Staging Environment: Content and features may be unstable or change without notice.
Advisory details: github_osv / GHSA-rrj9-5q2j-4gvr
Advisory ID github_osv/GHSA-rrj9-5q2j-4gvr
Aliases CVE-2026-48747
Summary Symfony: Mailomat Mailer Webhook Parser Reads the HMAC Algorithm from the Request: Signature Algorithm Downgrade ### Description `Symfony\Component\Mailer\Bridge\Mailomat\Webhook\MailomatRequestParser::validateSignature()` parses the `X-MOM-Webhook-Signature` request header as `algo=signature` and passes the wire-supplied `$algo` directly to `hash_hmac()` when verifying the request against the configured webhook secret. The request therefore selects the HMAC primitive used to authenticate it. PHP's `hash_hmac()` enforces only that the chosen algorithm is HMAC-compatible. That set still includes primitives with known cryptanalysis (`md4`, `md5`, `ripemd128`, `tiger128,3`, … — e.g. existential forgery of HMAC-MD4, Contini & Yin, ASIACRYPT 2006). This is the canonical algorithm-confusion shape, analogous to JWT `alg=none` / `alg=HS256` downgrades: any future cryptographic weakness in any HMAC primitive PHP exposes becomes immediately exploitable against a Mailomat webhook receiver, the moment an attacker is in a position to compute a signature for that primitive, without a code change on the Symfony side. Mailomat's [documented webhook security](https://api.mailomat.swiss/docs/#tag/webhook-security) pins SHA-256; the parser did not. ### Resolution `MailomatRequestParser::validateSignature()` now requires the signature header to be of the form `sha256=<hex>` and verifies the signature with HMAC-SHA256 keyed by the configured secret using a constant-time comparison. Any other algorithm declared on the wire (including the HMAC primitives PHP would otherwise accept) is rejected. The patch for this issue is available [here](https://github.com/symfony/symfony/commit/bdfe9fe0d94d33dfaca0bc2fe0b00b54767b0c88) for branch 7.4 (and forward-ported to 8.0 and 8.1). ### Credits Symfony would like to thank Omar Alshammari, Essam Alanazi and Alwaleed Alshammari for reporting the issue and Nicolas Grekas for providing the fix.
Status Published
Exploitability 0.5
Weighted Severity 0.0
Risk
Affected and Fixed Packages Package Details
Introduced and Fixed Package Commit Patches Package Commit Patches Details
Weaknesses (2)
System Score Found at
generic_textual MODERATE
No exploits are available.

No EPSS data available for this advisory.

Patch URL
There are no known patches.
There are no known vectors.

Vector: SSVCv2/E:N/A:N/T:P/P:M/B:A/M:M/D:T/2026-07-15T14:22:33Z/

Decision: Track

Source URL: https://github.com/cisagov/vulnrichment/blob/develop/2026/48xxx/CVE-2026-48747.json

Source Advisory: vulnrichment/CVE-2026-48747

View SSVC decision tree
[{'Exploitation': 'none'},
 {'Automatable': 'no'},
 {'Technical Impact': 'partial'},
 {'Mission Prevalence': 'minimal'},
 {'Public Well-being Impact': 'material'},
 {'Mission & Well-being': 'medium'}]