Advisory details:
github_osv / GHSA-7p3p-8qv8-m2vh
| Advisory ID | github_osv/GHSA-7p3p-8qv8-m2vh |
| Aliases |
CVE-2026-6790
|
| Summary | Eclipse Jetty: HTTP Authority/Host mismatch #### Summary Jetty currently accepts HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 requests where the regular Host header and the pseudo-header :authority do not match. As a result, the same request can carry two different host identities through Jetty: - logic based on `HttpURI` / `Request.getServerName(request)` uses `:authority` - logic based on raw request headers continues to use `Host` This creates a host/authority confusion condition that can break security assumptions in higher layers. Jetty already performs an explicit authority/Host consistency check on the HTTP/1.1 path, but equivalent validation is missing on the HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 paths. #### Security Impact This issue is not inherently remote code execution, but it can become security-relevant in deployments that rely on the request host for security-sensitive decisions, including: - host-based access control - virtual host isolation - multi-tenant routing by hostname - login/logout/callback URL construction - reverse proxy and forwarded-header trust chains - auditing, cache keys, and absolute URL generation Potential consequences include: - bypass of host-based ACLs - virtual host or tenant isolation failures - incorrect or attacker-influenced redirect/callback targets - inconsistent proxy/downstream interpretation of the original target host - misleading logs and audit records #### Technical Root Cause 1. On the HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 metadata builder paths: - `:authority` is parsed separately into authority/URI state - `Host` is preserved as a normal request header - the two values are not compared for consistency 2. On the HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 server entry paths: - Jetty calls `ComplianceUtils.verify(httpCompliance, requestMetaData, listener)` - this verification does not enforce `MISMATCHED_AUTHORITY` 3. On the HTTP/1.1 path: - Jetty explicitly checks whether authority and `Host` match - mismatches are rejected by default #### Relevant Code Locations HTTP/2 metadata builder: - `jetty-core/jetty-http2/jetty-http2-hpack/src/main/java/org/eclipse/jetty/http2/hpack/internal/MetaDataBuilder.java` HTTP/3 metadata builder: - `jetty-core/jetty-http3/jetty-http3-qpack/src/main/java/org/eclipse/jetty/http3/qpack/internal/metadata/MetaDataBuilder.java` HTTP/2 server entry: - `jetty-core/jetty-http2/jetty-http2-server/src/main/java/org/eclipse/jetty/http2/server/internal/HttpStreamOverHTTP2.java` HTTP/3 server entry: - `jetty-core/jetty-http3/jetty-http3-server/src/main/java/org/eclipse/jetty/http3/server/internal/HttpStreamOverHTTP3.java` Shared HTTP compliance verification: - `jetty-core/jetty-http/src/main/java/org/eclipse/jetty/http/ComplianceUtils.java` HTTP/1.1 authority/Host consistency check: - `jetty-core/jetty-server/src/main/java/org/eclipse/jetty/server/internal/HttpConnection.java` Defined but not enforced on H2/H3: - `jetty-core/jetty-http/src/main/java/org/eclipse/jetty/http/HttpCompliance.java` - violation: MISMATCHED_AUTHORITY #### Reproduction I reproduced this on local Jetty 12.1.9-SNAPSHOT source. Minimal reproduction steps: 1. Start a Jetty HTTP/2 or HTTP/3 test server. 2. Send a request with: - :authority = localhost:<port> - Host = evil.example:<port> 3. In the request handler, inspect both: - Request.getServerName(request) - request.getHeaders().get(HttpHeader.HOST) 4. Observe whether Jetty rejects the request or allows both values to remain visible. Observed result: - HTTP/2: request is accepted and returns 200 - HTTP/3: request is accepted and returns 200 - the server can observe both: - serverName=localhost - hostHeader=evil.example:<port> This shows that a single attacker-controlled request can preserve two conflicting host interpretations inside Jetty. #### Tests Used HTTP/2 rejection test: - `org.eclipse.jetty.http2.tests.HTTP2Test#testRejectMismatchedHostHeaderAndAuthority` HTTP/2 exploitability test: - `org.eclipse.jetty.http2.tests.HTTP2Test#testMismatchedHostHeaderAndAuthoritySplitsAuthorityFromHostHeader` HTTP/3 rejection test: - `org.eclipse.jetty.http3.tests.HandlerClientServerTest#testRejectMismatchedHostHeaderAndAuthority` HTTP/3 exploitability test: - `org.eclipse.jetty.http3.tests.HandlerClientServerTest#testMismatchedHostHeaderAndAuthoritySplitsAuthorityFromHostHeader` Observed behavior: - both rejection tests fail because Jetty returns 200 instead of 400 - both exploitability tests pass, confirming that Jetty exposes different host values to different layers #### Project-Internal Evidence of Real Impact Examples: - `jetty-openid` uses `Request.getServerName(request)` to construct redirect URLs - `jetty-ee11-proxy` uses the raw `Host` header when building `Forwarded` This indicates that the issue is not merely theoretical: Jetty’s own ecosystem already contains code paths where different host sources are used for different purposes. #### Affected Version Confirmed affected version: - 12.1.9-SNAPSHOT Other versions may also be affected if they share the same HTTP/2 / HTTP/3 request construction and compliance-validation logic. I have not yet completed a historical version matrix and would recommend confirming exact affected ranges from Jetty’s branch history. #### Suggested Fix Recommend adding HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 validation equivalent to the existing HTTP/1.1 authority/Host consistency check: - if both :authority and regular Host are present - normalize and compare them - if they do not match, reject the request with 400 Bad Request - route the failure through the existing MISMATCHED_AUTHORITY compliance mechanism Also adding explicit HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 regression coverage for this case. #### Disclosure Status - not publicly disclosed - no public issue filed - shared only privately with the Jetty security contacts |
| Status | Published |
| Exploitability | 0.5 |
| Weighted Severity | 4.8 |
| Risk | 2.4 |
| Affected and Fixed Packages | Package Details |
| Introduced and Fixed Package Commit Patches | Package Commit Patches Details |
| CWE-20 | Improper Input Validation |
| System | Score | Found at |
|---|---|---|
| cvssv3.1 | 5.3 | https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/07/GHSA-7p3p-8qv8-m2vh/GHSA-7p3p-8qv8-m2vh.json |
| generic_textual | MODERATE |
No EPSS data available for this advisory.
| Patch URL | |
|---|---|
| There are no known patches. | |
| Attack Vector (AV) | Attack Complexity (AC) | Privileges Required (PR) | User Interaction (UI) | Scope (S) | Confidentiality Impact (C) | Integrity Impact (I) | Availability Impact (A) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
network adjacent_network local physical |
low high |
none low high |
none required |
unchanged changed |
high low none |
high low none |
high low none |
There are no SSVC decisions available.