kgf | https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/advisories-community/-/blob/main/pypi/gramps-webapi/CVE-2026-40258.yml | 38.6.0 |
| 2026-06-12T21:58:29.359705+00:00 | GitLab Importer | Affected by | VCID-d1eg-rkxk-6yba | https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/advisories-community/-/blob/main/pypi/gramps-webapi/GHSA-9gjv-jvm7-vv2v.yml | 38.6.0 |