Package Instance

Rails Active Storage has a possible DoS vulnerability when in proxy mode via Range requests
### Impact
When serving files through Active Storage's `Blobs::ProxyController`,
the controller loads the entire requested byte range into memory before sending it.
A request with a large or unbounded Range header (e.g. `bytes=0-`) could cause the server
to allocate memory proportional to the file size, possibly resulting in a DoS vulnerability through memory exhaustion.

### Releases
The fixed releases are available at the normal locations.

Circumvention of file size limits in ActiveStorage
There is a vulnerability in ActiveStorage's S3 adapter that allows the Content-Length of a
direct file upload to be modified by an end user.

Versions Affected:  rails < 5.2.4.2, rails < 6.0.3.1
Not affected:       Applications that do not use the direct upload functionality of the ActiveStorage S3 adapter.
Fixed Versions:     rails >= 5.2.4.3, rails >= 6.0.3.1

Impact
------

Utilizing this vulnerability, an attacker can control the Content-Length of an S3 direct upload URL without receiving a
new signature from the server. This could be used to bypass controls in place on the server to limit upload size.

Workarounds
-----------

This is a low-severity security issue. As such, no workaround is necessarily
until such time as the application can be upgraded.

Rails Active Storage has possible content type bypass via metadata in direct uploads
### Impact
Active Storage's `DirectUploadsController` accepts arbitrary metadata from the client and persists it on the blob.
Because internal flags like `identified` and `analyzed` are stored in the same metadata hash,
a malicious direct-upload client could set these flags.

### Releases
The fixed releases are available at the normal locations.

Rails Active Storage has possible Path Traversal in DiskService
### Impact
Active Storage's `DiskService#path_for` does not validate that the
resolved filesystem path remains within the storage root directory.
If a blob key containing path traversal sequences (e.g. `../`) is used,
it could allow reading, writing, or deleting arbitrary files on the server.
Blob keys are expected to be trusted strings,
but some applications could be passing user input as keys and would be affected.

### Releases
The fixed releases are available at the normal locations.

Rails Active Storage has possible glob injection in its DiskService
### Impact
Active Storage's `DiskService#delete_prefixed` passes blob keys directly to `Dir.glob` without escaping glob metacharacters.
If a blob key contains attacker-controlled input or custom-generated keys with glob metacharacters,
it may be possible to delete unintended files from the storage directory.

### Releases
The fixed releases are available at the normal locations.

Active Storage allowed transformation methods that were potentially unsafe
Active Storage attempts to prevent the use of potentially unsafe
image transformation methods and parameters by default.
The default allowed list contains three methods allowing for the
circumvention of the safe defaults which enables potential command
injection vulnerabilities in cases where arbitrary user supplied
input is accepted as valid transformation methods or parameters.

This has been assigned the CVE identifier CVE-2025-24293.

Versions Affected:  >= 5.2.0
Not affected:       < 5.2.0
Fixed Versions:     7.1.5.2, 7.2.2.2, 8.0.2.1

## Impact

This vulnerability impacts applications that use Active Storage
with the image_processing processing gem in addition to
mini_magick as the image processor.

Vulnerable code will look something similar to this:

```
<= image_tag blob.variant(params[:t] => params[:v]) >
```

Where the transformation method or its arguments are untrusted
arbitrary input.

All users running an affected release should either upgrade or
use one of the workarounds immediately.

## Releases

The fixed releases are available at the normal locations.

## Workarounds

Consuming user supplied input for image transformation methods
or their parameters is unsupported behavior and should be
considered dangerous.

Strict validation of user supplied methods and parameters should
be performed as well as having a strong
[ImageMagick security policy](https://imagemagick.org/script/security-policy.php) deployed.

## Credits

Thank you [lio346](https://hackerone.com/lio346) for reporting this!