Advisory Package Curation

PraisonAI Vulnerable to RCE via Automatic tools.py Import PraisonAI automatically imports `./tools.py` from the current working directory when launching certain components. This includes call.py, tool_resolver.py, and CLI tool-loading paths. A malicious tools.py placed in the process working directory is executed immediately, allowing arbitrary Python code execution in the host environment. ### Affected Code - call.py → `import_tools_from_file()` - tool_resolver.py → `_load_local_tools()` - tools.py → local tool import flow - ### PoC Create tools.py in the directory where PraisonAI is launched: ```python # tools.py import os os.system("echo pwned > /tmp/pwned.txt") ``` Run any PraisonAI component that loads local tools, for example: ```bash praisonai workflow run safe.yaml ``` ### Reproduction Steps 1. Create a malicious tools.py in the current working directory. 2. Start PraisonAI or invoke a CLI command that loads local tools. 3. Verify that `/tmp/pwned.txt` or the malicious command output exists. ### Impact An attacker who can place or influence tools.py in the working directory can execute arbitrary code in the PraisonAI process, compromising the host and any connected data. **Reporter:** Lakshmikanthan K (letchupkt)

PraisonAI Vulnerable to RCE via Automatic tools.py Import PraisonAI automatically imports `./tools.py` from the current working directory when launching certain components. This includes call.py, tool_resolver.py, and CLI tool-loading paths. A malicious tools.py placed in the process working directory is executed immediately, allowing arbitrary Python code execution in the host environment.

PraisonAI Vulnerable to RCE via Automatic tools.py Import PraisonAI automatically imports `./tools.py` from the current working directory when launching certain components. This includes call.py, tool_resolver.py, and CLI tool-loading paths. A malicious tools.py placed in the process working directory is executed immediately, allowing arbitrary Python code execution in the host environment. ### Affected Code - call.py → `import_tools_from_file()` - tool_resolver.py → `_load_local_tools()` - tools.py → local tool import flow - ### PoC Create tools.py in the directory where PraisonAI is launched: ```python # tools.py import os os.system("echo pwned > /tmp/pwned.txt") ``` Run any PraisonAI component that loads local tools, for example: ```bash praisonai workflow run safe.yaml ``` ### Reproduction Steps 1. Create a malicious tools.py in the current working directory. 2. Start PraisonAI or invoke a CLI command that loads local tools. 3. Verify that `/tmp/pwned.txt` or the malicious command output exists. ### Impact An attacker who can place or influence tools.py in the working directory can execute arbitrary code in the PraisonAI process, compromising the host and any connected data. **Reporter:** Lakshmikanthan K (letchupkt)

PraisonAI Vulnerable to RCE via Automatic tools.py Import PraisonAI automatically imports `./tools.py` from the current working directory when launching certain components. This includes call.py, tool_resolver.py, and CLI tool-loading paths. A malicious tools.py placed in the process working directory is executed immediately, allowing arbitrary Python code execution in the host environment. ### Affected Code - call.py → `import_tools_from_file()` - tool_resolver.py → `_load_local_tools()` - tools.py → local tool import flow - ### PoC Create tools.py in the directory where PraisonAI is launched: ```python # tools.py import os os.system("echo pwned > /tmp/pwned.txt") ``` Run any PraisonAI component that loads local tools, for example: ```bash praisonai workflow run safe.yaml ``` ### Reproduction Steps 1. Create a malicious tools.py in the current working directory. 2. Start PraisonAI or invoke a CLI command that loads local tools. 3. Verify that `/tmp/pwned.txt` or the malicious command output exists. ### Impact An attacker who can place or influence tools.py in the working directory can execute arbitrary code in the PraisonAI process, compromising the host and any connected data. **Reporter:** Lakshmikanthan K (letchupkt)