Advisory details:
github_osv / GHSA-hgg8-fqqc-vfmw
| Advisory ID | github_osv/GHSA-hgg8-fqqc-vfmw |
| Aliases |
CVE-2026-54236
|
| Summary | vLLM: incomplete CVE-2026-22778 fix leaks PIL repr addresses via Anthropic router # vLLM: incomplete CVE-2026-22778 fix leaks PIL repr addresses via the Anthropic API router **Researcher:** Kai Aizen — SnailSploit (@SnailSploit), Adversarial & Offensive Security Research **Severity:** CVSS 3.1 5.3 (Medium) `AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N` **Target:** https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm --- ## Summary The fix for CVE-2026-22778 / GHSA-4r2x-xpjr-7cvv (PRs #31987 and #32319) introduced `sanitize_message` and applied it at four FastAPI exception-handling sites in the OpenAI router. The sanitizer strips object-repr memory addresses (`<_io.BytesIO object at 0x7a95e299e750>` → `<_io.BytesIO object>`) before error messages reach the client, defeating the ASLR-bypass primitive that CVE-2026-22778 chained with a libopenjp2 heap overflow for RCE. The fix is incomplete: response paths added to vLLM at or after the same time as the fix continue to echo `str(exc)` directly to clients without `sanitize_message`. The original Stage 1 primitive — sending malformed image bytes so PIL raises `UnidentifiedImageError` whose message contains the BytesIO object repr — reaches all of them unmodified and leaks the heap address verbatim in the response body. All five lines below are present in `main` HEAD (`771e1e48b`, 2026-05-26). ## Affected sites Current `main` HEAD (`771e1e48b`, 2026-05-26): | # | File | Line | Code | |---|---|---|---| | 1 | `vllm/entrypoints/anthropic/api_router.py` | 78 | `message=str(e),` (inside `POST /v1/messages` exception handler) | | 2 | `vllm/entrypoints/anthropic/api_router.py` | 124 | `message=str(e),` (inside `POST /v1/messages/count_tokens`) | | 3 | `vllm/entrypoints/anthropic/serving.py` | 808 | `error=AnthropicError(type="internal_error", message=str(e)),` (SSE streaming converter) | | 4 | `vllm/entrypoints/speech_to_text/realtime/connection.py` | 75 | `await self.send_error(str(e), "processing_error")` (WebSocket event loop) | | 5 | `vllm/entrypoints/speech_to_text/realtime/connection.py` | 265 | `await self.send_error(str(e), "processing_error")` (WebSocket generation loop) | ## Why the global exception handler does not save these paths `api_server.py` registers a catch-all `app.exception_handler(Exception)(exception_handler)` at line 262, and that handler calls `create_error_response(exc)` which DOES apply `sanitize_message`. However, FastAPI exception handlers fire only on **unhandled** exceptions that propagate out of a route function. All affected HTTP paths catch `Exception` *inside* the route coroutine and construct the response themselves: ```python # vllm/entrypoints/anthropic/api_router.py:71-81 (POST /v1/messages) try: generator = await handler.create_messages(request, raw_request) except Exception as e: logger.exception("Error in create_messages: %s", e) return JSONResponse( status_code=HTTPStatus.INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR.value, content=AnthropicErrorResponse( error=AnthropicError( type="internal_error", message=str(e), # <-- unsanitized ) ).model_dump(), ) ``` Because the exception is caught and a `JSONResponse` is returned in-route, every registered FastAPI exception handler — including the sanitizing global one — is bypassed. The WebSocket path bypasses it for a different reason: WebSocket frames don't traverse FastAPI's HTTP exception handler chain at all. ## Reachability — the same primitive as the parent CVE The Anthropic Messages API accepts image content parts in the request body (`type: "image"` with base64 `source.data` or `type: "image_url"`). Image bytes are passed to the same multimodal loader used by the OpenAI router. Malformed bytes cause `PIL.Image.open` to raise: ``` UnidentifiedImageError: cannot identify image file <_io.BytesIO object at 0x7a95e299e750> ``` The exception propagates up through `handler.create_messages` into the `except Exception as e:` at `api_router.py:75`. `str(e)` returns the exception message verbatim, including the address. The address ends up in the `error.message` field of the JSON response body returned to the attacker. ASLR entropy on the affected process drops from ~4 billion to ~8 candidates, identically to CVE-2026-22778 Stage 1. The same primitive is reachable on `POST /v1/messages/count_tokens` (route #2), inside the SSE streaming converter when an exception is raised mid-stream (route #3), and over the realtime speech-to-text WebSocket when audio decoder or generation paths raise an exception containing any object repr (routes #4, #5). ## Chronology — these are scope misses, not legacy code - **2026-01-09:** PR #31987 (`aa125ecf0`) introduces `sanitize_message` and applies it to OpenAI router HTTP exception handlers. - **2026-01-15** (six days later): PR #32369 (`4c1c501a7`) adds `vllm/entrypoints/anthropic/api_router.py` containing line 78's `message=str(e)`. The fix was not applied to the new router. - **2026-03-02** (~two months later): PR #35588 (`9a87b0578`) adds the Anthropic `count_tokens` endpoint, replicating the same `message=str(e)` pattern at line 124. - **2026-05-12** (~four months later): PR #42370 (`d37e25ffb`) consolidates speech-to-text entrypoints and the realtime WebSocket uses `send_error(str(e), ...)` for both error paths. - **2026-05-26:** current `main` HEAD, all five lines still present. ## CVSS v3.1 `AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N` — Base 5.3 (MEDIUM) The parent CVE-2026-22778 was 9.8 (CRITICAL) because it chained the Stage 1 leak with a Stage 2 libopenjp2 heap overflow. Stage 2 is patched in OpenCV ≥ 4.13.0 (PR #32668 bumped the requirement), so Stage 1 alone here is a partial ASLR-bypass info-disclosure primitive rather than a complete RCE. Deployments that ship vLLM alongside an older OpenCV/libopenjp2 (system OpenCV on long-LTS distros, custom Docker images, downstream rebuilds) re-enable the full chain via the affected endpoints. ## CWE CWE-532 (Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File / Error Message). Same CWE assigned to the parent CVE-2026-22778. ## Remediation ### 1. Apply `sanitize_message` symmetrically to the five sites ```python # vllm/entrypoints/anthropic/api_router.py — add at top: from vllm.entrypoints.utils import sanitize_message # Line 78 (POST /v1/messages) and Line 124 (count_tokens): message=sanitize_message(str(e)), ``` ```python # vllm/entrypoints/anthropic/serving.py — add at top: from vllm.entrypoints.utils import sanitize_message # Line 808: error=AnthropicError(type="internal_error", message=sanitize_message(str(e))), ``` ```python # vllm/entrypoints/speech_to_text/realtime/connection.py — add at top: from vllm.entrypoints.utils import sanitize_message # Lines 75 and 265: await self.send_error(sanitize_message(str(e)), "processing_error") ``` ### 2. Tighten the regex (defense in depth) The current regex `r" at 0x[0-9a-f]+>"` is narrow — it only matches the exact CPython builtin object-repr suffix in lowercase hex with a trailing `>`. Future Python versions, C extensions, or custom `__repr__` methods could produce non-matching formats that re-enable the leak: ```python # vllm/entrypoints/utils.py def sanitize_message(message: str) -> str: # Strip any standalone hex address; downstream observers don't need them. return re.sub(r"\b0x[0-9a-fA-F]{6,}\b", "0x?", message) ``` ### 3. Future-proofing: consider a response middleware Both the route-local exception handling pattern (Anthropic router) and the WebSocket path bypass FastAPI's exception handler chain. A response-level middleware that always invokes `sanitize_message` on outgoing error bodies would prevent this class of regression entirely. ## Affected versions - All vLLM versions containing `vllm/entrypoints/anthropic/api_router.py` (introduced 2026-01-15 in PR #32369). - All vLLM versions containing `vllm/entrypoints/speech_to_text/realtime/connection.py` (introduced 2026-05-12 in PR #42370). - Confirmed present in `main` HEAD `771e1e48b` (2026-05-26). ## References - Parent advisory: https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-4r2x-xpjr-7cvv (CVE-2026-22778) - Fix PRs to model the patch on: #31987, #32319, #32668 - `vllm/entrypoints/utils.py:sanitize_message`: https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/771e1e48b/vllm/entrypoints/utils.py#L323-L326 - `vllm/entrypoints/anthropic/api_router.py` leak site: https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/771e1e48b/vllm/entrypoints/anthropic/api_router.py#L78 ## Steps to reproduce 1. Clone the target: `git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm` 2. Run the proof of concept (`PoC.py`) against the cloned source. 3. Observe the result shown under *Verified result* below. ## Credit Kai Aizen — SnailSploit (@SnailSploit). Adversarial & Offensive Security Research. ## Fix A fix for this vulnerability was added here: https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/45119 |
| Status | Published |
| Exploitability | 0.5 |
| Weighted Severity | 4.8 |
| Risk | 2.4 |
| Affected and Fixed Packages | Package Details |
| Introduced and Fixed Package Commit Patches | Package Commit Patches Details |
| System | Score | Found at |
|---|---|---|
| cvssv3.1 | 5.3 | https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/06/GHSA-hgg8-fqqc-vfmw/GHSA-hgg8-fqqc-vfmw.json |
| generic_textual | MODERATE |
No EPSS data available for this advisory.
| Patch URL | |
|---|---|
| There are no known patches. | |
| Attack Vector (AV) | Attack Complexity (AC) | Privileges Required (PR) | User Interaction (UI) | Scope (S) | Confidentiality Impact (C) | Integrity Impact (I) | Availability Impact (A) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
network adjacent_network local physical |
low high |
none low high |
none required |
unchanged changed |
high low none |
high low none |
high low none |
Vector: SSVCv2/E:P/A:Y/T:P/P:M/B:A/M:M/D:T/2026-06-23T12:32:56Z/
Decision: Track
Source URL: https://github.com/cisagov/vulnrichment/blob/develop/2026/54xxx/CVE-2026-54236.json
Source Advisory: vulnrichment/CVE-2026-54236
[{'Exploitation': 'poc'},
{'Automatable': 'yes'},
{'Technical Impact': 'partial'},
{'Mission Prevalence': 'minimal'},
{'Public Well-being Impact': 'material'},
{'Mission & Well-being': 'medium'}]