Advisory Weakness Curation

OpenZeppelin Contracts contains Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature ### Cause `is_valid_eth_signature` is missing a call to `finalize_keccak` after calling `verify_eth_signature`. ### Impact As a result, any contract using `is_valid_eth_signature` from the account library (such as the `EthAccount` preset) is vulnerable to a malicious sequencer. Specifically, the malicious sequencer would be able to bypass signature validation to impersonate an instance of these accounts. ### Risk In order to exploit this vulnerability, it is required to control a sequencer or prover since they're the ones executing the hints, being able to inject incorrect keccak results. Today StarkWare is the only party running both a prover or a sequencer, greatly reducing the risk of exploit. ### Patches The issue has been patched in 0.6.1. ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in the Contracts for Cairo repository https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/cairo-contracts/issues/new/choose * Email us at [security@openzeppelin.com](mailto:security@openzeppelin.com)

Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature OpenZeppelin Contracts for Cairo is a library for secure smart contract development written in Cairo for StarkNet, a decentralized ZK Rollup. `is_valid_eth_signature` is missing a call to `finalize_keccak` after calling `verify_eth_signature`. As a result, any contract using `is_valid_eth_signature` from the account library (such as the `EthAccount` preset) is vulnerable to a malicious sequencer. Specifically, the malicious sequencer would be able to bypass signature validation to impersonate an instance of these accounts. The issue has been patched in 0.6.1.

OpenZeppelin Contracts contains Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature ### Cause `is_valid_eth_signature` is missing a call to `finalize_keccak` after calling `verify_eth_signature`. ### Impact As a result, any contract using `is_valid_eth_signature` from the account library (such as the `EthAccount` preset) is vulnerable to a malicious sequencer. Specifically, the malicious sequencer would be able to bypass signature validation to impersonate an instance of these accounts. ### Risk In order to exploit this vulnerability, it is required to control a sequencer or prover since they're the ones executing the hints, being able to inject incorrect keccak results. Today StarkWare is the only party running both a prover or a sequencer, greatly reducing the risk of exploit. ### Patches The issue has been patched in 0.6.1. ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in the Contracts for Cairo repository https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/cairo-contracts/issues/new/choose * Email us at [security@openzeppelin.com](mailto:security@openzeppelin.com)