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Advisory details: pypa / vllm/PYSEC-2026-4179
Advisory ID pypa/vllm/PYSEC-2026-4179
Aliases CVE-2026-57173
GHSA-hcwq-8wjf-3gcr
PYSEC-2026-4179
Summary vLLM: Unauthenticated audio decompression-bomb DoS in /v1/chat/completions ### Summary The audio decode-duration guard (`max_duration_s`, env `VLLM_MAX_AUDIO_DECODE_DURATION_S`, default 600s) that protects against audio decompression-bomb DoS is wired into **only** the speech-to-text path (`/v1/audio/transcriptions`). The **chat** audio path (`/v1/chat/completions`, `input_audio` content parts) calls the same decoder with **no** limit, so an **unauthenticated** client can submit a few-KB compressed audio file that expands to multiple GB of float32 PCM at decode time, OOM-killing the worker. This is a distinct sibling of **CVE-2026-5497** (video frame-count bomb, `VideoMediaIO.load_base64`) and **GHSA-pq5c-rjhq-qp7p** (image) in the same media subsystem. Verified against `main` at HEAD `d78650c` (2026-06-16); applicable to the latest release v0.23.0. ### Details The guard rejects long audio *during* decode (before allocation), implemented in `vllm/multimodal/media/audio.py`: - `load_audio_pyav` — metadata reject (~82-98) and live sample-count reject (~129-136) - `load_audio_soundfile` — frames reject (~165-174) All are gated on `if max_duration_s is not None`. It is passed in exactly **one** place — the transcription serving layer: ```python # .../speech_to_text/base/serving.py:~170-174 load_audio(buf, sr=..., max_duration_s=self.max_audio_decode_duration_s) # self.max_audio_decode_duration_s = envs.VLLM_MAX_AUDIO_DECODE_DURATION_S (default 600) ``` The chat path never threads it: ```python # vllm/multimodal/media/audio.py:237-238 def load_bytes(self, data: bytes) -> tuple[npt.NDArray, float]: return load_audio(BytesIO(data), sr=None) # no max_duration_s -> every guard above is skipped ``` Unauthenticated reachability chain (chat): `parse_input_audio` (`chat_utils.py`) -> `parse_audio` -> `connector.fetch_audio` -> `AudioMediaIO._load_data_url` -> `load_base64` -> `load_bytes` -> `load_audio(..., sr=None)`. The connector never passes `max_duration_s`, and inline `data:` URLs need no HTTP fetch (so `VLLM_AUDIO_FETCH_TIMEOUT` does not bound them). The OpenAI-compatible server has no auth by default (auth only when `--api-key` / `VLLM_API_KEY` is set). ### Impact Unauthenticated remote denial of service (availability) via memory amplification on a default-no-auth endpoint, on any deployment serving an audio-capable model. Same class and impact as the sibling CVE-2026-5497 (video). CWE-770 / CWE-409. ### Fix A fix was introduced in this MR: https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/45908
Status Published
Exploitability 0.5
Weighted Severity 5.9
Risk 3.0
Affected and Fixed Packages Package Details
Introduced and Fixed Package Commit Patches Package Commit Patches Details
Weaknesses (0)
There are no known CWE.
No exploits are available.

No EPSS data available for this advisory.

Patch URL
There are no known patches.
Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H Found at https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/blob/main/vulns/vllm/PYSEC-2026-4179.yaml
Attack Vector (AV) Attack Complexity (AC) Privileges Required (PR) User Interaction (UI) Scope (S) Confidentiality Impact (C) Integrity Impact (I) Availability Impact (A)

network

adjacent_network

local

physical

low

high

none

low

high

none

required

unchanged

changed

high

low

none

high

low

none

high

low

none

There are no SSVC decisions available.