Advisory details:
pypa / vllm/PYSEC-2026-4306
| Advisory ID | pypa/vllm/PYSEC-2026-4306 |
| Aliases |
CVE-2026-105756
GHSA-2823-qmq8-rwvj PYSEC-2026-4306 |
| Summary | vLLM: Loose `cache_salt` validation lets a single request kill EngineCore on LMCache-MP deployments — uncaught downstream `ValueError` denial of service ## Affected - **Ecosystem / package:** pip / `vllm` - **Affected versions:** vLLM ≤ 0.25.1 (confirmed on 0.25.1, commit [`752a3a504485`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/tree/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34)). The lower bound predates 0.25.1; maintainers can confirm how far back the loose `cache_salt` validator and unguarded scheduling-path lookup reach. ## Summary vLLM's OpenAI-compatible request models (Completions, Chat Completions, Responses) accept a client-supplied `cache_salt` field and validate it only as "must be a non-empty string" — no character or length restrictions. On a deployment with the built-in LMCache-MP KV connector enabled, that value is stored verbatim on the request tracker and forwarded unguarded as a keyword argument into the scheduler's per-step cache lookup. The downstream LMCache library applies a *stricter* check in `IPCCacheServerKey.__post_init__`, which raises `ValueError` for any `cache_salt` containing `@`, `/`, `\`, or NUL (or longer than 128 characters). Neither the LMCache-MP connector lookup call site nor `Scheduler.schedule()` wraps that call in a request-scoped `try`/`except`, so the `ValueError` propagates uncaught into `EngineCore`'s top-level handler, which treats any uncaught exception as fatal and kills the whole engine process. A single publicly reachable request with, for example, `cache_salt="/"` therefore takes down the engine for all concurrent users. vLLM's boundary validator is looser than the downstream consumer's, and the gap is never converted into a request-scoped failure on the scheduling path. ## Affected code Links pinned to the confirmed commit [`752a3a504485`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/tree/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34) (v0.25.1): - The three `check_cache_salt_support` validators require only a non-empty string — no character or length bound: [`vllm/entrypoints/openai/completion/protocol.py#L502-L508`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/entrypoints/openai/completion/protocol.py#L502-L508) (field at [`#L172`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/entrypoints/openai/completion/protocol.py#L172)), [`vllm/entrypoints/openai/chat_completion/protocol.py#L913-L919`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/entrypoints/openai/chat_completion/protocol.py#L913-L919) (field at [`#L425`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/entrypoints/openai/chat_completion/protocol.py#L425)), and [`vllm/entrypoints/openai/responses/protocol.py#L459-L465`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/entrypoints/openai/responses/protocol.py#L459-L465) (field at [`#L235`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/entrypoints/openai/responses/protocol.py#L235)). The loose test itself is at [`completion #L503-L505`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/entrypoints/openai/completion/protocol.py#L503-L505), [`chat_completion #L914-L916`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/entrypoints/openai/chat_completion/protocol.py#L914-L916), [`responses #L460-L462`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/entrypoints/openai/responses/protocol.py#L460-L462). - Two further request models accept `cache_salt` with the same or weaker checking, and should be hardened at the same time: [`vllm/entrypoints/pooling/base/protocol.py#L74-L85`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/entrypoints/pooling/base/protocol.py#L74-L85) carries the identical non-empty-string-only validator (field at [`#L59`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/entrypoints/pooling/base/protocol.py#L59)), and the token-in-token-out scale-out `GenerateRequest` exposes the field with **no** `cache_salt` validator at all: [`vllm/entrypoints/scale_out/token_in_token_out/protocol.py#L110`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/entrypoints/scale_out/token_in_token_out/protocol.py#L110). - The LMCache-MP request tracker stores the salt verbatim: [`vllm/distributed/kv_transfer/kv_connector/v1/lmcache_mp_connector.py#L189`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/distributed/kv_transfer/kv_connector/v1/lmcache_mp_connector.py#L189) (`LMCacheMPRequestTracker`), assignment at [`#L223`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/distributed/kv_transfer/kv_connector/v1/lmcache_mp_connector.py#L223). - The lookup call forwards `cache_salt` with no surrounding `try`: [`vllm/distributed/kv_transfer/kv_connector/v1/lmcache_mp_connector.py#L733-L774`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/distributed/kv_transfer/kv_connector/v1/lmcache_mp_connector.py#L733-L774) (`get_num_new_matched_tokens` → `maybe_submit_lookup_request(...)` at [`#L770`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/distributed/kv_transfer/kv_connector/v1/lmcache_mp_connector.py#L770)). - The scheduler invokes the connector unguarded: [`vllm/v1/core/sched/scheduler.py#L739`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/v1/core/sched/scheduler.py#L739) (`self.connector.get_num_new_matched_tokens(...)`, inside [`schedule()` at #L396](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/v1/core/sched/scheduler.py#L396)). - The generic top-level handler treats the exception as fatal: [`vllm/v1/engine/core.py#L1229-L1235`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/v1/engine/core.py#L1229-L1235) — the `except Exception` in `run_engine_core` ([`#L1154`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/v1/engine/core.py#L1154)) logs `EngineCore encountered a fatal error.`, calls `_send_engine_dead()`, and re-raises. - Downstream strict validator (external LMCache library, not vLLM): `IPCCacheServerKey.__post_init__` in `lmcache/v1/multiprocess/custom_types.py` rejects `@ / \` NUL and >128-char salts (`_SALT_FORBIDDEN_CHARS = frozenset("@/\\\x00")`) by raising `ValueError`. The three OpenAI `check_cache_salt_support` validators are identical; the completion one is representative — a non-empty-string test with no character or length bound: ```python # vllm/entrypoints/openai/completion/protocol.py Lines 503-509 if data.get("cache_salt") is not None and ( not isinstance(data["cache_salt"], str) or not data["cache_salt"] ): raise VLLMValidationError( "Parameter 'cache_salt' must be a non-empty string if provided.", parameter="cache_salt", ) ``` On the scheduling path the connector is invoked with no surrounding `try` — a `ValueError` from the downstream salt check propagates straight out of `schedule()`: ```python # vllm/v1/core/sched/scheduler.py Lines 736-742 # Get externally-cached tokens if using a KVConnector. if self.connector is not None: ext_tokens, load_kv_async = ( self.connector.get_num_new_matched_tokens( request, num_new_local_computed_tokens ) ) ``` `run_engine_core`'s generic handler — the next `except` up the stack — treats that as fatal, marks the engine dead, and re-raises: ```python # vllm/v1/engine/core.py Lines 1229-1235 except Exception as e: if engine_core is None: logger.exception("EngineCore failed to start.") else: logger.exception("EngineCore encountered a fatal error.") engine_core._send_engine_dead() raise e ``` ## Impact Availability only. `cache_salt` is an attacker-controlled, publicly reachable request field that vLLM validates too loosely. A value such as `"/"` passes vLLM's check, reaches the stricter downstream validator, and its `ValueError` is never converted into a request-scoped failure — instead it kills the EngineCore process, a denial of service for every concurrent request on that server (HTTP failures, then `/health` failing). Applicability: the built-in LMCache-MP KV connector must be enabled (`lmcache >= 0.4.4`), which is itself an opt-in KV-connector boundary. On such deployments no other special configuration is required, and the crash is a resource-availability failure rather than expected behavior of the opt-in feature. ## Suggested Fix Two independent fixes: 1. **Tighten admission** — add one shared `validate_cache_salt()` helper (for example in `vllm/entrypoints/openai/engine/protocol.py`) that matches or exceeds the downstream `IPCCacheServerKey` rules — reject `@`, `/`, `\`, NUL, and >128-character salts at the HTTP boundary with a 4xx — and route every request model that exposes `cache_salt` through it: the three `check_cache_salt_support` validators above, the pooling base request, and the token-in-token-out `GenerateRequest` (which has no validator today). 2. **Defense in depth** — wrap the LMCache-MP lookup call reached from `Scheduler.schedule()` so a downstream validator `ValueError` becomes a request-scoped failure instead of an EngineCore-fatal exception. This is the fix that also covers future divergence between vLLM's and LMCache's salt rules; the right failure semantics (fail the request vs. fall back to a cold lookup) is a maintainer design call. The core of fix 1 is a single shared helper; each `check_cache_salt_support` body then becomes `validate_cache_salt(data.get("cache_salt"))`, and `GenerateRequest` gains an equivalent `mode="before"` validator: ```python # vllm/entrypoints/openai/engine/protocol.py — new shared helper _CACHE_SALT_FORBIDDEN_CHARS = frozenset("@/\\\x00") _MAX_CACHE_SALT_LENGTH = 128 def validate_cache_salt(cache_salt: object) -> None: """Validate cache salts before they reach downstream cache backends.""" if cache_salt is None: return if not isinstance(cache_salt, str) or not cache_salt: raise VLLMValidationError( "Parameter 'cache_salt' must be a non-empty string if provided.", parameter="cache_salt", ) if len(cache_salt) > _MAX_CACHE_SALT_LENGTH or any( char in _CACHE_SALT_FORBIDDEN_CHARS for char in cache_salt ): raise VLLMValidationError( "Parameter 'cache_salt' must be at most 128 characters and must " "not contain '@', '/', '\\\\', or NUL.", parameter="cache_salt", ) ``` This distinguishes the finding from **[GHSA-6qc9-v4r8-22xg](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-6qc9-v4r8-22xg)**: that advisory fixed only the `guided_json`/`xgrammar` trigger of the same `schedule()`-into-`run_engine_core` fatal-handler family, so the `cache_salt` admission gap and the `schedule()`-level defense-in-depth (fix 2) survive its published fix. A patch implementing fix 1 across all five request models, with a regression test covering the rejected (`"/"`, 129-char) and accepted salt shapes, applies to v0.25.1 with line offsets and no fuzz. ## Credit **Reported by:** Patch the Planet (Trail of Bits + OpenAI collaboration) This vulnerability was discovered using GPT-5.5-Cyber as part of the Patch the Planet security initiative. --- **Proposed fix:** a fix for this issue is proposed in a public pull request: https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/51444 |
| Status | Published |
| Exploitability | 0.5 |
| Weighted Severity | 5.9 |
| Risk | 3.0 |
| Affected and Fixed Packages | Package Details |
| Introduced and Fixed Package Commit Patches | Package Commit Patches Details |
| There are no known CWE. |
| System | Score | Found at |
|---|---|---|
| cvssv3.1 | 6.5 | https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/blob/main/vulns/vllm/PYSEC-2026-4306.yaml |
No EPSS data available for this advisory.
| Patch URL | |
|---|---|
| There are no known patches. | |
| Attack Vector (AV) | Attack Complexity (AC) | Privileges Required (PR) | User Interaction (UI) | Scope (S) | Confidentiality Impact (C) | Integrity Impact (I) | Availability Impact (A) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
network adjacent_network local physical |
low high |
none low high |
none required |
unchanged changed |
high low none |
high low none |
high low none |
There are no SSVC decisions available.