Package Instance

Clarify Content-Type handling
### Impact
In the OCI Distribution Specification version 1.0.0 and prior, the Content-Type header alone was used to determine the type of document during push and pull operations. Documents that contain both “manifests” and “layers” fields could be interpreted as either a manifest or an index in the absence of an accompanying Content-Type header. If a Content-Type header changed between two pulls of the same digest, a client may interpret the resulting content differently.

### Patches
The OCI Distribution Specification will be updated to require that a `mediaType` value present in a manifest or index match the Content-Type header used during the push and pull operations.

### Workarounds
Clients pulling from a registry may distrust the Content-Type header and reject an ambiguous document that contains both “manifests” and “layers” fields or “manifests” and “config” fields.

### References
https://github.com/opencontainers/image-spec/security/advisories/GHSA-77vh-xpmg-72qh

### For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
* Open an issue in https://github.com/opencontainers/distribution-spec/
* Email us at security@opencontainers.org

Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor and Origin Validation Error in podman
A flaw was found in podman. The `podman machine` function (used to create and manage Podman virtual machine containing a Podman process) spawns a `gvproxy` process on the host system. The `gvproxy` API is accessible on port 7777 on all IP addresses on the host. If that port is open on the host's firewall, an attacker can potentially use the `gvproxy` API to forward ports on the host to ports in the VM, making private services on the VM accessible to the network. This issue could be also used to interrupt the host's services by forwarding all ports to the VM.