Advisory Package Curation

OpenCanary Executes Commands From Potentially Writable Config File ### Impact OpenCanary directly executed commands taken from its config file. Where the config file is stored in an unprivileged user directory but the daemon is executed by root, it’s possible for the unprivileged user to change the config file and escalate permissions when root later runs the daemon. Thanks to the folks at Whirlylabs https://whirlylabs.com/ for finding and fixing this. ### Patches Upgrade to 0.9.4 or higher.

OpenCanary Executes Commands From Potentially Writable Config File OpenCanary directly executed commands taken from its config file. Where the config file is stored in an unprivileged user directory but the daemon is executed by root, it’s possible for the unprivileged user to change the config file and escalate permissions when root later runs the daemon. Thanks to the folks at Whirlylabs https://whirlylabs.com/ for finding and fixing this.

OpenCanary, a multi-protocol network honeypot, directly executed commands taken from its config file. Prior to version 0.9.4, where the config file is stored in an unprivileged user directory but the daemon is executed by root, it’s possible for the unprivileged user to change the config file and escalate permissions when root later runs the daemon. Version 0.9.4 contains a fix for the issue.

OpenCanary, a multi-protocol network honeypot, directly executed commands taken from its config file. Prior to version 0.9.4, where the config file is stored in an unprivileged user directory but the daemon is executed by root, it’s possible for the unprivileged user to change the config file and escalate permissions when root later runs the daemon. Version 0.9.4 contains a fix for the issue.