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| purl | pkg:deb/debian/docker.io@20.10.23%2Bdfsg1-1 |
| Next non-vulnerable version | 20.10.25+dfsg1-2 |
| Latest non-vulnerable version | 20.10.25+dfsg1-2 |
| Risk | 4.5 |
| Vulnerability | Summary | Fixed by |
|---|---|---|
|
VCID-h7tv-gsrm-aaab
Aliases: CVE-2023-28842 GHSA-6wrf-mxfj-pf5p |
Moby) is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as *Docker*. Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in `dockerd` and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code. The `overlay` network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with the VXLAN metadata, including a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes. Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the `u32` iptables extension provided by the `xt_u32` kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. The `overlay` driver dynamically and lazily defines the kernel configuration for the VXLAN network on each node as containers are attached and detached. Routes and encryption parameters are only defined for destination nodes that participate in the network. The iptables rules that prevent encrypted overlay networks from accepting unencrypted packets are not created until a peer is available with which to communicate. Encrypted overlay networks silently accept cleartext VXLAN datagrams that are tagged with the VNI of an encrypted overlay network. As a result, it is possible to inject arbitrary Ethernet frames into the encrypted overlay network by encapsulating them in VXLAN datagrams. The implications of this can be quite dire, and GHSA-vwm3-crmr-xfxw should be referenced for a deeper exploration. Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. In multi-node clusters, deploy a global ‘pause’ container for each encrypted overlay network, on every node. For a single-node cluster, do not use overlay networks of any sort. Bridge networks provide the same connectivity on a single node and have no multi-node features. The Swarm ingress feature is implemented using an overlay network, but can be disabled by publishing ports in `host` mode instead of `ingress` mode (allowing the use of an external load balancer), and removing the `ingress` network. If encrypted overlay networks are in exclusive use, block UDP port 4789 from traffic that has not been validated by IPSec. |
Affected by 4 other vulnerabilities. |
|
VCID-jnm2-7vwf-aaaj
Aliases: CVE-2023-28841 GHSA-33pg-m6jh-5237 |
Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as *Docker*. Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in `dockerd` and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code. The `overlay` network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with the VXLAN metadata, including a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes. Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the `u32` iptables extension provided by the `xt_u32` kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. An iptables rule designates outgoing VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted overlay network for IPsec encapsulation. Encrypted overlay networks on affected platforms silently transmit unencrypted data. As a result, `overlay` networks may appear to be functional, passing traffic as expected, but without any of the expected confidentiality or data integrity guarantees. It is possible for an attacker sitting in a trusted position on the network to read all of the application traffic that is moving across the overlay network, resulting in unexpected secrets or user data disclosure. Thus, because many database protocols, internal APIs, etc. are not protected by a second layer of encryption, a user may use Swarm encrypted overlay networks to provide confidentiality, which due to this vulnerability this is no longer guaranteed. Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. Close the VXLAN port (by default, UDP port 4789) to outgoing traffic at the Internet boundary in order to prevent unintentionally leaking unencrypted traffic over the Internet, and/or ensure that the `xt_u32` kernel module is available on all nodes of the Swarm cluster. |
Affected by 4 other vulnerabilities. |
|
VCID-vnpd-ha1h-aaab
Aliases: CVE-2023-28840 GHSA-232p-vwff-86mp |
Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby, is commonly referred to as *Docker*. Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in dockerd and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code. The overlay network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes. Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the u32 iptables extension provided by the xt_u32 kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. Two iptables rules serve to filter incoming VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted network and discards unencrypted datagrams. The rules are appended to the end of the INPUT filter chain, following any rules that have been previously set by the system administrator. Administrator-set rules take precedence over the rules Moby sets to discard unencrypted VXLAN datagrams, which can potentially admit unencrypted datagrams that should have been discarded. The injection of arbitrary Ethernet frames can enable a Denial of Service attack. A sophisticated attacker may be able to establish a UDP or TCP connection by way of the container’s outbound gateway that would otherwise be blocked by a stateful firewall, or carry out other escalations beyond simple injection by smuggling packets into the overlay network. Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3 and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. Close the VXLAN port (by default, UDP port 4789) to incoming traffic at the Internet boundary to prevent all VXLAN packet injection, and/or ensure that the `xt_u32` kernel module is available on all nodes of the Swarm cluster. |
Affected by 4 other vulnerabilities. |
| Vulnerability | Summary | Aliases |
|---|---|---|
| VCID-3aaq-ny82-aaag | Moby is an open-source project created by Docker to enable software containerization. A bug was found in Moby (Docker Engine) where supplementary groups are not set up properly. If an attacker has direct access to a container and manipulates their supplementary group access, they may be able to use supplementary group access to bypass primary group restrictions in some cases, potentially gaining access to sensitive information or gaining the ability to execute code in that container. This bug is fixed in Moby (Docker Engine) 20.10.18. Running containers should be stopped and restarted for the permissions to be fixed. For users unable to upgrade, this problem can be worked around by not using the `"USER $USERNAME"` Dockerfile instruction. Instead by calling `ENTRYPOINT ["su", "-", "user"]` the supplementary groups will be set up properly. |
CVE-2022-36109
GHSA-rc4r-wh2q-q6c4 |
| VCID-473a-3wpv-87ba | moby v25.0.5 is affected by a Race Condition in builder/builder-next/adapters/snapshot/layer.go. The vulnerability could be used to trigger concurrent builds that call the EnsureLayer function resulting in resource leaks/exhaustion. |
CVE-2024-36621
GHSA-2mj3-vfvx-fc43 |
| VCID-axr6-brgf-aaas | moby/moby: Classic builder cache poisoning |
CVE-2024-24557
GHSA-xw73-rw38-6vjc |
| VCID-h7tv-gsrm-aaab | Moby) is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as *Docker*. Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in `dockerd` and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code. The `overlay` network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with the VXLAN metadata, including a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes. Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the `u32` iptables extension provided by the `xt_u32` kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. The `overlay` driver dynamically and lazily defines the kernel configuration for the VXLAN network on each node as containers are attached and detached. Routes and encryption parameters are only defined for destination nodes that participate in the network. The iptables rules that prevent encrypted overlay networks from accepting unencrypted packets are not created until a peer is available with which to communicate. Encrypted overlay networks silently accept cleartext VXLAN datagrams that are tagged with the VNI of an encrypted overlay network. As a result, it is possible to inject arbitrary Ethernet frames into the encrypted overlay network by encapsulating them in VXLAN datagrams. The implications of this can be quite dire, and GHSA-vwm3-crmr-xfxw should be referenced for a deeper exploration. Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. In multi-node clusters, deploy a global ‘pause’ container for each encrypted overlay network, on every node. For a single-node cluster, do not use overlay networks of any sort. Bridge networks provide the same connectivity on a single node and have no multi-node features. The Swarm ingress feature is implemented using an overlay network, but can be disabled by publishing ports in `host` mode instead of `ingress` mode (allowing the use of an external load balancer), and removing the `ingress` network. If encrypted overlay networks are in exclusive use, block UDP port 4789 from traffic that has not been validated by IPSec. |
CVE-2023-28842
GHSA-6wrf-mxfj-pf5p |
| VCID-jnm2-7vwf-aaaj | Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as *Docker*. Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in `dockerd` and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code. The `overlay` network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with the VXLAN metadata, including a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes. Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the `u32` iptables extension provided by the `xt_u32` kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. An iptables rule designates outgoing VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted overlay network for IPsec encapsulation. Encrypted overlay networks on affected platforms silently transmit unencrypted data. As a result, `overlay` networks may appear to be functional, passing traffic as expected, but without any of the expected confidentiality or data integrity guarantees. It is possible for an attacker sitting in a trusted position on the network to read all of the application traffic that is moving across the overlay network, resulting in unexpected secrets or user data disclosure. Thus, because many database protocols, internal APIs, etc. are not protected by a second layer of encryption, a user may use Swarm encrypted overlay networks to provide confidentiality, which due to this vulnerability this is no longer guaranteed. Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. Close the VXLAN port (by default, UDP port 4789) to outgoing traffic at the Internet boundary in order to prevent unintentionally leaking unencrypted traffic over the Internet, and/or ensure that the `xt_u32` kernel module is available on all nodes of the Swarm cluster. |
CVE-2023-28841
GHSA-33pg-m6jh-5237 |
| VCID-naqn-a7xz-8ucq | moby v25.0.3 has a Race Condition vulnerability in the streamformatter package which can be used to trigger multiple concurrent write operations resulting in data corruption or application crashes. |
CVE-2024-36623
GHSA-gh5c-3h97-2f3q |
| VCID-r6sa-d3zt-aaab | Moby is an open source container framework that is a key component of Docker Engine, Docker Desktop, and other distributions of container tooling or runtimes. Moby's networking implementation allows for many networks, each with their own IP address range and gateway, to be defined. This feature is frequently referred to as custom networks, as each network can have a different driver, set of parameters and thus behaviors. When creating a network, the `--internal` flag is used to designate a network as _internal_. The `internal` attribute in a docker-compose.yml file may also be used to mark a network _internal_, and other API clients may specify the `internal` parameter as well. When containers with networking are created, they are assigned unique network interfaces and IP addresses. The host serves as a router for non-internal networks, with a gateway IP that provides SNAT/DNAT to/from container IPs. Containers on an internal network may communicate between each other, but are precluded from communicating with any networks the host has access to (LAN or WAN) as no default route is configured, and firewall rules are set up to drop all outgoing traffic. Communication with the gateway IP address (and thus appropriately configured host services) is possible, and the host may communicate with any container IP directly. In addition to configuring the Linux kernel's various networking features to enable container networking, `dockerd` directly provides some services to container networks. Principal among these is serving as a resolver, enabling service discovery, and resolution of names from an upstream resolver. When a DNS request for a name that does not correspond to a container is received, the request is forwarded to the configured upstream resolver. This request is made from the container's network namespace: the level of access and routing of traffic is the same as if the request was made by the container itself. As a consequence of this design, containers solely attached to an internal network will be unable to resolve names using the upstream resolver, as the container itself is unable to communicate with that nameserver. Only the names of containers also attached to the internal network are able to be resolved. Many systems run a local forwarding DNS resolver. As the host and any containers have separate loopback devices, a consequence of the design described above is that containers are unable to resolve names from the host's configured resolver, as they cannot reach these addresses on the host loopback device. To bridge this gap, and to allow containers to properly resolve names even when a local forwarding resolver is used on a loopback address, `dockerd` detects this scenario and instead forward DNS requests from the host namework namespace. The loopback resolver then forwards the requests to its configured upstream resolvers, as expected. Because `dockerd` forwards DNS requests to the host loopback device, bypassing the container network namespace's normal routing semantics entirely, internal networks can unexpectedly forward DNS requests to an external nameserver. By registering a domain for which they control the authoritative nameservers, an attacker could arrange for a compromised container to exfiltrate data by encoding it in DNS queries that will eventually be answered by their nameservers. Docker Desktop is not affected, as Docker Desktop always runs an internal resolver on a RFC 1918 address. Moby releases 26.0.0, 25.0.4, and 23.0.11 are patched to prevent forwarding any DNS requests from internal networks. As a workaround, run containers intended to be solely attached to internal networks with a custom upstream address, which will force all upstream DNS queries to be resolved from the container's network namespace. |
CVE-2024-29018
GHSA-mq39-4gv4-mvpx |
| VCID-s3pe-n9gh-aaar | Moby is an open source container framework that is a key component of Docker Engine, Docker Desktop, and other distributions of container tooling or runtimes. In 26.0.0, IPv6 is not disabled on network interfaces, including those belonging to networks where `--ipv6=false`. An container with an `ipvlan` or `macvlan` interface will normally be configured to share an external network link with the host machine. Because of this direct access, (1) Containers may be able to communicate with other hosts on the local network over link-local IPv6 addresses, (2) if router advertisements are being broadcast over the local network, containers may get SLAAC-assigned addresses, and (3) the interface will be a member of IPv6 multicast groups. This means interfaces in IPv4-only networks present an unexpectedly and unnecessarily increased attack surface. The issue is patched in 26.0.2. To completely disable IPv6 in a container, use `--sysctl=net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6=1` in the `docker create` or `docker run` command. Or, in the service configuration of a `compose` file. |
CVE-2024-32473
GHSA-x84c-p2g9-rqv9 |
| VCID-vnpd-ha1h-aaab | Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby, is commonly referred to as *Docker*. Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in dockerd and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code. The overlay network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes. Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the u32 iptables extension provided by the xt_u32 kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. Two iptables rules serve to filter incoming VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted network and discards unencrypted datagrams. The rules are appended to the end of the INPUT filter chain, following any rules that have been previously set by the system administrator. Administrator-set rules take precedence over the rules Moby sets to discard unencrypted VXLAN datagrams, which can potentially admit unencrypted datagrams that should have been discarded. The injection of arbitrary Ethernet frames can enable a Denial of Service attack. A sophisticated attacker may be able to establish a UDP or TCP connection by way of the container’s outbound gateway that would otherwise be blocked by a stateful firewall, or carry out other escalations beyond simple injection by smuggling packets into the overlay network. Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3 and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. Close the VXLAN port (by default, UDP port 4789) to incoming traffic at the Internet boundary to prevent all VXLAN packet injection, and/or ensure that the `xt_u32` kernel module is available on all nodes of the Swarm cluster. |
CVE-2023-28840
GHSA-232p-vwff-86mp |
| VCID-vr1j-tz9g-aaae | Moby is an open-source project created by Docker for software containerization. A security vulnerability has been detected in certain versions of Docker Engine, which could allow an attacker to bypass authorization plugins (AuthZ) under specific circumstances. The base likelihood of this being exploited is low. Using a specially-crafted API request, an Engine API client could make the daemon forward the request or response to an authorization plugin without the body. In certain circumstances, the authorization plugin may allow a request which it would have otherwise denied if the body had been forwarded to it. A security issue was discovered In 2018, where an attacker could bypass AuthZ plugins using a specially crafted API request. This could lead to unauthorized actions, including privilege escalation. Although this issue was fixed in Docker Engine v18.09.1 in January 2019, the fix was not carried forward to later major versions, resulting in a regression. Anyone who depends on authorization plugins that introspect the request and/or response body to make access control decisions is potentially impacted. Docker EE v19.03.x and all versions of Mirantis Container Runtime are not vulnerable. docker-ce v27.1.1 containes patches to fix the vulnerability. Patches have also been merged into the master, 19.03, 20.0, 23.0, 24.0, 25.0, 26.0, and 26.1 release branches. If one is unable to upgrade immediately, avoid using AuthZ plugins and/or restrict access to the Docker API to trusted parties, following the principle of least privilege. |
CVE-2024-41110
GHSA-v23v-6jw2-98fq |
| Date | Actor | Action | Vulnerability | Source | VulnerableCode Version |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025-06-22T03:18:43.850135+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-naqn-a7xz-8ucq | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 36.1.3 |
| 2025-06-21T22:20:03.662293+00:00 | Debian Importer | Affected by | VCID-h7tv-gsrm-aaab | None | 36.1.3 |
| 2025-06-21T16:36:40.702573+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-s3pe-n9gh-aaar | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 36.1.3 |
| 2025-06-21T08:26:40.245580+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-axr6-brgf-aaas | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 36.1.3 |
| 2025-06-21T08:23:44.906425+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-vnpd-ha1h-aaab | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 36.1.3 |
| 2025-06-21T05:41:54.044271+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-jnm2-7vwf-aaaj | None | 36.1.3 |
| 2025-06-21T05:39:02.115990+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-r6sa-d3zt-aaab | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 36.1.3 |
| 2025-06-21T04:50:52.024864+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-473a-3wpv-87ba | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 36.1.3 |
| 2025-06-21T02:55:15.182499+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-3aaq-ny82-aaag | None | 36.1.3 |
| 2025-06-20T23:34:47.634678+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-h7tv-gsrm-aaab | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 36.1.3 |
| 2025-06-20T23:31:12.176840+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-jnm2-7vwf-aaaj | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 36.1.3 |
| 2025-06-20T23:00:35.072218+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-3aaq-ny82-aaag | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 36.1.3 |
| 2025-06-20T21:43:46.994027+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-h7tv-gsrm-aaab | None | 36.1.3 |
| 2025-06-20T19:50:45.303893+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-vnpd-ha1h-aaab | None | 36.1.3 |
| 2025-06-05T13:57:38.672302+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-vnpd-ha1h-aaab | None | 36.1.0 |
| 2025-04-13T02:11:37.125015+00:00 | Debian Oval Importer | Fixing | VCID-vr1j-tz9g-aaae | https://www.debian.org/security/oval/oval-definitions-bullseye.xml.bz2 | 36.0.0 |
| 2025-04-07T01:43:29.639400+00:00 | Debian Importer | Affected by | VCID-jnm2-7vwf-aaaj | None | 36.0.0 |
| 2025-04-06T22:02:16.823675+00:00 | Debian Importer | Affected by | VCID-vnpd-ha1h-aaab | None | 36.0.0 |
| 2025-04-06T12:29:10.052665+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-vr1j-tz9g-aaae | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 36.0.0 |
| 2025-04-06T11:24:06.270957+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-naqn-a7xz-8ucq | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 36.0.0 |
| 2025-04-05T18:20:25.740670+00:00 | Debian Importer | Affected by | VCID-h7tv-gsrm-aaab | None | 36.0.0 |
| 2025-04-05T13:00:56.988339+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-s3pe-n9gh-aaar | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 36.0.0 |
| 2025-04-05T05:43:21.984141+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-axr6-brgf-aaas | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 36.0.0 |
| 2025-04-05T05:40:33.517825+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-vnpd-ha1h-aaab | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 36.0.0 |
| 2025-04-05T02:56:27.063087+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-jnm2-7vwf-aaaj | None | 36.0.0 |
| 2025-04-05T02:53:37.292219+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-r6sa-d3zt-aaab | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 36.0.0 |
| 2025-04-04T07:40:10.062588+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-473a-3wpv-87ba | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 36.0.0 |
| 2025-04-04T05:42:14.827115+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-3aaq-ny82-aaag | None | 36.0.0 |
| 2025-04-04T02:15:34.488750+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-h7tv-gsrm-aaab | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 36.0.0 |
| 2025-04-04T02:11:49.388927+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-jnm2-7vwf-aaaj | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 36.0.0 |
| 2025-04-04T01:40:08.640022+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-3aaq-ny82-aaag | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 36.0.0 |
| 2025-04-04T00:21:12.453081+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-h7tv-gsrm-aaab | None | 36.0.0 |
| 2025-04-03T22:56:30.250141+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-vnpd-ha1h-aaab | None | 36.0.0 |
| 2025-02-22T01:58:33.496895+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-vr1j-tz9g-aaae | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 35.1.0 |
| 2025-02-21T23:32:40.642385+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-naqn-a7xz-8ucq | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 35.1.0 |
| 2025-02-21T23:32:39.916922+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-473a-3wpv-87ba | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 35.1.0 |
| 2025-02-21T22:04:02.150017+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-s3pe-n9gh-aaar | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 35.1.0 |
| 2025-02-21T21:44:19.137124+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-r6sa-d3zt-aaab | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 35.1.0 |
| 2025-02-21T18:42:06.947321+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-axr6-brgf-aaas | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 35.1.0 |
| 2025-02-21T10:36:06.536951+00:00 | Debian Importer | Affected by | VCID-h7tv-gsrm-aaab | None | 35.1.0 |
| 2025-02-21T10:36:01.823124+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-h7tv-gsrm-aaab | None | 35.1.0 |
| 2025-02-21T10:36:00.477623+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-h7tv-gsrm-aaab | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 35.1.0 |
| 2025-02-21T10:35:57.787715+00:00 | Debian Importer | Affected by | VCID-jnm2-7vwf-aaaj | None | 35.1.0 |
| 2025-02-21T10:35:49.587804+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-jnm2-7vwf-aaaj | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 35.1.0 |
| 2025-02-21T10:35:48.921717+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-jnm2-7vwf-aaaj | None | 35.1.0 |
| 2025-02-21T10:35:40.105501+00:00 | Debian Importer | Affected by | VCID-vnpd-ha1h-aaab | None | 35.1.0 |
| 2025-02-21T10:35:38.088664+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-vnpd-ha1h-aaab | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 35.1.0 |
| 2025-02-21T10:35:37.410123+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-vnpd-ha1h-aaab | None | 35.1.0 |
| 2025-02-21T00:42:46.674943+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-3aaq-ny82-aaag | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 35.1.0 |
| 2025-02-21T00:42:45.869658+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-3aaq-ny82-aaag | None | 35.1.0 |
| 2024-12-15T14:56:55.668613+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-naqn-a7xz-8ucq | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 35.0.0 |
| 2024-12-15T14:56:54.958053+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-473a-3wpv-87ba | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 35.0.0 |
| 2024-11-24T12:41:12.230535+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-vr1j-tz9g-aaae | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 35.0.0 |
| 2024-11-24T09:40:59.097416+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-s3pe-n9gh-aaar | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 35.0.0 |
| 2024-11-24T09:33:29.023384+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-r6sa-d3zt-aaab | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 35.0.0 |
| 2024-11-24T07:08:47.665874+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-axr6-brgf-aaas | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 35.0.0 |
| 2024-11-24T00:10:26.055161+00:00 | Debian Importer | Affected by | VCID-h7tv-gsrm-aaab | None | 35.0.0 |
| 2024-11-24T00:10:21.276225+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-h7tv-gsrm-aaab | None | 35.0.0 |
| 2024-11-24T00:10:19.914129+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-h7tv-gsrm-aaab | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 35.0.0 |
| 2024-11-24T00:10:17.140744+00:00 | Debian Importer | Affected by | VCID-jnm2-7vwf-aaaj | None | 35.0.0 |
| 2024-11-24T00:10:08.976227+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-jnm2-7vwf-aaaj | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 35.0.0 |
| 2024-11-24T00:10:08.298520+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-jnm2-7vwf-aaaj | None | 35.0.0 |
| 2024-11-24T00:09:59.470558+00:00 | Debian Importer | Affected by | VCID-vnpd-ha1h-aaab | None | 35.0.0 |
| 2024-11-24T00:09:57.406348+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-vnpd-ha1h-aaab | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 35.0.0 |
| 2024-11-24T00:09:56.720773+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-vnpd-ha1h-aaab | None | 35.0.0 |
| 2024-11-23T16:17:45.840117+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-3aaq-ny82-aaag | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 35.0.0 |
| 2024-10-11T08:07:08.138872+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-vr1j-tz9g-aaae | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 34.0.2 |
| 2024-10-10T21:48:11.016086+00:00 | Debian Importer | Affected by | VCID-h7tv-gsrm-aaab | None | 34.0.2 |
| 2024-10-10T21:48:06.833806+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-h7tv-gsrm-aaab | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 34.0.2 |
| 2024-10-10T21:48:06.149854+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-h7tv-gsrm-aaab | None | 34.0.2 |
| 2024-10-10T21:48:03.233662+00:00 | Debian Importer | Affected by | VCID-jnm2-7vwf-aaaj | None | 34.0.2 |
| 2024-10-10T21:47:56.147372+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-jnm2-7vwf-aaaj | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 34.0.2 |
| 2024-10-10T21:47:55.466735+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-jnm2-7vwf-aaaj | None | 34.0.2 |
| 2024-10-10T21:47:47.695678+00:00 | Debian Importer | Affected by | VCID-vnpd-ha1h-aaab | None | 34.0.2 |
| 2024-10-10T21:47:45.571294+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-vnpd-ha1h-aaab | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 34.0.2 |
| 2024-10-10T21:47:44.864275+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-vnpd-ha1h-aaab | None | 34.0.2 |
| 2024-10-10T13:55:29.857466+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-3aaq-ny82-aaag | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 34.0.2 |
| 2024-09-25T21:55:54.073172+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-vr1j-tz9g-aaae | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 34.0.1 |
| 2024-09-20T02:43:05.046128+00:00 | Debian Importer | Affected by | VCID-h7tv-gsrm-aaab | None | 34.0.1 |
| 2024-09-20T02:43:00.921109+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-h7tv-gsrm-aaab | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 34.0.1 |
| 2024-09-20T02:43:00.219538+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-h7tv-gsrm-aaab | None | 34.0.1 |
| 2024-09-20T02:42:57.444965+00:00 | Debian Importer | Affected by | VCID-jnm2-7vwf-aaaj | None | 34.0.1 |
| 2024-09-20T02:42:50.723239+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-jnm2-7vwf-aaaj | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 34.0.1 |
| 2024-09-20T02:42:50.046137+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-jnm2-7vwf-aaaj | None | 34.0.1 |
| 2024-09-20T02:42:42.669146+00:00 | Debian Importer | Affected by | VCID-vnpd-ha1h-aaab | None | 34.0.1 |
| 2024-09-20T02:42:40.618413+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-vnpd-ha1h-aaab | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 34.0.1 |
| 2024-09-20T02:42:39.902924+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-vnpd-ha1h-aaab | None | 34.0.1 |
| 2024-09-19T20:16:10.156724+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-3aaq-ny82-aaag | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 34.0.1 |
| 2024-04-26T02:42:44.300728+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-h7tv-gsrm-aaab | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 34.0.0rc4 |
| 2024-04-26T02:42:40.314348+00:00 | Debian Importer | Affected by | VCID-h7tv-gsrm-aaab | None | 34.0.0rc4 |
| 2024-04-26T02:42:38.746694+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-h7tv-gsrm-aaab | None | 34.0.0rc4 |
| 2024-04-26T02:42:37.912775+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-jnm2-7vwf-aaaj | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 34.0.0rc4 |
| 2024-04-26T02:42:37.123649+00:00 | Debian Importer | Affected by | VCID-jnm2-7vwf-aaaj | None | 34.0.0rc4 |
| 2024-04-26T02:42:32.282782+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-jnm2-7vwf-aaaj | None | 34.0.0rc4 |
| 2024-04-26T02:42:31.497463+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-vnpd-ha1h-aaab | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 34.0.0rc4 |
| 2024-04-26T02:42:28.374880+00:00 | Debian Importer | Affected by | VCID-vnpd-ha1h-aaab | None | 34.0.0rc4 |
| 2024-04-26T02:42:25.940361+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-vnpd-ha1h-aaab | None | 34.0.0rc4 |
| 2024-04-25T18:44:16.481971+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-3aaq-ny82-aaag | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 34.0.0rc4 |
| 2024-04-25T18:44:11.802434+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-3aaq-ny82-aaag | None | 34.0.0rc4 |
| 2024-01-12T12:45:18.311123+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-h7tv-gsrm-aaab | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 34.0.0rc2 |
| 2024-01-12T12:45:13.360473+00:00 | Debian Importer | Affected by | VCID-h7tv-gsrm-aaab | None | 34.0.0rc2 |
| 2024-01-12T12:45:11.684800+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-h7tv-gsrm-aaab | None | 34.0.0rc2 |
| 2024-01-12T12:45:10.619481+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-jnm2-7vwf-aaaj | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 34.0.0rc2 |
| 2024-01-12T12:45:09.845827+00:00 | Debian Importer | Affected by | VCID-jnm2-7vwf-aaaj | None | 34.0.0rc2 |
| 2024-01-12T12:45:03.931914+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-jnm2-7vwf-aaaj | None | 34.0.0rc2 |
| 2024-01-12T12:45:03.103751+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-vnpd-ha1h-aaab | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 34.0.0rc2 |
| 2024-01-12T12:44:59.880552+00:00 | Debian Importer | Affected by | VCID-vnpd-ha1h-aaab | None | 34.0.0rc2 |
| 2024-01-12T12:44:57.107540+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-vnpd-ha1h-aaab | None | 34.0.0rc2 |
| 2024-01-11T22:42:06.707891+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-3aaq-ny82-aaag | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 34.0.0rc2 |
| 2024-01-11T22:42:01.288288+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-3aaq-ny82-aaag | None | 34.0.0rc2 |
| 2024-01-05T08:28:43.507780+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-h7tv-gsrm-aaab | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 34.0.0rc1 |
| 2024-01-05T08:28:39.509873+00:00 | Debian Importer | Affected by | VCID-h7tv-gsrm-aaab | None | 34.0.0rc1 |
| 2024-01-05T08:28:37.862298+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-h7tv-gsrm-aaab | None | 34.0.0rc1 |
| 2024-01-05T08:28:37.032778+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-jnm2-7vwf-aaaj | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 34.0.0rc1 |
| 2024-01-05T08:28:36.218253+00:00 | Debian Importer | Affected by | VCID-jnm2-7vwf-aaaj | None | 34.0.0rc1 |
| 2024-01-05T08:28:31.509033+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-jnm2-7vwf-aaaj | None | 34.0.0rc1 |
| 2024-01-05T08:28:30.619451+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-vnpd-ha1h-aaab | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 34.0.0rc1 |
| 2024-01-05T08:28:27.426762+00:00 | Debian Importer | Affected by | VCID-vnpd-ha1h-aaab | None | 34.0.0rc1 |
| 2024-01-05T08:28:24.949380+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-vnpd-ha1h-aaab | None | 34.0.0rc1 |
| 2024-01-05T04:05:33.829482+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-3aaq-ny82-aaag | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json | 34.0.0rc1 |
| 2024-01-05T04:05:28.427690+00:00 | Debian Importer | Fixing | VCID-3aaq-ny82-aaag | None | 34.0.0rc1 |