CSRF token fixation in fastify-passport
The CSRF
https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/csrf protection enforced by the `@fastify/csrf-protection` library, when combined with `@fastify/passport`, can be bypassed by network and same-site attackers.
## Details
`fastify/csrf-protection` implements the synchronizer token pattern
https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Cross-Site_Request_Forgery_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html#synchronizer-token-pattern (using plugins `@fastify/session` and `@fastify/secure-session`) by storing a random value used for CSRF token generation in the `_csrf` attribute of a user's session.
The `@fastify/passport` library does not clear the session object upon authentication, preserving the `_csrf` attribute between pre-login and authenticated sessions. Consequently, CSRF tokens generated before authentication are still valid. Network and same-site attackers
https://canitakeyoursubdomain.name/ can thus obtain a CSRF token for their pre-session, fixate that pre-session in the victim's browser via cookie tossing, and then perform a CSRF attack after the victim authenticates.
## Fix
As a solution, newer versions of `@fastify/passport` include the configuration options
* `clearSessionOnLogin (default: true)` and
* `clearSessionIgnoreFields (default: ['session'])`
to clear all the session attributes by default, preserving those explicitly defined in `clearSessionIgnoreFields`.
## Credits
* Pedro Adão (@pedromigueladao), Instituto Superior Técnico, University of Lisbon
https://tecnico.ulisboa.pt/
* Marco Squarcina (@lavish), Security & Privacy Research Unit, TU Wien
https://secpriv.wien/