Advisory details:
gitlab / maven/org.apache.tomcat.embed/tomcat-embed-core/CVE-2020-1938
| Advisory ID | gitlab/maven/org.apache.tomcat.embed/tomcat-embed-core/CVE-2020-1938 |
| Aliases |
CVE-2020-1938
GHSA-c9hw-wf7x-jp9j |
| Summary | Improper Privilege Management When using the Apache JServ Protocol (AJP), care must be taken when trusting incoming connections to Apache Tomcat. Tomcat treats AJP connections as having higher trust than, for example, a similar HTTP connection. If such connections are available to an attacker, they can be exploited in ways that may be surprising. In Apache Tomcat 9.0.0.M1 to 9.0.0.30, 8.5.0 to 8.5.50 and 7.0.0 to 7.0.99, Tomcat shipped with an AJP Connector enabled by default that listened on all configured IP addresses. It was expected (and recommended in the security guide) that this Connector would be disabled if not required. This vulnerability report identified a mechanism that allowed: - returning arbitrary files from anywhere in the web application - processing any file in the web application as a JSP Further, if the web application allowed file upload and stored those files within the web application (or the attacker was able to control the content of the web application by some other means) then this, along with the ability to process a file as a JSP, made remote code execution possible. It is important to note that mitigation is only required if an AJP port is accessible to untrusted users. Users wishing to take a defence-in-depth approach and block the vector that permits returning arbitrary files and execution as JSP may upgrade to Apache Tomcat 9.0.31, 8.5.51 or 7.0.100 or later. A number of changes were made to the default AJP Connector configuration in 9.0.31 to harden the default configuration. It is likely that users upgrading to 9.0.31, 8.5.51 or 7.0.100 or later will need to make small changes to their configurations. |
| Status | Published |
| Exploitability | 0.5 |
| Weighted Severity | 0.0 |
| Risk | |
| Affected and Fixed Packages | Package Details |
| Introduced and Fixed Package Commit Patches | Package Commit Patches Details |
| Data source | Metasploit |
|---|---|
| Description | When using the Apache JServ Protocol (AJP), care must be taken when trusting incoming connections to Apache Tomcat. Tomcat treats AJP connections as having higher trust than, for example, a similar HTTP connection. If such connections are available to an attacker, they can be exploited in ways that may be surprising. In Apache Tomcat 9.0.0.M1 to 9.0.0.30, 8.5.0 to 8.5.50 and 7.0.0 to 7.0.99, Tomcat shipped with an AJP Connector enabled by default that listened on all configured IP addresses. It was expected (and recommended in the security guide) that this Connector would be disabled if not required. This vulnerability report identified a mechanism that allowed: - returning arbitrary files from anywhere in the web application - processing any file in the web application as a JSP. Further, if the web application allowed file upload and stored those files within the web application (or the attacker was able to control the content of the web application by some other means) then this, along with the ability to process a file as a JSP, made remote code execution possible. It is important to note that mitigation is only required if an AJP port is accessible to untrusted users. Users wishing to take a defence-in-depth approach and block the vector that permits returning arbitrary files and execution as JSP may upgrade to Apache Tomcat 9.0.31, 8.5.51 or 7.0.100 or later. A number of changes were made to the default AJP Connector configuration in 9.0.31 to harden the default configuration. It is likely that users upgrading to 9.0.31, 8.5.51 or 7.0.100 or later will need to make small changes to their configurations. |
| Note | AKA: - Ghostcat Stability: - crash-safe Reliability: [] SideEffects: [] |
| Ransomware campaign use | Unknown |
| Source publication date | Feb. 20, 2020 |
| Source URL | https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/tree/master/modules/auxiliary/admin/http/tomcat_ghostcat.rb |
| Data source | KEV |
|---|---|
| Date added | March 3, 2022 |
| Description | Apache Tomcat treats Apache JServ Protocol (AJP) connections as having higher trust than, for example, a similar HTTP connection. If such connections are available to an attacker, they can be exploited. |
| Required action | Apply updates per vendor instructions. |
| Due date | March 17, 2022 |
| Note | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1938 |
| Ransomware campaign use | Unknown |
| Data source | Exploit-DB |
|---|---|
| Date added | Feb. 27, 2020 |
| Description | Apache Tomcat - AJP 'Ghostcat File Read/Inclusion |
| Ransomware campaign use | Unknown |
| Source publication date | Feb. 20, 2020 |
| Exploit type | webapps |
| Platform | multiple |
| Source update date | March 2, 2020 |
| Source URL | https://github.com/YDHCUI/CNVD-2020-10487-Tomcat-Ajp-lfi/blob/8bd38f4cf22331ecf4e48096a78c5931509c26be/CNVD-2020-10487-Tomcat-Ajp-lfi.py |
No EPSS data available for this advisory.
| Patch URL | |
|---|---|
| There are no known patches. | |
| Exploitability (E) | Access Vector (AV) | Access Complexity (AC) | Authentication (Au) | Confidentiality Impact (C) | Integrity Impact (I) | Availability Impact (A) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
high functional unproven proof_of_concept not_defined |
local adjacent_network network |
high medium low |
multiple single none |
none partial complete |
none partial complete |
none partial complete |
| Attack Vector (AV) | Attack Complexity (AC) | Privileges Required (PR) | User Interaction (UI) | Scope (S) | Confidentiality Impact (C) | Integrity Impact (I) | Availability Impact (A) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
network adjacent_network local physical |
low high |
none low high |
none required |
unchanged changed |
high low none |
high low none |
high low none |
Vector: SSVCv2/E:A/A:Y/T:T/P:M/B:A/M:M/D:C/2025-02-06T21:05:38Z/
Decision: Act
Source URL: https://github.com/cisagov/vulnrichment/blob/develop/2020/1xxx/CVE-2020-1938.json
Source Advisory: vulnrichment/CVE-2020-1938
[{'Exploitation': 'active'},
{'Automatable': 'yes'},
{'Technical Impact': 'total'},
{'Mission Prevalence': 'minimal'},
{'Public Well-being Impact': 'material'},
{'Mission & Well-being': 'medium'}]