Package Instance

`docker cp` allows unexpected chmod of host files in Moby Docker Engine
## Impact
A bug was found in Moby (Docker Engine) where attempting to copy files using `docker cp` into a specially-crafted container can result in Unix file permission changes for existing files in the host’s filesystem, widening access to others. This bug does not directly allow files to be read, modified, or executed without an additional cooperating process.

## Patches
This bug has been fixed in Moby (Docker Engine) 20.10.9. Users should update to this version as soon as possible. Running containers do not need to be restarted.

## Workarounds
Ensure you only run trusted containers.

## Credits
The Moby project would like to thank Lei Wang and Ruizhi Xiao for responsibly disclosing this issue in accordance with the [Moby security policy](https://github.com/moby/moby/blob/master/SECURITY.md).

## For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

* [Open an issue](https://github.com/moby/moby/issues/new)
* Email us at  security@docker.com  if you think you’ve found a security bug

Authz zero length regression
A security vulnerability has been detected in certain versions of Docker Engine, which could allow an attacker to bypass [authorization plugins (AuthZ)](https://docs.docker.com/engine/extend/plugins_authorization/) under specific circumstances. The base likelihood of this being exploited is low. This advisory outlines the issue, identifies the affected versions, and provides remediation steps for impacted users.

### Impact

Using a specially-crafted API request, an Engine API client could make the daemon forward the request or response to an [authorization plugin](https://docs.docker.com/engine/extend/plugins_authorization/) without the body. In certain circumstances, the authorization plugin may allow a request which it would have otherwise denied if the body had been forwarded to it.


A security issue was discovered In 2018,  where an attacker could bypass AuthZ plugins using a specially crafted API request. This could lead to unauthorized actions, including privilege escalation. Although this issue was fixed in Docker Engine [v18.09.1](https://docs.docker.com/engine/release-notes/18.09/#security-fixes-1) in January 2019, the fix was not carried forward to later major versions, resulting in a regression. Anyone who depends on authorization plugins that introspect the request and/or response body to make access control decisions is potentially impacted.

Docker EE v19.03.x and all versions of Mirantis Container Runtime **are not vulnerable.**

### Vulnerability details

- **AuthZ bypass and privilege escalation:** An attacker could exploit a bypass using an API request with Content-Length set to 0, causing the Docker daemon to forward the request without the body to the AuthZ plugin, which might approve the request incorrectly.
- **Initial fix:** The issue was fixed in Docker Engine [v18.09.1](https://docs.docker.com/engine/release-notes/18.09/#security-fixes-1) January 2019..
- **Regression:** The fix was not included in Docker Engine v19.03 or newer versions. This was identified in April 2024 and patches were released for the affected versions on July 23, 2024. The issue was assigned [CVE-2024-41110](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2024-41110).

### Patches

- docker-ce v27.1.1 containes patches to fix the vulnerability.
- Patches have also been merged into the master, 19.0, 20.0, 23.0, 24.0, 25.0, 26.0, and 26.1 release branches.

### Remediation steps

- If you are running an affected version, update to the most recent patched version.
- Mitigation if unable to update immediately:
    - Avoid using AuthZ plugins.
    - Restrict access to the Docker API to trusted parties, following the principle of least privilege.


### References

- https://github.com/moby/moby/commit/fc274cd2ff4cf3b48c91697fb327dd1fb95588fb
- https://github.com/moby/moby/commit/a79fabbfe84117696a19671f4aa88b82d0f64fc1
- https://www.docker.com/blog/docker-security-advisory-docker-engine-authz-plugin/

Docker CLI leaks private registry credentials to registry-1.docker.io
## Impact

A bug was found in the Docker CLI where running `docker login my-private-registry.example.com` with a misconfigured configuration file (typically `~/.docker/config.json`) listing a `credsStore` or `credHelpers` that could not be executed would result in any provided credentials being sent to `registry-1.docker.io` rather than the intended private registry.

## Patches

This bug has been fixed in Docker CLI 20.10.9.  Users should update to this version as soon as possible.

## Workarounds

Ensure that any configured `credsStore` or `credHelpers` entries in the configuration file reference an installed credential helper that is executable and on the `PATH`.

## For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

* [Open an issue](https://github.com/docker/cli/issues/new/choose)
* Email us at security@docker.com if you think you’ve found a security bug

Moby (Docker Engine) Insufficiently restricted permissions on data directory
## Impact

A bug was found in Moby (Docker Engine) where the data directory (typically `/var/lib/docker`) contained subdirectories with insufficiently restricted permissions, allowing otherwise unprivileged Linux users to traverse directory contents and execute programs.  When containers included executable programs with extended permission bits (such as `setuid`), unprivileged Linux users could discover and execute those programs.  When the UID of an unprivileged Linux user on the host collided with the file owner or group inside a container, the unprivileged Linux user on the host could discover, read, and modify those files.

## Patches

This bug has been fixed in Moby (Docker Engine) 20.10.9.  Users should update to this version as soon as possible.  Running containers should be stopped and restarted for the permissions to be fixed.

## Workarounds

Limit access to the host to trusted users.  Limit access to host volumes to trusted containers.

## Credits

The Moby project would like to thank Joan Bruguera for responsibly disclosing this issue in accordance with the [Moby security policy](https://github.com/moby/moby/blob/master/SECURITY.md).

## For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

* [Open an issue](https://github.com/moby/moby/issues/new)
* Email us at security@docker.com if you think you’ve found a security bug

Multiple vulnerabilities have been found in containerd, the worst
    of which could result in privilege escalation.

containerd v1.2.x can be coerced into leaking credentials during image pull
## Impact

If a container image manifest in the OCI Image format or Docker Image V2 Schema 2 format includes a URL for the location of a specific image layer (otherwise known as a “foreign layer”), the default containerd resolver will follow that URL to attempt to download it. In v1.2.x but not 1.3.0 or later, the default containerd resolver will provide its authentication credentials if the server where the URL is located presents an HTTP 401 status code along with registry-specific HTTP headers.

If an attacker publishes a public image with a manifest that directs one of the layers to be fetched from a web server they control and they trick a user or system into pulling the image, they can obtain the credentials used for pulling that image. In some cases, this may be the user's username and password for the registry. In other cases, this may be the credentials attached to the cloud virtual instance which can grant access to other cloud resources in the account.

The default containerd resolver is used by the cri-containerd plugin (which can be used by Kubernetes), the ctr development tool, and other client programs that have explicitly linked against it.

This vulnerability has been rated by the containerd maintainers as medium, with a CVSS score of 6.1 and a vector string of CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N.

## Patches

This vulnerability has been fixed in containerd 1.2.14.  containerd 1.3 and later are not affected.

## Workarounds

If you are using containerd 1.3 or later, you are not affected.  If you are using cri-containerd in the 1.2 series or prior, you should ensure you only pull images from trusted sources.  Other container runtimes built on top of containerd but not using the default resolver (such as Docker) are not affected.

## Credits

The containerd maintainers would like to thank Brad Geesaman, Josh Larsen, Ian Coldwater, Duffie Cooley, and Rory McCune for responsibly disclosing this issue in accordance with the [containerd security policy](https://github.com/containerd/project/blob/master/SECURITY.md).

moby Access to remapped root allows privilege escalation to real root
### Impact

When using `--userns-remap`, if the root user in the remapped namespace has access to the host filesystem they can modify files under `/var/lib/docker/<remapping>` that cause writing files with extended privileges.

### Patches

Versions 20.10.3 and 19.03.15 contain patches that prevent privilege escalation from remapped user.

### Credits

Maintainers would like to thank Alex Chapman for discovering the vulnerability; @awprice, @nathanburrell, @raulgomis, @chris-walz, @erin-jensby, @bassmatt, @mark-adams, @dbaxa for working on it and Zac Ellis for responsibly disclosing it to security@docker.com