Package Instance

Bundler allows attacker to inject arbitrary code via secondary Gem source
Bundler 1.x might allow remote attackers to inject arbitrary Ruby code into an application by leveraging a gem name collision on a secondary source.  NOTE: this might overlap CVE-2013-0334.

Insecure path handling in Bundler
Bundler prior to 2.1.0 uses a predictable path in `/tmp/`, created with insecure permissions as a storage location for gems, if locations under the user's home directory are not available. If Bundler is used in a scenario where the user does not have a writable home directory, an attacker could place malicious code in this directory that would be later loaded and executed.

Local Code Execution through Argument Injection via dash leading git url parameter in Gemfile.
In `bundler` versions before 2.2.33, when working with untrusted and apparently harmless `Gemfile`'s, it is not expected that they lead to execution of external code, unless that's explicit in the ruby code inside the `Gemfile` itself. However, if the `Gemfile` includes `gem` entries that use the `git` option with invalid, but seemingly harmless, values with a leading dash, this can be false.

To handle dependencies that come from a Git repository instead of a registry, Bundler uses various commands, such as `git clone`. These commands are being constructed using user input (e.g. the repository URL). When building the
commands, Bundler versions before 2.2.33 correctly avoid Command Injection vulnerabilities by passing an array of arguments instead of a command string. However, there is the possibility that a user input starts with a dash (`-`) and is therefore treated as an optional argument instead of a positional one. This can lead to Code Execution because some of the commands have options that can be leveraged to run arbitrary executables.

Since this value comes from the `Gemfile` file, it can contain any character, including a leading dash.