Advisory details:
github_osv / GHSA-x3pr-vrhq-vq43
| Advisory ID | github_osv/GHSA-x3pr-vrhq-vq43 |
| Aliases |
CVE-2026-33492
|
| Summary | AVideo has Session Fixation via GET PHPSESSID Parameter With Disabled Login Session Regeneration ## Summary AVideo's `_session_start()` function accepts arbitrary session IDs via the `PHPSESSID` GET parameter and sets them as the active PHP session. A session regeneration bypass exists for specific blacklisted endpoints when the request originates from the same domain. Combined with the explicitly disabled session regeneration in `User::login()`, this allows a classic session fixation attack where an attacker can fix a victim's session ID before authentication and then hijack the authenticated session. ## Details The vulnerability is a chain of three weaknesses that together enable session fixation: ### 1. Attacker-controlled session ID acceptance (`objects/functionsPHP.php:344-367`) ```php function _session_start(array $options = []) { // ... if (isset($_GET['PHPSESSID']) && !_empty($_GET['PHPSESSID'])) { $PHPSESSID = $_GET['PHPSESSID']; // ... if (!User::isLogged()) { if ($PHPSESSID !== session_id()) { _session_write_close(); session_id($PHPSESSID); // <-- sets session to attacker's ID } $session = @session_start($options); // <-- starts with attacker's ID ``` The code reads `$_GET['PHPSESSID']` and programmatically calls `session_id($PHPSESSID)`, which bypasses both `session.use_only_cookies` and `session.use_strict_mode` PHP settings since the session ID is set via the PHP API, not via cookie/URL handling. ### 2. Session regeneration bypass for blacklisted endpoints (`objects/functionsPHP.php:375-378`, `objects/functions.php:3100-3116`) ```php // functionsPHP.php:375-378 if (!blackListRegenerateSession()) { _session_regenerate_id(); // <-- SKIPPED when blacklisted + same-domain } ``` ```php // functions.php:3100-3116 function blackListRegenerateSession() { if (!requestComesFromSafePlace()) { return false; } $list = [ 'objects/getCaptcha.php', 'objects/userCreate.json.php', 'objects/videoAddViewCount.json.php', ]; foreach ($list as $needle) { if (str_ends_with($_SERVER['SCRIPT_NAME'], $needle)) { return true; // <-- regeneration skipped for these endpoints } } return false; } ``` The `requestComesFromSafePlace()` check at `objects/functionsSecurity.php:182` only verifies that `HTTP_REFERER` matches the AVideo domain. When a victim clicks a link from within the AVideo platform (e.g., in a comment or video description), the browser naturally sets the Referer to the AVideo domain, satisfying this check. ### 3. Disabled session regeneration on login (`objects/user.php:1315-1317`) ```php // Call custom session regenerate logic // this was regenerating the session all the time, making harder to save info in the session //_session_regenerate_id(); // <-- COMMENTED OUT ``` The session regeneration after authentication is explicitly disabled. This means the session ID persists unchanged through the login transition, which is the fundamental requirement for session fixation to succeed. ### Amplifying factors - `objects/phpsessionid.json.php` exposes session IDs to any same-origin JavaScript without authentication (line 12: `$obj->phpsessid = session_id()`) - `view/js/session.js` stores the session ID in a global `window.PHPSESSID` variable and logs it to console (line 15) - No session-to-IP or session-to-user-agent binding exists (verified via codebase search) ## PoC ### Step 1: Attacker obtains a session ID ```bash # Attacker visits the site to get a valid session ID curl -v https://target.example.com/ 2>&1 | grep 'set-cookie.*PHPSESSID' # Response: Set-Cookie: PHPSESSID=attacker_known_session_id; ... ``` ### Step 2: Attacker injects a link on the platform The attacker posts a comment on a video or creates content containing a link: ``` https://target.example.com/objects/getCaptcha.php?PHPSESSID=attacker_known_session_id ``` This can be placed in a video comment, video description, user bio, or forum post — anywhere AVideo renders user-provided links. ### Step 3: Victim clicks the link while browsing AVideo When the victim clicks the link from within the AVideo platform: 1. Browser sets `Referer: https://target.example.com/...` (same-domain) 2. `_session_start()` processes `$_GET['PHPSESSID']`, victim is not logged in, so `session_id('attacker_known_session_id')` is called 3. `blackListRegenerateSession()` returns `true` (script is `getCaptcha.php` + same-domain Referer) 4. `_session_regenerate_id()` is **skipped** 5. Victim's session is now fixed to `attacker_known_session_id` ### Step 4: Victim logs in The victim navigates to the login page and authenticates. `User::login()` populates `$_SESSION['user']` but does NOT regenerate the session ID (line 1317 is commented out). ### Step 5: Attacker hijacks the authenticated session ```bash # Attacker uses the known session ID to access victim's account curl -b "PHPSESSID=attacker_known_session_id" https://target.example.com/objects/user.php?userAPI=1 # Response: victim's user data, confirming session hijack ``` ## Impact - **Full account takeover**: An attacker can hijack any user's authenticated session, including administrator accounts - **Data access**: Full access to the victim's videos, private content, messages, and personal information - **Privilege escalation**: If the victim is an admin, the attacker gains full administrative control over the AVideo instance - **Lateral actions**: The attacker can perform any action as the victim — upload/delete content, modify settings, access admin panel ## Recommended Fix ### Fix 1: Re-enable session regeneration on login (`objects/user.php:1317`) ```php // Replace the commented-out line: //_session_regenerate_id(); // With: _session_regenerate_id(); ``` This is the most critical fix. Session regeneration on authentication transition is a fundamental defense against session fixation (OWASP recommendation). ### Fix 2: Remove GET-based session ID acceptance (`objects/functionsPHP.php:344-383`) Remove or restrict the `$_GET['PHPSESSID']` handling entirely. If it is needed for specific use cases (e.g., CAPTCHA), validate the session ID against a server-side token rather than blindly accepting arbitrary values: ```php // Instead of accepting any GET PHPSESSID, remove this block entirely. // If CAPTCHA requires session continuity, pass a CSRF token instead. if (isset($_GET['PHPSESSID']) && !_empty($_GET['PHPSESSID'])) { // REMOVED: Do not accept session IDs from URL parameters } ``` ### Fix 3: Remove session ID exposure (`objects/phpsessionid.json.php`, `view/js/session.js`) The `phpsessionid.json.php` endpoint and the `session.js` global variable negate the `httponly` cookie flag. If JavaScript needs to reference the session for AJAX requests, the browser automatically includes session cookies — there is no need to expose the session ID value to JavaScript. |
| Status | Published |
| Exploitability | 0.5 |
| Weighted Severity | 6.6 |
| Risk | 3.3 |
| Affected and Fixed Packages | Package Details |
| Introduced and Fixed Package Commit Patches | Package Commit Patches Details |
| CWE-384 | Session Fixation |
| System | Score | Found at |
|---|---|---|
| cvssv3.1 | 7.3 | https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/03/GHSA-x3pr-vrhq-vq43/GHSA-x3pr-vrhq-vq43.json |
| generic_textual | HIGH |
No EPSS data available for this advisory.
| Patch URL | |
|---|---|
| There are no known patches. | |
| Attack Vector (AV) | Attack Complexity (AC) | Privileges Required (PR) | User Interaction (UI) | Scope (S) | Confidentiality Impact (C) | Integrity Impact (I) | Availability Impact (A) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
network adjacent_network local physical |
low high |
none low high |
none required |
unchanged changed |
high low none |
high low none |
high low none |
There are no SSVC decisions available.