Staging Environment: Content and features may be unstable or change without notice.
Advisory details: github_osv / GHSA-55rj-x2vc-4whq
Advisory ID github_osv/GHSA-55rj-x2vc-4whq
Aliases CVE-2026-47212
Summary Symfony: Twilio SMS Notifier allows unauthenticated webhook injection due to missing X-Twilio-Signature verification ### Description The Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request. As a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc. ### Resolution `TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison. When no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: signature verification remains opt-in, but it is now actually enforced once opted in. Applications behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy must configure `framework.trusted_proxies` and `framework.trusted_headers` so that `Request::getUri()` returns the public URL Twilio signed. The patch for this issue is available [here](https://github.com/symfony/symfony/commit/8545fb2af6c07dfb5ef0fc8d9bccf86db2c94356) for branch 6.4. ### Credits Symfony would like to thank Himanshu Anand for reporting the issue and Nicolas Grekas for providing the fix.
Status Published
Exploitability 0.5
Weighted Severity 4.1
Risk 2.0
Affected and Fixed Packages Package Details
Introduced and Fixed Package Commit Patches Package Commit Patches Details
Weaknesses (2)
No exploits are available.

No EPSS data available for this advisory.

Patch URL
There are no known patches.
Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U Found at https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/05/GHSA-55rj-x2vc-4whq/GHSA-55rj-x2vc-4whq.json
Attack Vector (AV) Attack Complexity (AC) Attack Requirements (AT) Privileges Required (PR) User Interaction (UI) Vulnerable System Impact Confidentiality (VC) Vulnerable System Impact Integrity (VI) Vulnerable System Impact Availability (VA) Subsequent System Impact Confidentiality (SC) Subsequent System Impact Integrity (SI) Subsequent System Impact Availability (SA)

network

adjacent

local

physical

low

high

none

present

none

low

high

none

passive

active

high

low

none

high

low

none

high

low

none

high

low

none

high

low

none

high

low

none

Vector: SSVCv2/E:N/A:Y/T:P/P:M/B:A/M:M/D:T/2026-07-15T14:04:33Z/

Decision: Track

Source URL: https://github.com/cisagov/vulnrichment/blob/develop/2026/47xxx/CVE-2026-47212.json

Source Advisory: vulnrichment/CVE-2026-47212

View SSVC decision tree
[{'Exploitation': 'none'},
 {'Automatable': 'yes'},
 {'Technical Impact': 'partial'},
 {'Mission Prevalence': 'minimal'},
 {'Public Well-being Impact': 'material'},
 {'Mission & Well-being': 'medium'}]