Vulnerabilities affecting this package (0)
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This package is not known to be affected by vulnerabilities.
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Vulnerabilities fixed by this package (7)
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VCID-1xu4-29uk-z3f8
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TYPO3 CMS Authentication Bypass vulnerability
It has been discovered that TYPO3’s Salted Password system extension (which is a mandatory system component) is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass when using hashing methods which are related by PHP class inheritance. In standard TYPO3 core distributions stored passwords using the blowfish hashing algorithm can be overridden when using MD5 as the default hashing algorithm by just knowing a valid username. Per default the Portable PHP hashing algorithm (PHPass) is used which is not vulnerable.
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GHSA-x4rj-f7m6-42c3
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VCID-2734-1z2d-9ydz
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TYPO3 CMS Privilege Escalation and SQL Injection
Failing to properly dissociate system related configuration from user generated configuration, the Form Framework (system extension "form") is vulnerable to SQL injection and Privilege Escalation. Basically instructions can be persisted to a form definition file that were not configured to be modified - this applies to definitions managed using the form editor module as well as direct file upload using the regular file list module. A valid backend user account as well as having system extension form activated are needed in order to exploit this vulnerability.
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GHSA-45wj-jv2h-jwrf
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VCID-59c6-ews9-cbaf
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Privilege Escalation & SQL Injection in TYPO3 CMS.
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2018-07-12-3
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VCID-cvpr-b5np-6bcv
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Improper Authentication
Authentication Bypass in TYPO3 CMS.
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2018-07-12-1
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VCID-jzqt-aujy-n3gw
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Insecure Deserialization in TYPO3 CMS.
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2018-07-12-4
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VCID-n7ha-dtwq-xqf9
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Insecure Deserialization & Arbitrary Code Execution in TYPO3 CMS.
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2018-07-12-2
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VCID-yv3c-d7fb-v3bm
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TYPO3 CMS Insecure Deserialization & Arbitrary Code Execution
Phar files (formerly known as "PHP archives") can act als self extracting archives which leads to the fact that source code is executed when Phar files are invoked. The Phar file format is not limited to be stored with a dedicated file extension - "bundle.phar" would be valid as well as "bundle.txt" would be. This way, Phar files can be obfuscated as image or text file which would not be denied from being uploaded and persisted to a TYPO3 installation. Due to a missing sanitization of user input, those Phar files can be invoked by manipulated URLs in TYPO3 backend forms. A valid backend user account is needed to exploit this vulnerability. In theory the attack vector would be possible in the TYPO3 frontend as well, however no functional exploit has been identified so far.
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GHSA-cc97-g92w-jm65
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