Staging Environment: Content and features may be unstable or change without notice.
Advisory details: github_osv / GHSA-9392-pj54-qqf8
Advisory ID github_osv/GHSA-9392-pj54-qqf8
Aliases CVE-2026-47696
Summary WWBN AVideo: Authenticated wallet credit bypass in AuthorizeNet processPayment endpoint ### Summary `plugin/AuthorizeNet/processPayment.json.php` credits the logged-in user's wallet based only on the attacker-controlled `amount` POST parameter. The endpoint contains a TODO for real Authorize.Net charging, hardcodes `$paymentSuccess = true`, and then calls `YPTWallet::addBalance()` without validating any Authorize.Net transaction, webhook signature, hosted payment token, nonce, or server-side payment record. This allows any logged-in user to add arbitrary funds to their own AVideo wallet when the `AuthorizeNet` and `YPTWallet` plugins are enabled. ### Details Affected file: `plugin/AuthorizeNet/processPayment.json.php` Relevant code: ```php $amount = isset($_POST['amount']) ? floatval($_POST['amount']) : 0; $userData = isset($_POST['userData']) ? $_POST['userData'] : []; if ($amount <= 0) { echo json_encode(['error' => 'Invalid amount']); exit; } // TODO: Implement payment logic using Authorize.Net API // Example: Call Authorize.Net API here // $result = $plugin->chargePayment($amount, $userData); // Simulate payment success for now $paymentSuccess = true; $users_id = @User::getId(); if ($paymentSuccess && !empty($users_id)) { $walletPlugin = AVideoPlugin::loadPluginIfEnabled("YPTWallet"); if ($walletPlugin) { $walletPlugin->addBalance($users_id, $amount, 'Authorize.Net one-time payment'); echo json_encode(['success' => true, 'result' => 'Payment processed and wallet updated']); exit; } } ``` Vulnerable flow: 1. `$_POST['amount']` is read from the client. 2. The endpoint only checks that the amount is greater than zero. 3. The real Authorize.Net charge is not performed. 4. `$paymentSuccess` is hardcoded to true. 5. The logged-in user's wallet is credited with the client-supplied amount. There is no verification of: - Authorize.Net transaction ID - payment token - webhook signature - pending payment record - expected server-side amount - currency - duplicate transaction/replay state ### PoC Prerequisites: - AVideo with AuthorizeNet plugin enabled - YPTWallet plugin enabled - Attacker has any valid user account Steps: 1. Log in as a low-privileged user. 2. Open the wallet page and record the current balance. 3. Send the following request with the user's authenticated session cookie: ``` curl -i -s -b 'PHPSESSID=<user_session>' \ -X POST 'https://target.example/plugin/AuthorizeNet/processPayment.json.php' \ --data 'amount=9999&userData[note]=poc' ``` 4. The endpoint returns: ``` {"success":true,"result":"Payment processed and wallet updated"} ``` 5. Refresh the wallet page. 6. The wallet balance is increased by 9999. No Authorize.Net hosted payment page, card payment, transaction confirmation, webhook, or server-side payment validation is required. ### Impact A normal authenticated user can mint arbitrary wallet balance. Depending on the target site's configuration, this may allow the attacker to: - purchase paid videos or subscriptions without payment - abuse any feature backed by YPTWallet - transfer fake funds to other users - manipulate accounting or payout-related workflows - bypass monetization controls ### Recommended fix - Remove or disable `processPayment.json.php` if it is obsolete. - Never credit wallet balance from client-supplied `amount` alone. - Use the existing Authorize.Net hosted token / webhook / transaction reconciliation flow. - Require a verified Authorize.Net transaction ID and server-side amount lookup before calling `addBalance()`. - Add regression tests proving arbitrary POSTs cannot credit a wallet.
Status Published
Exploitability 0.5
Weighted Severity 6.4
Risk 3.2
Affected and Fixed Packages Package Details
Introduced and Fixed Package Commit Patches Package Commit Patches Details
Weaknesses (1)
No exploits are available.

No EPSS data available for this advisory.

Patch URL
There are no known patches.
Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N Found at https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/06/GHSA-9392-pj54-qqf8/GHSA-9392-pj54-qqf8.json
Attack Vector (AV) Attack Complexity (AC) Privileges Required (PR) User Interaction (UI) Scope (S) Confidentiality Impact (C) Integrity Impact (I) Availability Impact (A)

network

adjacent_network

local

physical

low

high

none

low

high

none

required

unchanged

changed

high

low

none

high

low

none

high

low

none

Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Found at https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/06/GHSA-9392-pj54-qqf8/GHSA-9392-pj54-qqf8.json
Attack Vector (AV) Attack Complexity (AC) Attack Requirements (AT) Privileges Required (PR) User Interaction (UI) Vulnerable System Impact Confidentiality (VC) Vulnerable System Impact Integrity (VI) Vulnerable System Impact Availability (VA) Subsequent System Impact Confidentiality (SC) Subsequent System Impact Integrity (SI) Subsequent System Impact Availability (SA)

network

adjacent

local

physical

low

high

none

present

none

low

high

none

passive

active

high

low

none

high

low

none

high

low

none

high

low

none

high

low

none

high

low

none

Vector: SSVCv2/E:P/A:Y/T:P/P:M/B:A/M:M/D:T/2026-05-29T14:03:48Z/

Decision: Track

Source URL: https://github.com/cisagov/vulnrichment/blob/develop/2026/47xxx/CVE-2026-47696.json

Source Advisory: vulnrichment/CVE-2026-47696

View SSVC decision tree
[{'Exploitation': 'poc'},
 {'Automatable': 'yes'},
 {'Technical Impact': 'partial'},
 {'Mission Prevalence': 'minimal'},
 {'Public Well-being Impact': 'material'},
 {'Mission & Well-being': 'medium'}]