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Advisory details: github_osv / GHSA-hvcg-qmg6-jm4c
Advisory ID github_osv/GHSA-hvcg-qmg6-jm4c
Aliases CVE-2026-50020
Summary Netty: HttpObjectDecoder skips arbitrary initial control characters when only initial CRLF characters are permitted ## Summary Before reading the first request-line, `HttpObjectDecoder` skips every byte for which `Character.isISOControl(b)` is `true` (0x00–0x1F and 0x7F) as well as all whitespace. RFC 9112 §2.2 only asks servers to ignore **empty CRLF lines** preceding the request-line — a carefully scoped robustness allowance intended to handle HTTP/1.0 POST workarounds. Silently absorbing NUL bytes, SOH, STX, and other non-CRLF control characters goes significantly beyond this, and can be exploited for request-boundary confusion in pipelined or multiplexed transports where a front-end component treats those bytes differently. ## Affected Code | File | Lines | Role | |------|-------|------| | `codec-http/src/main/java/io/netty/handler/codec/http/HttpObjectDecoder.java` | 1298–1313 | `ISO_CONTROL_OR_WHITESPACE` static initialiser — marks all ISO control chars | | `codec-http/src/main/java/io/netty/handler/codec/http/HttpObjectDecoder.java` | 1307–1313 | `SKIP_CONTROL_CHARS_BYTES` `ByteProcessor` — skips the entire set | | `codec-http/src/main/java/io/netty/handler/codec/http/HttpObjectDecoder.java` | 1275–1289 | `LineParser.skipControlChars` — advances `readerIndex` past all matching bytes | ## Specification Analysis ### RFC 9112 §2.2 — Message Parsing > In the interest of robustness, a server that is expecting to receive and parse a > request-line **SHOULD ignore at least one empty line (CRLF)** received prior to the > request-line. > An HTTP/1.1 user agent **MUST NOT** preface or follow a request with an extra CRLF. ### Deviation The RFC names a single permitted exception: an **empty line** (bare CRLF, i.e. the two-byte sequence `\r\n`). The `ISO_CONTROL_OR_WHITESPACE` table is initialised as: ```java for (byte b = Byte.MIN_VALUE; b < Byte.MAX_VALUE; b++) { ISO_CONTROL_OR_WHITESPACE[128 + b] = Character.isISOControl(b) || isWhitespace(b); } ``` `Character.isISOControl` returns `true` for `0x00`–`0x1F` and `0x7F`. This includes NUL (`0x00`), SOH (`0x01`), STX (`0x02`), BEL (`0x07`), DEL (`0x7F`), and every other non-CRLF control character. The `SKIP_CONTROL_CHARS` state runs this scan unconditionally before the first `READ_INITIAL`, meaning any sequence of such bytes prepended to a request is silently consumed. A load balancer or TLS terminator that does not perform the same scan sees a different message boundary than Netty does, which is the basis of a request-desync / smuggling attack. ## Suggested Unit Test Add to `HttpRequestDecoderTest.java`. ```java @Test public void testNonCrlfControlBytesPrecedingRequestLineAreRejected() { // RFC 9112 §2.2: servers SHOULD ignore "at least one empty line (CRLF)" before the // request-line. Non-CRLF control bytes are not part of this robustness allowance // and must not be silently swallowed. EmbeddedChannel channel = new EmbeddedChannel(new HttpRequestDecoder()); ByteBuf buf = Unpooled.buffer(); buf.writeByte(0x00); // NUL — not an empty CRLF line buf.writeByte(0x01); // SOH — not an empty CRLF line buf.writeCharSequence( "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: example.com\r\n\r\n", CharsetUtil.US_ASCII); channel.writeInbound(buf); HttpRequest req = channel.readInbound(); // Current behaviour: NUL and SOH are in ISO_CONTROL_OR_WHITESPACE, so they are // silently skipped; the request decodes successfully and isFailure() == false. // // RFC-correct behaviour: only empty CRLF lines should be ignored; NUL/SOH must // cause a parse error — isFailure() == true. assertTrue( req.decoderResult().isFailure(), "Non-CRLF control bytes before the request-line must not be silently skipped " + "(RFC 9112 §2.2 allows only empty CRLF lines)"); assertFalse(channel.finish()); } ``` **Current behaviour (unfixed):** `skipControlChars` advances past `0x00` and `0x01` because both are in `ISO_CONTROL_OR_WHITESPACE`; the request parses normally, `isFailure()` is `false` → test **fails**. **Expected behaviour after fix:** only CRLF empty lines are tolerated; non-CRLF control bytes produce an error, `isFailure()` is `true` → test **passes**.
Status Published
Exploitability 0.5
Weighted Severity 4.8
Risk 2.4
Affected and Fixed Packages Package Details
Introduced and Fixed Package Commit Patches Package Commit Patches Details
Weaknesses (1)
No exploits are available.

No EPSS data available for this advisory.

Patch URL
There are no known patches.
Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N Found at https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/06/GHSA-hvcg-qmg6-jm4c/GHSA-hvcg-qmg6-jm4c.json
Attack Vector (AV) Attack Complexity (AC) Privileges Required (PR) User Interaction (UI) Scope (S) Confidentiality Impact (C) Integrity Impact (I) Availability Impact (A)

network

adjacent_network

local

physical

low

high

none

low

high

none

required

unchanged

changed

high

low

none

high

low

none

high

low

none

There are no SSVC decisions available.