Staging Environment: Content and features may be unstable or change without notice.
Advisory details: github_osv / GHSA-wfq5-qgqp-hvhv
Advisory ID github_osv/GHSA-wfq5-qgqp-hvhv
Aliases CVE-2026-33035
Summary Unauthenticated Reflected XSS via innerHTML in AVideo ## Summary AVideo contains a reflected XSS vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary JavaScript in a victim's browser. User input from a URL parameter flows through PHP's `json_encode()` into a JavaScript function that renders it via `innerHTML`, bypassing encoding and achieving full script execution. ## Root Cause The vulnerability is caused by two issues working together: ### 1. Source: Unescaped user input passed to JavaScript (videoNotFound.php) **File:** `view/videoNotFound.php` line 49 ```php if (!empty($_REQUEST['404ErrorMsg'])) { echo 'avideoAlertInfo(' . json_encode($_REQUEST['404ErrorMsg']) . ');'; } ``` PHP's `json_encode()` with default flags only escapes quotes (`"` → `\"`) and backslashes. It does **NOT** escape HTML special characters (`<`, `>`, `/`). The resulting string contains raw HTML tags that are passed directly to JavaScript. ### 2. Sink: innerHTML renders HTML tags as executable DOM (script.js) **File:** `view/js/script.js` ```javascript function avideoAlertInfo(msg) { // line ~1891 avideoAlert("", msg, 'info'); // calls ↓ } function avideoAlert(title, msg, type) { // line ~1270 avideoAlertHTMLText(title, msg, type); // calls ↓ } function avideoAlertHTMLText(title, msg, type) { // line ~1451 var span = document.createElement("span"); span.innerHTML = msg; // line 1464 — XSS SINK swal({ content: span }); } ``` `innerHTML` parses the string as HTML. Any `<img>`, `<svg>`, or other HTML tags with event handlers are instantiated as real DOM elements, triggering JavaScript execution. ### Data Flow ``` URL parameter (?404ErrorMsg=PAYLOAD) → $_REQUEST['404ErrorMsg'] → json_encode() ← does NOT escape < > / → avideoAlertInfo() → avideoAlert() → avideoAlertHTMLText() → span.innerHTML = msg ← renders HTML tags, executes JS ``` --- ## Proof of Concept ``` https://localhost/view/videoNotFound.php?404ErrorMsg=<img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)> ``` <img width="1918" height="1035" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/20077ce2-5b49-4bd3-a7df-ab48be786cc1" /> The page renders: ```javascript avideoAlertInfo("<img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)>"); ``` Which flows to `span.innerHTML = "<img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)>"`. The browser creates an `<img>` element, `src=x` fails to load, `onerror` fires `alert(document.domain)`. ## Affected Code | File | Line | Issue | |------|------|-------| | `view/videoNotFound.php` | 49 | `json_encode()` does not escape `<` `>` for HTML context | | `view/js/script.js` | 1464 | `span.innerHTML = msg` renders user input as HTML | | `view/js/script.js` | 1282 | `span.innerHTML = msg` in `avideoAlertWithCookie()` | | `view/js/script.js` | 1335 | `span.innerHTML = __(msg,true)` in `avideoConfirm()` | | `view/js/script.js` | 1358 | `span.innerHTML = msg` in `avideoAlertOnceForceConfirm()` | The `innerHTML` sink exists in 4 functions. Any future code that passes user input to `avideoAlertInfo()`, `avideoAlertWarning()`, `avideoAlertDanger()`, or `avideoAlertSuccess()` will create additional XSS vectors. ## Remediation ### Fix 1: Escape HTML in PHP (source fix) ```php // view/videoNotFound.php line 49 // BEFORE (vulnerable): echo 'avideoAlertInfo(' . json_encode($_REQUEST['404ErrorMsg']) . ');'; // AFTER (fixed): echo 'avideoAlertInfo(' . json_encode($_REQUEST['404ErrorMsg'], JSON_HEX_TAG | JSON_HEX_AMP) . ');'; ``` `JSON_HEX_TAG` converts `<` → `\u003C` and `>` → `\u003E`, preventing HTML injection. ### Fix 2: Use textContent instead of innerHTML (sink fix, recommended) ```javascript // view/js/script.js - all alert functions // BEFORE (vulnerable): span.innerHTML = msg; // AFTER (fixed): span.textContent = msg; ``` `textContent` treats the string as plain text — HTML tags are displayed literally, never parsed or executed. ### Fix 3: Add Content-Security-Policy header (defense in depth) ``` Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' ``` ## Impact - **Session hijacking** — steal `PHPSESSID` cookie (not HttpOnly by default) - **Account takeover** — use stolen session to change password or email - **Phishing** — inject a realistic login form inside the SweetAlert modal - **Worm propagation** — inject self-spreading payloads via comments/messages - **Admin compromise** — send crafted link to admin, steal session, gain full control
Status Published
Exploitability 0.5
Weighted Severity 4.8
Risk 2.4
Affected and Fixed Packages Package Details
Introduced and Fixed Package Commit Patches Package Commit Patches Details
Weaknesses (1)
No exploits are available.

No EPSS data available for this advisory.

Patch URL
There are no known patches.
Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N Found at https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/03/GHSA-wfq5-qgqp-hvhv/GHSA-wfq5-qgqp-hvhv.json
Attack Vector (AV) Attack Complexity (AC) Attack Requirements (AT) Privileges Required (PR) User Interaction (UI) Vulnerable System Impact Confidentiality (VC) Vulnerable System Impact Integrity (VI) Vulnerable System Impact Availability (VA) Subsequent System Impact Confidentiality (SC) Subsequent System Impact Integrity (SI) Subsequent System Impact Availability (SA)

network

adjacent

local

physical

low

high

none

present

none

low

high

none

passive

active

high

low

none

high

low

none

high

low

none

high

low

none

high

low

none

high

low

none

Vector: SSVCv2/E:P/A:N/T:P/P:M/B:A/M:M/D:T/2026-03-20T15:39:55Z/

Decision: Track

Source URL: https://github.com/cisagov/vulnrichment/blob/develop/2026/33xxx/CVE-2026-33035.json

Source Advisory: vulnrichment/CVE-2026-33035

View SSVC decision tree
[{'Exploitation': 'poc'},
 {'Automatable': 'no'},
 {'Technical Impact': 'partial'},
 {'Mission Prevalence': 'minimal'},
 {'Public Well-being Impact': 'material'},
 {'Mission & Well-being': 'medium'}]