Domain restrictions bypass via DNS Rebinding in WireMock and WireMock Studio webhooks, proxy and recorder modes
### Impact
The proxy mode of WireMock, can be protected by the network restrictions configuration, as documented in Preventing proxying to and recording from specific target addresses
https://wiremock.org/docs/configuration/#preventing-proxying-to-and-recording-from-specific-target-addresses. These restrictions can be configured using the domain names, and in such a case the configuration is vulnerable to the DNS rebinding attacks. A similar patch was applied in WireMock 3.0.0-beta-15 for the WireMock Webhook Extensions.
The root cause of the attack is a defect in the logic which allows for a race condition triggered by a DNS server whose address expires in between the initial validation and the outbound network request that might go to a domain that was supposed to be prohibited. Control over a DNS service is required to exploit this attack, so it has high execution complexity and limited impact.
### Affected versions
- WireMock 3,x until 3.0.3 (security patch), on default settings in environments with access to the network
- WireMock 2.x until 2.35.1 (security patch), on default settings in environments with access to the network
- Python WireMock until 2.6.1
- WireMock Studio - all versions, this proprietary product was discontinued in 2022
### Patches
- WireMock 3.0.3 + the 3.0.3-1 Docker image
- WireMock 2.35.1 + the 2.35.1-1 Docker image - backport to WireMock 2.x
- Python WireMock 2.6.1
### Workarounds
For WireMock:
- Option 1: Configure WireMock to use IP addresses instead of the domain names in the outbound URLs subject to DNS rebinding
- Option 2: Use external firewall rules to define the list of permitted destinations
For WireMock Studio: N/A. Switch to another distribution, there will be no fix provided. The vendor of former WireMock Studio recommends migration to WireMock Cloud
https://www.wiremock.io/product
### References
- CVE-2023-41327 - Related issue in the WireMock Webhooks Extension