Package Instance

Denial-of-Service Extended Event Loop Blocking
qs is affected by a denial of service vulnerability that results from excessive recursion in parsing a deeply nested JSON string.

Denial-of-Service Memory Exhaustion in qs
The qs module before 1.0.0 in Node.js does not call the compact function for array data, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) by using a large index value to create a sparse array.

qs's arrayLimit bypass in its bracket notation allows DoS via memory exhaustion
The `arrayLimit` option in qs did not enforce limits for bracket notation (`a[]=1&a[]=2`), only for indexed notation (`a[0]=1`). This is a consistency bug; `arrayLimit` should apply uniformly across all array notations.

**Note:** The default `parameterLimit` of 1000 effectively mitigates the DoS scenario originally described. With default options, bracket notation cannot produce arrays larger than `parameterLimit` regardless of `arrayLimit`, because each `a[]=value` consumes one parameter slot. The severity has been reduced accordingly.

qs vulnerable to Prototype Pollution
qs before 6.10.3 allows attackers to cause a Node process hang because an `__ proto__` key can be used. In many typical web framework use cases, an unauthenticated remote attacker can place the attack payload in the query string of the URL that is used to visit the application, such as `a[__proto__]=b&a[__proto__]&a[length]=100000000`. The fix was backported to qs 6.9.7, 6.8.3, 6.7.3, 6.6.1, 6.5.3, 6.4.1, 6.3.3, and 6.2.4.

Denial-of-Service Extended Event Loop Blocking in qs
The qs module before 1.0.0 does not have an option or default for specifying object depth and when parsing a string representing a deeply nested object will block the event loop for long periods of time. An attacker could leverage this to cause a temporary denial-of-service condition, for example, in a web application, other requests would not be processed while this blocking is occurring.

qs's arrayLimit bypass in comma parsing allows denial of service
### Summary
The `arrayLimit` option in qs does not enforce limits for comma-separated values when `comma: true` is enabled, allowing attackers to cause denial-of-service via memory exhaustion. This is a bypass of the array limit enforcement, similar to the bracket notation bypass addressed in GHSA-6rw7-vpxm-498p (CVE-2025-15284).

### Details
When the `comma` option is set to `true` (not the default, but configurable in applications), qs allows parsing comma-separated strings as arrays (e.g., `?param=a,b,c` becomes `['a', 'b', 'c']`). However, the limit check for `arrayLimit` (default: 20) and the optional throwOnLimitExceeded occur after the comma-handling logic in `parseArrayValue`, enabling a bypass. This permits creation of arbitrarily large arrays from a single parameter, leading to excessive memory allocation.

**Vulnerable code** (lib/parse.js: lines ~40-50):
```js
if (val && typeof val === 'string' && options.comma && val.indexOf(',') > -1) {
    return val.split(',');
}

if (options.throwOnLimitExceeded && currentArrayLength >= options.arrayLimit) {
    throw new RangeError('Array limit exceeded. Only ' + options.arrayLimit + ' element' + (options.arrayLimit === 1 ? '' : 's') + ' allowed in an array.');
}

return val;
```
The `split(',')` returns the array immediately, skipping the subsequent limit check. Downstream merging via `utils.combine` does not prevent allocation, even if it marks overflows for sparse arrays.This discrepancy allows attackers to send a single parameter with millions of commas (e.g., `?param=,,,,,,,,...`), allocating massive arrays in memory without triggering limits. It bypasses the intent of `arrayLimit`, which is enforced correctly for indexed (`a[0]=`) and bracket (`a[]=`) notations (the latter fixed in v6.14.1 per GHSA-6rw7-vpxm-498p).

### PoC
**Test 1 - Basic bypass:**
```
npm install qs
```

```js
const qs = require('qs');

const payload = 'a=' + ','.repeat(25);  // 26 elements after split (bypasses arrayLimit: 5)
const options = { comma: true, arrayLimit: 5, throwOnLimitExceeded: true };

try {
  const result = qs.parse(payload, options);
  console.log(result.a.length);  // Outputs: 26 (bypass successful)
} catch (e) {
  console.log('Limit enforced:', e.message);  // Not thrown
}
```
**Configuration:**
- `comma: true`
- `arrayLimit: 5`
- `throwOnLimitExceeded: true`

Expected: Throws "Array limit exceeded" error.
Actual: Parses successfully, creating an array of length 26.


### Impact
Denial of Service (DoS) via memory exhaustion.

### Suggested Fix
Move the `arrayLimit` check before the comma split in `parseArrayValue`, and enforce it on the resulting array length. Use `currentArrayLength` (already calculated upstream) for consistency with bracket notation fixes.

**Current code** (lib/parse.js: lines ~40-50):
```js
if (val && typeof val === 'string' && options.comma && val.indexOf(',') > -1) {
    return val.split(',');
}

if (options.throwOnLimitExceeded && currentArrayLength >= options.arrayLimit) {
    throw new RangeError('Array limit exceeded. Only ' + options.arrayLimit + ' element' + (options.arrayLimit === 1 ? '' : 's') + ' allowed in an array.');
}

return val;
```

**Fixed code:**
```js
if (val && typeof val === 'string' && options.comma && val.indexOf(',') > -1) {
    const splitArray = val.split(',');
    if (splitArray.length > options.arrayLimit - currentArrayLength) {  // Check against remaining limit
        if (options.throwOnLimitExceeded) {
            throw new RangeError('Array limit exceeded. Only ' + options.arrayLimit + ' element' + (options.arrayLimit === 1 ? '' : 's') + ' allowed in an array.');
        } else {
            // Optionally convert to object or truncate, per README
            return splitArray.slice(0, options.arrayLimit - currentArrayLength);
        }
    }
    return splitArray;
}

if (options.throwOnLimitExceeded && currentArrayLength >= options.arrayLimit) {
    throw new RangeError('Array limit exceeded. Only ' + options.arrayLimit + ' element' + (options.arrayLimit === 1 ? '' : 's') + ' allowed in an array.');
}

return val;
```
This aligns behavior with indexed and bracket notations, reuses `currentArrayLength`, and respects `throwOnLimitExceeded`. Update README to note the consistent enforcement.

High severity vulnerability that affects qs
Withdrawn, accidental duplicate publish.

The qs module before 1.0.0 in Node.js does not call the compact function for array data, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) by using a large index value to create a sparse array.