Advisory Severity Curation

Path traversal in spotipy ### Summary If a malicious URI is passed to the library, the library can be tricked into performing an operation on a different API endpoint than intended. ### Details The code Spotipy uses to parse URIs and URLs https://github.com/spotipy-dev/spotipy/blob/master/spotipy/client.py#L1942 accepts user data too liberally which allows a malicious user to insert arbitrary characters into the path that is used for API requests. Because it is possible to include `..`, an attacker can redirect for example a track lookup via `spotifyApi.track()` to an arbitrary API endpoint like playlists, but this is possible for other endpoints as well. Before the security advisory feature was enabled on GitHub, I was already in contact with Stéphane Bruckert via e-mail, and he asked me to look into a potential fix. My recommendation is to perform stricter parsing of URLs and URIs, which I implemented in the patch included at the end of the report. If you prefer, I can also invite you to a private fork of the repository. ### Impact The impact of this vulnerability depends heavily on what operations a client application performs when it handles a URI from a user and how it uses the responses it receives from the API.

Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') Spotipy is a light weight Python library for the Spotify Web API. In versions prior to 2.22.1, if a malicious URI is passed to the library, the library can be tricked into performing an operation on a different API endpoint than intended. The code Spotipy uses to parse URIs and URLs allows an attacker to insert arbitrary characters into the path that is used for API requests. Because it is possible to include "..", an attacker can redirect for example a track lookup via spotifyApi.track() to an arbitrary API endpoint like playlists, but this is possible for other endpoints as well. The impact of this vulnerability depends heavily on what operations a client application performs when it handles a URI from a user and how it uses the responses it receives from the API. This issue is patched in version 2.22.1.

Path traversal in spotipy ### Summary If a malicious URI is passed to the library, the library can be tricked into performing an operation on a different API endpoint than intended. ### Details The code Spotipy uses to parse URIs and URLs https://github.com/spotipy-dev/spotipy/blob/master/spotipy/client.py#L1942 accepts user data too liberally which allows a malicious user to insert arbitrary characters into the path that is used for API requests. Because it is possible to include `..`, an attacker can redirect for example a track lookup via `spotifyApi.track()` to an arbitrary API endpoint like playlists, but this is possible for other endpoints as well. Before the security advisory feature was enabled on GitHub, I was already in contact with Stéphane Bruckert via e-mail, and he asked me to look into a potential fix. My recommendation is to perform stricter parsing of URLs and URIs, which I implemented in the patch included at the end of the report. If you prefer, I can also invite you to a private fork of the repository. ### Impact The impact of this vulnerability depends heavily on what operations a client application performs when it handles a URI from a user and how it uses the responses it receives from the API.

Path traversal in spotipy ### Summary If a malicious URI is passed to the library, the library can be tricked into performing an operation on a different API endpoint than intended. ### Details The code Spotipy uses to parse URIs and URLs https://github.com/spotipy-dev/spotipy/blob/master/spotipy/client.py#L1942 accepts user data too liberally which allows a malicious user to insert arbitrary characters into the path that is used for API requests. Because it is possible to include `..`, an attacker can redirect for example a track lookup via `spotifyApi.track()` to an arbitrary API endpoint like playlists, but this is possible for other endpoints as well. Before the security advisory feature was enabled on GitHub, I was already in contact with Stéphane Bruckert via e-mail, and he asked me to look into a potential fix. My recommendation is to perform stricter parsing of URLs and URIs, which I implemented in the patch included at the end of the report. If you prefer, I can also invite you to a private fork of the repository. ### Impact The impact of this vulnerability depends heavily on what operations a client application performs when it handles a URI from a user and how it uses the responses it receives from the API.