CHECK-fail in SparseConcat
### Impact
An attacker can trigger a denial of service via a `CHECK`-fail in `tf.raw_ops.SparseConcat`:
```python
import tensorflow as tf
import numpy as np
indices_1 = tf.constant([[514, 514], [514, 514]], dtype=tf.int64)
indices_2 = tf.constant([[514, 530], [599, 877]], dtype=tf.int64)
indices = [indices_1, indices_2]
values_1 = tf.zeros([0], dtype=tf.int64)
values_2 = tf.zeros([0], dtype=tf.int64)
values = [values_1, values_2]
shape_1 = tf.constant([442, 514, 514, 515, 606, 347, 943, 61, 2], dtype=tf.int64)
shape_2 = tf.zeros([9], dtype=tf.int64)
shapes = [shape_1, shape_2]
tf.raw_ops.SparseConcat(indices=indices, values=values, shapes=shapes, concat_dim=2)
```
This is because the implementation
https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/blob/b432a38fe0e1b4b904a6c222cbce794c39703e87/tensorflow/core/kernels/sparse_concat_op.cc#L76 takes the values specified in `shapes[0]` as dimensions for the output shape:
```cc
TensorShape input_shape(shapes[0].vec<int64>());
```
The `TensorShape` constructor
https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/blob/6f9896890c4c703ae0a0845394086e2e1e523299/tensorflow/core/framework/tensor_shape.cc#L183-L188 uses a `CHECK` operation which triggers when `InitDims`
https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/blob/6f9896890c4c703ae0a0845394086e2e1e523299/tensorflow/core/framework/tensor_shape.cc#L212-L296 returns a non-OK status.
```cc
template <class Shape>
TensorShapeBase<Shape>::TensorShapeBase(gtl::ArraySlice<int64> dim_sizes) {
set_tag(REP16);
set_data_type(DT_INVALID);
TF_CHECK_OK(InitDims(dim_sizes));
}
```
In our scenario, this occurs when adding a dimension from the argument results in overflow:
```cc
template <class Shape>
Status TensorShapeBase<Shape>::InitDims(gtl::ArraySlice<int64> dim_sizes) {
...
Status status = Status::OK();
for (int64 s : dim_sizes) {
status.Update(AddDimWithStatus(internal::SubtleMustCopy(s)));
if (!status.ok()) {
return status;
}
}
}
template <class Shape>
Status TensorShapeBase<Shape>::AddDimWithStatus(int64 size) {
...
int64 new_num_elements;
if (kIsPartial && (num_elements() < 0 || size < 0)) {
new_num_elements = -1;
} else {
new_num_elements = MultiplyWithoutOverflow(num_elements(), size);
if (TF_PREDICT_FALSE(new_num_elements < 0)) {
return errors::Internal("Encountered overflow when multiplying ",
num_elements(), " with ", size,
", result: ", new_num_elements);
}
}
...
}
```
This is a legacy implementation of the constructor and operations should use `BuildTensorShapeBase` or `AddDimWithStatus` to prevent `CHECK`-failures in the presence of overflows.
### Patches
We have patched the issue in GitHub commit 69c68ecbb24dff3fa0e46da0d16c821a2dd22d7c
https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/commit/69c68ecbb24dff3fa0e46da0d16c821a2dd22d7c.
The fix will be included in TensorFlow 2.5.0. We will also cherrypick this commit on TensorFlow 2.4.2, TensorFlow 2.3.3, TensorFlow 2.2.3 and TensorFlow 2.1.4, as these are also affected and still in supported range.
### For more information
Please consult our security guide
https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/blob/master/SECURITY.md for more information regarding the security model and how to contact us with issues and questions.
### Attribution
This vulnerability has been reported by Yakun Zhang and Ying Wang of Baidu X-Team.