Advisory details:
github_osv / GHSA-jw8g-5j46-44rp
| Advisory ID | github_osv/GHSA-jw8g-5j46-44rp |
| Aliases |
CVE-2026-43877
|
| Summary | AVideo: CSRF in userSavePhoto.php Allows Cross-Origin Overwrite of Authenticated Users' Profile Photos with Arbitrary Content ## Summary `objects/userSavePhoto.php` is a legacy profile-photo endpoint that accepts a base64 POST parameter and writes the decoded bytes to `videos/userPhoto/photo<users_id>.png`. Its only access control is `User::isLogged()`. It does not end in `.json.php`, so it is excluded from the project's global `autoCSRFGuard` (which is suffix-scoped in `objects/include_config.php`). There is no CSRF token, no Origin/Referer check, and no MIME validation of the decoded bytes. Because AVideo's default cookie policy is `SameSite=None; Secure` on HTTPS (`objects/functionsPHP.php:227`), an attacker who lures a logged-in user to a malicious page can overwrite that user's profile photo with arbitrary bytes and also triggers a site-wide `clearCache(true)` on every forged request. ## Details Handler (`objects/userSavePhoto.php`, 51 lines total): ```php // line 12 - only access control if (!User::isLogged()) { $obj->msg = __("You must be logged"); die(json_encode($obj)); } // ... // line 29 - unvalidated base64 from POST $fileData = base64DataToImage($_POST['imgBase64']); // line 30 - deterministic filename tied to the VICTIM's session $fileName = 'photo'. User::getId().'.png'; $photoURL = $imagePath.$fileName; // line 35 - raw bytes written to disk $bytes = file_put_contents($global['systemRootPath'].$photoURL, $fileData); // lines 43-48 - DB update + global cache invalidation unconditionally $user = new User(User::getId()); $user->setPhotoURL($photoURL); if ($user->save()) { User::deleteOGImage(User::getId()); User::updateSessionInfo(); clearCache(true); } ``` `base64DataToImage` (`objects/functionsImages.php:1026`) performs no content validation: ```php function base64DataToImage($imgBase64) { $img = $imgBase64; $img = str_replace('data:image/png;base64,', '', $img); $img = str_replace(' ', '+', $img); return base64_decode($img); } ``` There is no call to `getimagesizefromstring`, `imagecreatefromstring`, or MIME detection. Arbitrary bytes up to `post_max_size` are accepted. **Why the global CSRF guard does not apply.** `objects/include_config.php` (around line 314) only invokes `autoCSRFGuard` when the script filename matches `*.json.php`: ```php if (... $_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] === 'POST' && substr($baseName, -9) === '.json.php') { autoCSRFGuard($baseName, $_SERVER['SCRIPT_FILENAME']); } ``` `userSavePhoto.php` is missing the `.json.php` suffix, so neither `autoCSRFGuard` nor `forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest` runs. There is no explicit call to any of these in the file (verified by grep: no `getCSRF`, no `forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest`, no `HTTP_ORIGIN`, no `HTTP_REFERER`). Routing rewrites in `.htaccess` also expose this handler as `/savePhoto`. **Why the victim's cookie is sent cross-origin.** `objects/functionsPHP.php:227`: ```php function _getCookieSameSiteValue($secure) { return $secure ? 'None' : 'Lax'; } ``` On HTTPS (the expected deployment), session cookies default to `SameSite=None; Secure`, which browsers attach to cross-site POSTs. A plain `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` form POST is a "simple request" under CORS rules and does not trigger a preflight, so the browser sends the POST and its cookie without the server having to opt in. ## PoC 1. Victim logs into the AVideo instance (e.g., `https://victim.example.com`). `PHPSESSID` is set with `SameSite=None; Secure`. 2. Attacker hosts the following HTML on any domain: ```html <!doctype html> <html><body> <form id="f" action="https://victim.example.com/objects/userSavePhoto.php" method="POST"> <!-- Any bytes: here, 'HELLO WORLD' base64-encoded --> <input name="imgBase64" value="SEVMTE8gV09STEQ="> </form> <script>document.forms[0].submit();</script> </body></html> ``` 3. Victim visits the attacker page in the same browser. The form auto-submits. The browser sends the POST with the victim's session cookie. 4. `userSavePhoto.php` passes the `User::isLogged()` check, decodes the base64, and writes the raw bytes to `videos/userPhoto/photo<VICTIM_USERS_ID>.png`. It also calls `$user->save()`, `User::deleteOGImage()`, `User::updateSessionInfo()`, and `clearCache(true)`. 5. Fetching `https://victim.example.com/videos/userPhoto/photo<VICTIM_USERS_ID>.png` (the file is now the attacker's bytes — `HELLO WORLD` in this test case). The response is `200 OK` and the body equals the submitted bytes. Replace the `imgBase64` payload with a valid PNG to make the defacement visually persuasive, or with up to ~6 MB of any bytes to force a large write. ## Impact - **Integrity — profile defacement of any logged-in user.** One click lets an attacker replace a victim's profile photo with arbitrary bytes: offensive imagery, misleading branding, or a clone of another user's photo for impersonation. The file path is deterministic (`photo<users_id>.png`), so the attacker can later direct others to the overwritten URL. - **Availability — global cache thrash.** Every successful forged request calls `clearCache(true)`, invalidating application-wide caches. Repeatedly tricking logged-in users into visiting the attacker page (e.g., by including the payload as a hidden iframe on a popular site) produces sustained cache invalidation. - **Availability — disk pressure.** With no size cap beyond PHP's `post_max_size` (default 8 MB → ~6 MB after base64 decode), each forged submission writes a multi-megabyte file. Across many victims this enables distributed disk exhaustion. - **No confidentiality impact** and no code execution (files are served with `Content-Type: image/png` based on extension, so SVG-with-script payloads are not interpreted). - **Related endpoints.** `objects/userSaveBackground.php` exhibits the same pattern (same `base64DataToImage` sink, same lack of CSRF/Origin/MIME checks) and is exploitable identically; fix should be applied consistently. ## Recommended Fix Apply the existing same-origin guard that protects the `*.json.php` endpoints and add content validation. In `objects/userSavePhoto.php`, immediately after the login check: ```php require_once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'objects/functionsSecurity.php'; forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest('userSavePhoto'); $raw = $_POST['imgBase64'] ?? ''; if (strlen($raw) > 2 * 1024 * 1024) { // ~1.5 MB decoded cap $obj->msg = __('Image too large'); die(json_encode($obj)); } $fileData = base64DataToImage($raw); if ($fileData === false || $fileData === '' || @imagecreatefromstring($fileData) === false) { $obj->msg = __('Invalid image'); die(json_encode($obj)); } ``` The longer-term fix is to broaden the global guard in `objects/include_config.php` so that `autoCSRFGuard` covers every authenticated POST handler, not only those whose filenames end in `.json.php` — the current suffix-based gating is a footgun that silently excludes legacy endpoints like `userSavePhoto.php` and `userSaveBackground.php`. Also consider moving the `clearCache(true)` call inside the `if ($bytes)` branch so that zero-byte writes do not invalidate the global cache. |
| Status | Published |
| Exploitability | 0.5 |
| Weighted Severity | 4.9 |
| Risk | 2.5 |
| Affected and Fixed Packages | Package Details |
| Introduced and Fixed Package Commit Patches | Package Commit Patches Details |
| System | Score | Found at |
|---|---|---|
| cvssv3.1 | 5.4 | https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/05/GHSA-jw8g-5j46-44rp/GHSA-jw8g-5j46-44rp.json |
| generic_textual | MODERATE |
No EPSS data available for this advisory.
| Patch URL | |
|---|---|
| There are no known patches. | |
| Attack Vector (AV) | Attack Complexity (AC) | Privileges Required (PR) | User Interaction (UI) | Scope (S) | Confidentiality Impact (C) | Integrity Impact (I) | Availability Impact (A) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
network adjacent_network local physical |
low high |
none low high |
none required |
unchanged changed |
high low none |
high low none |
high low none |
There are no SSVC decisions available.