Package Instance

Impact

Cloudflare quiche was discovered to be vulnerable to incorrect congestion window growth, which could cause it to send data at a rate faster than the path might actually support.

An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit the vulnerability by first completing a handshake and initiating a congestion-controlled data transfer towards itself. Then, it could manipulate the victim's congestion control state by sending ACK frames covering a large range of packet numbers (including packet numbers that had never been sent); see RFC 9000 Section 19.3. The victim could grow the congestion window beyond typical expectations and allow more bytes in flight than the path might really support. In extreme cases, the window might grow beyond the limit of the internal variable's type, leading to an overflow panic.



Patches


quiche 0.24.4 is the earliest version containing the fix for this issue.

quiche connection ID retirement can trigger an infinite loop
## Impact

Cloudflare quiche was discovered to be vulnerable to an infinite loop when sending packets containing RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frames.

QUIC connections possess a set of connection identifiers (IDs); see [Section 5.1 of RFC 9000](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000#section-5.1). Once the QUIC handshake completes, a local endpoint is responsible for issuing and retiring Connection IDs that are used by the remote peer to populate the Destination Connection ID field in packets sent from remote to local. Each Connection ID has a sequence number to ensure synchronization between peers

An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability by first completing a handshake and then sending a specially-crafted set of frames that trigger a connection ID retirement in the victim. When the victim attempts to send a packet containing RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frames, [Section 19.16 of RFC 9000](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000#section-19.16) requires that the sequence number of the retired connection ID must not be the same as the sequence number of the connection ID used by the packet. In other words, a packet cannot contain a frame that retires itself.  In scenarios such as path migration, it is possible for there to be multiple active paths with different active connection IDs that could be used to retire each other. The exploit triggered an unintentional behaviour of a quiche design feature that supports retirement across paths while maintaining full connection ID  synchronization, leading to an infinite loop.

## Patches

quiche 0.24.5 is the earliest version containing the fix for the issue

Impact

Cloudflare quiche was discovered to be vulnerable to incorrect congestion window growth, which could cause it to send data at a rate faster than the path might actually support.

An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit the vulnerability by first completing a handshake and initiating a congestion-controlled data transfer towards itself. Then, it could manipulate the victim's congestion control state by sending ACK frames exercising an opportunistic ACK attack; see RFC 9000 Section 21.4. The victim could grow the congestion window beyond typical expectations and allow more bytes in flight than the path might really support.



Patches


quiche 0.24.4 is the earliest version containing the fix for this issue.